On February 10, 1998, Judge Susan Webber Wright, presiding over the Paula Jones civil suit, denied President Clinton's request to move the trial date up. In a motion filed February 2, the President's lawyers argued that the trial should begin earlier than the scheduled May 27 date because pretrial discovery "has become a vehicle for parties allied in an attempt to destroy the President."

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION

PAULA CORBIN JONES,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
and DANNY FERGUSON,

Defendants.

No. LR-C-94-290

ORDER

On August 25, 1997, this Court issues a Scheduling Order establishing May 27, 1998, as the beginning day of jury selection for the case of Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D.Ark.). The Court also established January 30, 1998, as the cutoff date for the completion of discovery and March 13, 1998, as the deadline for the filing of motions for summary judgement. Now before the Court is President Clinton's Motion for Expedited Trial and Motions Schedule. The plaintiff has responded in opposition to this motion and the President has filed a reply to plaintiff's response. Having considered the matter, the Court finds that the President's motion should be and hereby is denied.

In moving for an expedited trial and motions schedule, the President states that "[t]he events of the last few days have shown that the higher courts' confidence that this case could proceed without undue distraction to the nation's business was unfounded." He states:

[D]espite this Court's herculean efforts to maintain control of the litigation, all the dire consequences that we predicted in our briefs and oral argument have come to pass. The virtually unregulated processes of civil discovery have become a vehicle for parties allied in an attempt to destroy the President. The President is being tarred in the media; gossip, innuendo and hearsay are being passed off as fact. Allegations by unnamed sources are claimed to be credible. Normal journalistic restraint has been abandoned by the broadcast media in their competition to be first on the air with titillating allegations. In short, raw and salacious material is being placed in the public forum without providing the public the means to evaluate the credibility of the information.

While this Court is certainly cognizant of the specific interests of the Office of the President in having this matter speedily resolved (interests which this Court has previously considered in the course of this lawsuit and will continue to consider), the Court must also consider the interests of the plaintiff. In this regard, the Court, notwithstanding the President's admittedly valid concerns about the current state of journalism, determines that the previously set trial date should at this time remain in place.

Plaintiff's counsel represent to this Court that tangible harm will befall their client if the trial date is accelerated. They state that they will soon be filing a motion to compel additional discovery from prior witnesses who, in their view, asserted baseless and frivolous objections and from witnesses who, again in their view, dodged service of process until after the January 30, 1998, cutoff date for discovery. Plaintiff's counsel state that they will need additional time in which to complete this discovery and that accelerating the trial schedule will hamper their case.¹ Plaintiff has also filed under seal a motion for reconsideration of this Court's ruling excluding the Monica Lewinsky evidence from this case or, in the alternative, for interlocutory.² Plaintiff states, and this Court agrees, that the logical stance in this situation is to leave the trial setting as it is at least until the Eighth Circuit rules on these matters. Considering also plaintiff's counsels' commitments to other parties and other courts (which are outlined in the affidavit submitted in support of plaintiff's response to the President's motion), granting the President's request to expedite the trial date could, under these circumstances, constitute an abuse of discretion.³

The Court will, however, expect plaintiff's counsel to be available, either in person or for telephone conferences, well before the actual trial date to consider certain pretrial matters, such as the preparation of jury questionnaires and the logistics involved in this high profile trial. The Court also intends to explore with counsel the possibility of beginning voir dire of the jury panel prior to May 27, 1998, so that the actual trial can proceed as near the May 27 trial date as possible.

Although the Court will not expedite the actual trial of this matter (as opposed to certain pretrial matters), the Court will permit the President to file his motion for summary judgement at any time prior to the March 13 deadline that he so chooses.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of February 1998.

/s/ United States District Judge

ENDNOTES
¹ Although the Court is not now ruling on any such motion, the mere filing of such a motion, the responses thereto, and this Court's consideration of the motion will take some time. Similarly, counsel for the President state that they intend to file an extensive motion for summary judgement. The Court would prefer a sufficient amount of time in which to give this motion careful and reasoned consideration.

² This motion refers to discovery matters that are under seal in accordance with the Court's Confidentiality Order on Consent of all Parties and, for that reason, shall remain under seal.

³ Should scheduling problems on the part of the President later arise, this Court will attempt to accomodate the President's needs to the greatest extent possible and will give "the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities." Clinton v. Jones, 117 S.Ct. 1651-52 (1997).