|
Response from Hyde to Democrats on impeachment standards
The following is the response from House Judiciary Chairman Henry Hyde to Judiciary Democratic leadership regarding their request to vote on what constitutes impeachable offenses before any impeachment hearings occur.
[ Read the letter to Hyde. ]
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
The Honorable Robert C. Scott
Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. House of Representatives
2142 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Gentlemen:
I am in receipt of your letter of November 11th proposing that the Committee take the unprecedented step of ruling on the Referral from the Office of Independent Counsel under some notion of demurrer or summary judgment. It appears that you have already made up your mind and that you believe a rush to judgment is appropriate without any airing of the facts or thoughtful consideration of the evidence. However, that directly contradicts the approach that the Committee has taken in past impeachment inquiries. As you recall, in the impeachment of President Nixon, the staff report prepared for the use of the Committee concluded:
Delicate issues of constitutional law are involved. Those issues cannot be defined in detail in advance of full investigation of the facts. The Supreme Court of the United States does not reach out, in the abstract, to rule on the constitutionality of statutes or of conduct. Cases must be brought and adjudicated on particular facts in terms of the Constitution. Similarly, the House does not engage in abstract, advisory or hypothetical debates about the precise nature of conduct that calls for the exercise of its constitutional powers; rather, must await full development of the facts and understanding of the events to which those facts relate.
John, let me remind you of how you interpreted our duty under the Constitution when you led the inquiry of impeachment of Judge Alcee Hastings in 1988:
The goal of the subcommittee's inquiry was to provide to the House all of the facts necessary to make an informed and fair decision about whether Judge Hastings should or should not be impeached.
In your letter, you seem inclined to view this impeachment inquiry in any context except a factual one. You cite your views of what the polls mean and the views of some scholars. However, in the impeachment of Judge Hastings, you so aptly stated:
An impeachment decision must be based upon the facts. It would be inappropriate, in my opinion, for any Member of Congress to make factual determinations based upon polls or letter received or calls coming into one's office or from any other secondary matter.
Next, you suggest that we adopt a demurrer or summary judgment standard procedure-- practices that are reserved for courtroom trials. Again, I believe that we should defer to the way you conducted the inquiry of impeachment of Judge Hastings:
I repeat, this is not a trial; it is an investigation. The procedures that are appropriate for the determination of guilt or innocence in an adversary proceeding are not appropriate to our hearing. We believe our procedures will provide us with all the pertinent evidence and provide the subcommittee with a basis for determining the facts and making a recommendation.
I agree with the fair-minded views you stated then and intend to follow them now.
As clearly shown at the hearing on Monday, November 9th, scholarly opinion regarding impeachment is fiercely divided on whether allegations that the President has committed perjury and obstructed justice are impeachable offenses.
Professor Parker, Professor Presser, Professor Turley, and Professor McGinnis, all agreed that the allegations of lying under oath, obstruction of justice and subornation of perjury in a sexual harassment civil rights lawsuit rose to the level of an impeachable offense. Professor Parker suggested, "One way to cover up an embarrassment is to bribe somebody.... If for example, a President bribed a judge in a sexual harassment civil lawsuit against him or her, that would be impeachable - plainly, obviously. The first article of impeachment against President Nixon involved giving out hush money to individuals involved in the break-in. So, again, I think the committee has to ask itself if bribing a judge to cover up an embarrassment is plainly impeachable, why not obstruction of justice, subornation of witnesses and lying under oath in Federal judicial proceedings."
Professor McGinnis when asked whether perjury as alleged was an impeachable offense, he said, "Well, I absolutely think that is an impeachable offense. I think it is really about using, obstructing the legitimate exercise of governmental power-- in this case, the coordinate judicial branch -- for one's own private gain." He points out that the "conduct I think speaks of a state of mind to actually obstruct the rights of another citizen."
Professor Turley said, "I do not believe that there is a basis to exclude such conduct from potential articles of impeachment on any definitional, historical or policy basis.... Allegations of criminal acts in office by a president are perhaps the greatest threat to the perceived legitimacy of a government. Where there is compelling evidence of criminal acts in the Chief Executive, an entire system of laws is undermined and demands some form of corrective action."
Professor Presser opined that, "These allegations concern conduct by the President in which he allegedly ignored his Constitutional obligations to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and instead used his august position to frustrate enforcement of the law. If these allegations are true, then the President has acted in a manner against the interest of the state and he has sought to subvert the essence of our Constitutional government - that ours is a government of laws not of men. If these allegations are true, then the President has engaged in conduct that can only be described as corrupt, and corrupt in a manner that the impeachment process was expressly designed to correct."
It is not only the precedent of the Committee that undermines your proposal. Indeed, when some advanced a similar argument before we began the inquiry, both The New York Times and The Washington Post editorialized that the Committee need not decide in advance what constitutes an impeachable offense. According to The New York Times editorial of October 4, 1998:
The natural contours of an impeachment inquiry accommodate two converging avenues of work, one dealing with the evidence, the other with the constitutional question of what constitutes an impeachable offense. The Judiciary Committee has wisely chosen to consider these in tandem, with the expectation that each inquiry will inform the other.
The Washington Post editorial of October 2, 1998 observed the following:
Some Democrats also want the panel to decide in advance what constitutes an impeachable offense, and only then begin an inquiry into the President's behavior if the two seem to match up. Judiciary Chairman Hyde is correct to resist that as well. It's true that in eventually deciding whether the President' conduct constituted an impeachable offense, the committee will have to decide, if only implicitly, how serious such an offense must be. But that kind of judgment is all but impossible to make in the abstract, outside the context of facts that are still emerging and that almost daily paint President Clinton's behavior in slightly different hues.
I know that you are concerned about proceeding fairly and would like the Committee to move as expeditiously as possible. I have pledged to try to finish this inquiry by the end of the year. However, if we continue to revisit this issue over and over again, the Committee may be delayed in completing its important work. Thank you again for your letter.
Sincerely,
HENRY J. HYDE
Chairman
| 
Full Coverage