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Clinton impeachment trial transcripts January 23, 1999
The following transcript was provided to Court TV by Federal Document Clearing House:
SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON CONTINUES
JANUARY 23, 1999
SPEAKERS: WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE, U.S. SUPREME COURT
LLOYD OGILVIE, SENATE CHAPLAIN
U.S. SENATOR TRENT LOTT, MAJORITY LEADER
U.S. SENATOR THOMAS DASCHLE (D-SD)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HENRY HYDE (R-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER (R-WI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BILL MCCOLLUM (R-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE GEORGE GEKAS (R-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES CANADY (R-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEPHEN BUYER (R-IN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ED BRYENT (R-TN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEVE CHABOT (R-OH)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BOB BARR (R-GA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ASA HUTCHINSON (R-AR)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHRIS CANNON (R-UT)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES ROGAN (R-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC)
DAVID KENDALL, ATTORNEY FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON
CHARLES F.C. RUFF, OFFICE OF THE WHITE
HOUSE COUNCIL
GREGORY B. CRAIG, OFFICE OF THE WHITE
HOUSE COUNCIL
CHERYL D. MILLS, OFFICE OF THE WHITE
HOUSE COUNCIL
...has left office.
RUFF: So there can be no argument that "oh, this will just fall
into the cracks or this will disappear in to the ether somewhere.'
The president is -- will be at risk. We trust that reasonable
judgments will be made and a determination will be reached that it is
not appropriate to pursue him. But that too will be pursued under the
rule of law to which he is subject.
REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Campbell, Hagel and
Specter to the House managers.
White House counsel has several times asserted that the grand
jury perjury charge is just a "he says, she says" case and that we
cannot consider corroborating witnesses you cite. What is it about
the president's grand jury testimony that convinces you he should be
removed from office?
MCCOLLUM: Mr. Chief Justice, that question goes to the heart of
what we're here about, today. We've had a great deal of discussion
about a lot of peripheral questions and issues, but the fact of the
matter is, the simplest portion of this deals with grand jury perjury.
And I assume the question principally is directed to the first of
the four points under the grand jury perjury article because, for
example, the second point, with respect to the president having the
goal or the intent of being truthful, which he said he did in the
grand jury in the Jones deposition, there isn't a he says/she says
question. That's just very simple. The president lied multiple times
in that civil deposition, and if he said in the grand jury to the
grand jurors, "my goal was to be truthful" is pretty self-evident that
that was a lie, and he perjured himself.
MCCOLLUM: So, that's not a he says/she says.
But the question that the counsel over here have tried to bring
up several times is saying the part with respect particularly to
Monica Lewinsky saying that the president certain parts of her of her
body, which would have been covered by the Jones' definition of sexual
relations, and the president who said explicitly in his grand jury
testimony "I didn't touch those parts, and yes I agree that would have
been and is part of the definition of sexual relations in the Jones'
case." That is where you believe her or him.
And that say that's a he says/she says and it's not.
But even if it were, you could listen to it and accept it. I
think there is some confusion about the law.
The law of perjury does not require two witnesses nor does it
require the corroborating testimony of anybody else.
It does not. That's why in 1970, it was changed.
MCCOLLUM: And most prosecutions today for perjury, including
people who are in federal prison today for perjury in civil cases, for
lying about matters related to sex, and there are several -- a couple
of whom testified before us in the judiciary committee during our
process and hearings -- are based upon that 1970 law that does not
require any corroboration.
In this case you have Monica Lewinsky who is a very credible
witness by other reasons. That you don't even have to get to those
corroborating witnesses on these points. Number one, she was under
immunity. Under the threat of prosecution when she testified that
way. Number two, she has consistent statements throughout, many times
over. She didn't say she'd had sexual intercourse with him. She
could have made that up, but she didn't. Everything she says is
believable about that portion of it.
And third, and not last in all of this, is that she did make very
contemporaneous statements to at least six other people who were her
friends and counselors describing in detail exactly the same thing she
testified to under oath before the grand jury in this respect.
MCCOLLUM: Now, they say, the counselors here, you can't consider
that under the federal rules of evidence because that's presumably
hearsay. Well, there are at least three exceptions to that hearsay
rule which could be brought out in a courtroom. They've gone about
trying to carefully say, "We never said that Monica Lewinsky lied."
I remember -- I think it was Mr. Kendall, or maybe it was Mr.
Craig up here a little earlier -- saying, "When asked that question,
did she lie in this instance or in any other." And they said, "Well,
it's just different version of the truth." Well, if she's saying it
as explicitly as she is about this nine times, or four times and
whatever. And the president's saying, "I never did that," I don't see
how they can fudge around challenging her truthfulness and
credibility. That's what they've been doing.
And in any courtroom I've ever been in, once that's occurred you
could certainly bring in her prior consistent statements, and you
don't even have to go with the rules of evidence on this. You're not
bound by those rules of evidence. And common sense says she had no
motive to be lying to her friends in those numerous telephone
conversations, or her meetings with her counselors when she described
in detail these things the president says he didn't do, because all of
those statements occurred -- all of those discussions occurred --
before she ever was knowingly on a witness list, or likely to have to
testify in any other way.
MCCOLLUM: She's very credible. Those prior consistent
statements are very believable and I submit to you they would be
admissible in a court, in the kind of contest that would be involved
in the situation like this. And it goes to the very heart of what
we're here about: grand jury perjury, the simplest, clearest one.
The president lied, Monica Lewinsky told the truth about it and
it's profound -- then it is important, and it's critical to this case.
And that's the principle. One of the perjuries that we've been
directing our attention to because it is so clear.
Thank you.
REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Dorgan to counsel for
the president.
How can the House claim that its function is accusatory only,
when the articles it voted for -- voted call for the president's
removal?
RUFF: This of course, takes us back to the very heart of the
argument that raged fro a small time here yesterday and in previous
days. The notion that the House of Representatives viewed itself
during the month of December, as merely -- I won't even say that it
rose in their mind to the level of accusatory body that we would think
of when we think of the grand jury, but to a body who's job it was, as
one of the managers said at one point, simply to find probable cause
to believe that the president had committed these acts.
RUFF: Perhaps there has been some extraordinary transposition
from the mood and the tenor of the comments made during those days
when the Judiciary Committee was doing its work to the days when these
managers have appeared in the well of the Senate, something that has
transformed the mere probable cause screening finding that they
allegedly viewed as the role of the House and of the Judiciary
Committee into the certainty that you hear today.
It is a good question as to how then given the role they saw for
themselves, they could go so far not only to seek the removal of the
president, but indeed in all their prosecutorial vigor, something that
has never been sought before, a bar against holding any future office
at the level of certainty that must have achieved given the standard
that they held themselves to.
RUFF: What happened between December 19th and today that allows
these managers to come before you not saying, "well, we were certain
then and we're more certain now." Or, "we only found probably cause
back in 1998 but in 1999 we are sufficiently certain that we ought to
shut down the public will as expressed in the elections of 1996."
I haven't yet found an answer to that question.
REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Bond, Brownback,
Campbell, Hagel, Luger, Hutchison of Texas, Roth and Stevens. It's
directed to the House managers. "After everything you've heard over
the last several weeks from the president's counsel, do you still
believe that the facts support the charges of obstruction of justice
alleged in the articles of impeachment, specifically, what allegations
of improper conduct has the president's counsel failed to undermine?"
The question's also from Senators Specter and McConnell.
HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
HUTCHINSON: First of all, why is obstruction of justice
important to begin with? I think back on a opportunity I had at a
hearing once to question a member of the Colombian drug cartel and I
asked him, "What is the greatest weapon that law enforcement has that
you fear?"
And his answer was, very quickly, "Extradition." And I said,
"Well, explain, what do you mean by -- why is extradition feared?"
And he said, "Because in Colombia you can fix the system, but in
America, you can't."
And that's why I think the obstruction of justice charge is so
important to the administration of justice. Money, position, power,
does not corrupt, should not corrupt the administration of justice.
And the question is, is "Where has the president attacked, the
counselors attacked credibly, the allegations of obstruction?"
The first one is that the president personally encouraged a
witness, Monica Lewinsky, to lie. This was on December 17th at 2:00
am in the morning when the president calls Monica to tell her that she
is a witness on the list, 2 a.m. in the morning.
HUTCHINSON: And at that time, of course she's nervous, she's a
witness. And asks about well, what am I going to say? And the
president offers, according to Monica Lewinsky, you can always say you
came to see Betty or you came to deliver papers. Now, the president's
counselor attacked this by saying well, remember what Monica said, I
was never told to lie. Well, I would refer you to a 10th Circuit case
in which United States versus Tranicos (ph), 10th Circuit 1990. And
the law is that the request to lie need not be a direct statement. As
the court held quote, "The statute prohibits elliptical suggestions as
much as it does direct commands," end quote.
HUTCHINSON: Now that's common sense. That is logic. That's
what a jury applies, common sense. And here of course, in this case,
Monica Lewinsky testified that she was told in essence to lie. Now
she wasn't -- the president didn't say "Monica, I need you go in and
lie for me." He told her the cover story in a legal context that she
could use, that would cover for him, that in essence would be a lie.
We all know that is what it is.
And of course says, well -- he denies that. And of course he
said "I never told her to use cover stories in a legal context" --
direct in conflict but clearly the president's counselors have not
attacked that obstruction of justice.
The second one is the jobs and the false affidavit. And they say
there is absolutely no connection in these two, none whatsoever.
HUTCHINSON: And, of course, I pointed out the testimony of
Vernon Jordan, who testified, it doesn't take an Einstein to know that
whenever he found out she was a witness, she was under subpoena, that
the subpoena changed the circumstances. That's the testimony of
Vernon Jordan. So, they say there's no connection, Vernon Jordan, the
president's friend, says the circumstances change whenever you're
talking about getting a job with somebody who is also under subpoena
in a case that is very important to the president of the United
States.
And, of course, the president -- Vernon Jordan also indicated the
president's personal involvement when he testified before the grand
jury in June. He said, "He was interested in this matter. He,"
referring to the president, "was the source of it coming to my
attention in the first place."
He further testified: "The president asked me to get Monica
Lewinsky a job."
The president was personally involved in the obtaining of a job.
He was personally concerned about the false affidavit.
HUTCHINSON: And Vernon Jordan acknowledges that when those are
combined, the circumstances are different.
The third area of obstruction is the tampering with the witness,
Betty Currie. On January 18th and January 20th, where the questions
were posed after the deposition. The president's counselor challenged
this and says, "Well, she wasn't a witness. We hadn't -- even the
Jones lawyers never had any clue that she was going to be a witness in
this case. The president couldn't know that she was going to be a
witness."
Well, they hoped that we would never find the subpoena. Because
he, Mr. Ruff made that statement early on, which he very
professionally expressed regret that he made that misrepresentation.
But we found the subpoena, we found the subpoena that was actually
issued a few days after the deposition for Betty Currie, she was a
witness, she was not just a prospective witness. She was there, she
was -- had to be ready to go.
And the president knew this, the Jones lawyer knew it. So that
stands. The pillar of obstruction stands.
The false statements to the grand jury. That has been covered.
There's been never any holes that have been poked into that. But it
was to continue the cover-up of the false statements that were made in
a civil rights case.
HUTCHINSON: Another area of obstruction was the December 28th
when the gifts were retrieved. And this has been challenged. And I
will admit, as I always have, that there is a dispute in the
testimony. But I believe the case is made through the circumstances,
the motivation, the testimony of Monica Lewinsky as to what Betty
Currie said when she called, and the corroborating evidence.
I don't believe they have poked a hole in that. I believe it
stands. We would like to hear the witnesses to make you more
comfortable in resolving that conflict and to determine the
credibility of those witnesses. But the gifts that were subpoenaed
were evidence in a trial. They were needed in a civil rights case.
The president knew they were under subpoena. He had the most to gain.
And they were retrieved, and I believe the testimony indicates that it
was based upon the actions of Betty Currie that would have been
directed by the president.
HUTCHINSON: There are other areas of obstruction including the
president allowing his attorney Robert Bennett to make false
representation to the federal district judge in the deposition.
The president's defense is that there's no proof whatsoever that
he was paying any attention.
Now we offered the videotape that shows that he is I believe
looking at the attorney. But we offer a witness in that regard to
show that he was attentive. That's simply something that can be
substantiated and we believe that you can evaluate that, that he was
paying attention.
But that is an element of obstruction, because he was allowing
his attorney to make a false representation to the court that was
totally untrue, that would aid in the cover-up and that was presented.
REHNQUIST: Mr. Hutchinson, I think you have answered the
question.
HUTCHINSON: I thank the Chief Justice.
REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Levin to counsel for
the White House.
In their brief to the Senate, the House managers said that there
was quote "no urgency," close quote, to help Ms. Lewinsky until
December 11th, 1997 and that on that date quote "sudden interest was
inspired," close quote by a court order which the House Managers had
represented was issued on the morning of December 11th before the
Vernon Jordan - Monica Lewinsky meeting that afternoon.
REHNQUIST: It took doing yesterday to get the House Managers to
finally acknowledge that the court order was not issued in the
morning, but in the afternoon of December 11th. Why were the House
Managers so reluctant to make that acknowledgment?
KENDALL: Mr. Chief Justice. Well, I think they were reluctant
to make the acknowledgement because they were in cement (ph) due their
trial brief, which at page 20, as the question indicates, said as to
this particular time period, after the December 6th meeting.
KENDALL: There was obviously still no urgency to help Miss
Lewinsky. They thought that they had a chronology that was consistent
with the inference of causation. But when you look at the true time
of the events, that dissolves.
Now, Mr. Manager Hutchinson used a word, a phrase I'd like to
call your attention to. Repeatedly as he was summarizing the
evidence, he used the phrase in essence. Now that's another phrase
that's kind of a weasel word. When you hear that, it means that the
evidence isn't really quite there but if you look at the big picture
maybe you can see what's there in essence. It doesn't work here. It
doesn't work because of the evidence. Just a week ago Mr. Manager
Hutchinson, on this obstruction of justice question was asked very
clearly. On the case that you have against the president on
obstruction of justice, not the perjury, would you be confident of a
conviction in a criminal court?
KENDALL: And he said, "No, I would not."
Now, he -- I'm not going to walk through each and every elements
that he identified -- I think we've repeatedly dealt with them, and
I'm not going to step on your patience to do that again each time.
I would like to make two points, and that was: In terms of
encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to lie, were these cover stories an attempt
to encourage her to lie. As I tried to indicate there is testimony in
the record that, at a certain time in the relation these cover stories
were discussed.
There is not any evidence, however, for Ms. Lewinsky, the
president or anyone else, that these were discussed in connection with
the testimony, in connection with the affidavit. You remember Ms.
Lewinsky, when asked if she could exclude that possibility said, "I
pretty much can."
KENDALL: Now the testimony that Mr. Hutchinson mentioned with
Mr. Jordan on December 19th, you'll remember he quoted Mr. Jordan. He
said, "The discovery of the subpoena at that point changed the
circumstances." Well it did, but just in the opposite way that Mr. --
Manager Hutchinson would have you infer.
Because when Mr. Jordan discovered on December 19th, that Ms.
Lewinsky, had a subpoena, was going to testify in the Jones case as a
witness, unless she could get it quashed, he went to her and went to
the president to seek assurance that the job assistance he was
engaging in could not, at any time, be said to be improper because of
the presence of an improper relationship. Both parties assured him
that there was no such relationship.
This observation by Mr. Jordan, cuts just the opposite way.
Thank you.
LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice.
REHNQUIST: The chair recognizes the Majority Leader.
LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice, I do have another question I will send
to the desk momentarily, but I would like for the Senators to know
that we've had some 104 or five questions now that have been asked. I
believe that's correct. One hundred and four.
Senator Daschle and I conferred. We want to thank the Senators
for their participation and their questions. We do want to make it
clear we're not seeking questions.
(LAUGHTER)
So, don't feel like you need to help us by sending any down.
(LAUGHTER)
But under your rights as senators, under the Senate Resolution
16, and the rules we're proceeding under, every and each Senator is
entitled to submit a question if he or she feels that it's important.
But I hope it would be one that you think really is essential,
that has not been touched on some where already in the answers to the
questions.
And also would hope and the record may be made clear that we in a
bipartisan way, have tried very hard to make sure that this proceeding
here, and the questions here, and all that we've done has been fair,
both to the president's counsel and the House managers.
LOTT: And we will continue to work in that vein. With that
observation, and if we do need to continue going forward with
questions we would have to give some consideration to taking a break
and going longer. Although I'd indicated I'd hoped we could quit at
four. Maybe after this question, and if necessary, one or two more,
we could end for the day and then get together and see if we need more
time on Monday for additional questions. I send the next question to
the desk.
REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Cochran, Roth,
Campbell, and Frist to the House managers. The president's counsel
has suggested that the Senate considered a good behavior standard in
impeachment cases involving federal judges. The removal of judges
seems to have been based by the Senate on the impeachment power whose
standard for removal is the same for both federal judges and executive
branch officials.
REHNQUIST: Is the counsel for the president asking us to use a
different test for removal of this president than we did in the case
of Judge Walter Nixon? Please explain."
CANADY: Mr. Chief Justice, members of the Senate, I appreciate
the opportunity to ask this question, it is an important question.
And it is true that counsel for the president are asking that you use
a different standard in this case, than the standard you have already
established, not in just one case, but, in fact, in a series of cases
involving federal judges that were before the Senate in the 1980s.
There was a succession of three cases in the Senate, all dealing
with the question of whether a federal judge who had lied under oath
should be removed from office because the federal judge had lied under
oath.
CANADY: In all three cases, the Senate decided that the federal
judge should be convicted and removed. Now the president's counsel
have the burden of establishing that those recent, and very clear
precedents of the Senate, should not apply to this case where the
president is charged with lying under oath.
And they attempt to do that in a number of ways. What I would
suggest, is you evaluate their attempt to distinguish away those
precedents. That you look first and last to the Constitution. The
Constitution should be your guide. And I would suggest to you that
there is nothing in the Constitution which establishes a different
standard for the president, for any reason.
There's not something in the Constitution that says he is subject
to a different standard because he is elected. That argument has been
advanced.
CANADY: If you look in the Constitution, you simply won't find
that.
And to argue for a different standard because the president is
elected, I would submit to you is to impose something on the
Constitution that is entirely alien to the document itself.
The Constitution contains a single standard for the application
of the impeachment and removal power. And I've read it before, but I
read it again.
Article II, Section 4 provides "the president, vice president and
all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office
on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors."
Now reference was made in the question and reference has been
made by the president's counsel to the good behavior clause. That's
found in Article III, Section I. That clause does not alter the
standard I have just read to you however.
Rather than creating a altered standard for removal of federal
judges, the good behavior clause merely establishes that the term of
office for judicial officers is a lie.
CANADY: Now, I wouldn't ask you to take my word for this, let me
refer, again, to the 1974 report by the staff of the Nixon impeachment
inquiry.
There they said, they asked the question: "Does article three,
section one of the Constitution, which states that judges shall hold
their offices during good behavior, limit the relevance of the
impeachments of judges with respect to presidential impeachment
standard, as has been argued by some."
That is, essentially, the question before the Senate now.
Their answer was: "It does not. It does not. The only
impeachment provision," they go on to say, "discussed in the
Constitutional Convention, and indeed, in the Constitution, is article
two, section four, which, by its express terms, applies to all civil
officers, including judges."
Now, I would go on to note that it's very interesting, that at
the Constitutional Convention, on August the 27th, 1787, an attempt
was made to amend the good behavior clause by adding a provision for
the removal of judges by the executive on the application by the
Senate and House of Representative.
Now, this proposal, which was offered by John Dickinson, was
based on the English parliamentary practice of removal of judges by
address.
CANADY: A practice also utilized by several American states.
And under this process judges could be removed for misconduct falling
short of the level of seriousness that would justify impeachment. Now
the proposal offered by Dickinson was overwhelmingly rejected. It was
overwhelmingly rejected by the convention.
Thus, the sole provision for removal and the sole standard for
removal is that, which I have referred to in Article II Section Four.
Now mention has been made and I want to respond to this, because
mention has been made of efforts in Congress to establish a separate
procedure for the removal of federal judges. A procedure separate and
apart from the impeachment and removal process.
A specific mention has also been made of testimony given in 1970
by the Chief Justice, who was then an assistant attorney general,
regarding a proposal to establish a separate removal procedure. The
testimony given by the Chief Justice at that time, related to the
constitutionality of the provisions of the bill relating to the
removal of judges by methods "other than," methods "other than"
impeachment.
Now my own view, quite candidly, is that such a separate removal
procedure raises serious constitutional questions, serious questions
about maintaining the independence of the judiciary. But putting that
question aside, and regardless of the standards that might be applied
in such a separate removal procedure.
CANADY: It is clear that the single constitutional standard for
impeachment and removal would remain the same. That is what is in the
constitution. That can't be changed by any statute or anything that
is set up apart from the constitutional procedures.
Now, one thing I make as I move toward concluding my response, it
should be recognized that some specific acts might be a breach of duty
if done by a judge, but not a breach of duty if done by the president
of the United States. And that's an important distinction that we all
should bear in mind.
For example, it would be serious misconduct for a judge to engage
in repeated ex parte meetings with parties who have an interest in a
matter pending before that judge. But it is typical for the president
to engage in such ex parte meetings with persons who have an interest
in matters on which he will decide. For a judge, such conduct
constitutes a breach of duty.
CANADY: For the president, it does not constitute a breach of
duty.
REHNQUIST: Mr. Canady, I think you've answered the question.
CANADY: Thank you.
REHNQUIST: This question from Senator Harkin is to counsel for
the president.
There are three contradictions in the record. One, who touched
who on what parts of the body. Two, when the relationship began.
Three, who called whom to get the gifts, Ms. Curry, or Ms. Lewinsky.
How would these witnesses clear up the contradictions?
CRAIG: Mr. Chief Justice, Senator Harkin, it's difficult for me
to explain how after you've gotten 19 interviews, two grand jury
appearances, one deposition, to cover, to cover that precise
territory, that any further kind of inquiry along those lines would be
of any help.
CRAIG: The House managers have argued that they need to call
witnesses for the purposes of resolving inconsistencies, conflicts and
discrepancies in testimony. And they have, in fact, identified Monica
Lewinsky, in particular, as having given testimony in conflict with
the testimony of the president, with Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan.
But it would be well to remember that the lawyers for the office
of independent counsel, certainly not seeking elicit testimony that's
favorable to the president, that those lawyers have already done a
great deal of this precise kind of inquiry at some great length.
Those lawyers, no friends of the president, have already explored
inconsistencies, they've already tested memories, they've already
laboriously and at great length subjected these witnesses to searching
scrutiny. And their work is available for all to see in the record of
this case before the Senate today.
CRAIG: Let me be very specific and very concrete.
Monica Lewinsky was interviewed by the lawyers for the office of
independent counsel, or testified before the grand jury on 20
different occasions, after Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan had given
their testimony before the grand jury. And contrary to the assertions
of the House Managers, Monica Lewinsky was interviewed six times and
testified twice -- one time before the grand jury and once at a sworn
deposition -- after the president had given his testimony before the
grand jury on August 17th.
On August 19th, she was interviewed by the FBI and by lawyers for
the special counsel.
She testified before the grand jury -- Ms. Lewinsky testified
before the grand jury on August 20th. She was interviewed by lawyers
and FBI agents for the independent counsel on August 24th. She was
interviewed on August 26th. She appeared for a deposition held in the
conference room of the office of the independent counsel on August
26th. She was interviewed pursuant to her immunity agreement with
independent counsel and FBI agents on September 5th. She was also
interviewed -- excuse me that was September 3rd.
She appeared and listened to tapes with the FBI present on many
occasions on many period during the period September 3rd through
September 6th.
She appeared and was interviewed by special counsel, Independent
Counsel on September 7th, on September 5th and on September 6th.
CRAIG: So it raises a question as to whether or not the desire
to interview Monica Lewinsky stems from a desire to resolve conflicts
that she has with other people. Because certainly these occasions
gave the lawyers for the Independent Counsel, an opportunity to do so.
And I would simply submit that within the bounds of ethical behavior
I'm sure, because I respect the professionalism of the House managers,
but I would suspect that one of the reasons they want to inquire of
Ms. Lewinsky is not to resolve discrepancies and disputes. It is to
perhaps, challenge her testimony when it's helpful to the president,
and perhaps bolster her testimony when it's not helpful to the
president.
CRAIG: The House managers are not neutral investigators or
neutral interrogators. And it raises questions about what the
managers' true purpose in calling Vernon Jordan and Betty Currie
forward as witnesses; what they want to inquire about if they conduct
an interview with them. And I suggest that this is also a bit of a
fishing expedition, looking for evidence that will be damaging to the
president.
We're not afraid of witnesses. But we do want fairness. And we
don't think it's fair in this process -- if you're going to have a
real trial, then we want a real defense. And to have a real defense,
requires real discovery, and real opportunity to have access to
documents, and witnesses, and evidence that has been in the custody
and the control of the House of Representatives, that has not been
made available to us.
CRAIG: That is in the custody and control of the office of
independent counsel that has not been made available to us. And I
would suggest, as we have seen from the statements made by the
managers to this body yesterday and today about Vernon Jordan
suggesting -- actually suggesting that he did not tell the truth when
he testified numerous times before the grand jury, which is an
outrageous suggestion.
And suggesting, which happened today -- implying that he
destroyed evidence, which not even the independent counsel has
suggested, they seek to do nothing more than to attack, attack,
attack. The best friend of the president of the United States and his
personal secretary. That's the reason they want to talk to these
people. And I think it's an improper reason. It's wanting to win too
much. And I don't think the United States Senate should be part of
it.
REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Hagel, Abraham, and
Hatch to the House managers.
REHNQUIST: White House Counsel has indicated their opposition to
calling witnesses, asserting that calling witnesses would not shed
light on the facts and would unnecessarily prolong the proceedings.
But it is the responsibility of this Senate to find the truth. And if
any senators reasonably believe that hearing witnesses would assist in
finding the truth, why shouldn't they be called?
MCCOLLUM: Mr. Chief Justice, me thinks thou dost protest too
much. And I think that's what White House Counsel's been doing. I
don't know why. But they frankly don't want witnesses. They don't
want what you normally have in a trial.
We can paint this with any kind of colors that you want to have.
But a trial without witnesses, when it involves a criminal accusation,
a criminal matter, is not a true trial. It really isn't. I mean
it's, it is not what I think of and I guarantee it's not what any of
my friends who sit over here, who've been counsels and prosecutors and
defense lawyers think of.
It is remotely conceivable, but certainly not where you have had
the inferences and the conclusions that we draw logically from the
entire sequence of events that are painted from the very day when the
president got word of Monica Lewinsky being on the witness list. And
all the way through his testimony in the Jones case, all the way
through his grand jury testimony, when they challenge every inference
that we think you should logically draw from the record.
MCCOLLUM: And then suggest that "oh, but we shouldn't have any
body in here," so you who are going to judge ultimately whether our
representations are persuasive or not about those inferences, whether
you should be able to judge -- and I think you should-- what the
witnesses actually are saying.
Let's give you one illustration and yield any of my other
counsels on this -- I don't know how many times -- I think two or
three times I've put up here on a board, or I've said to you, and I
know a couple of my colleagues have said to you, that during the
discussion with regard to the affidavit that Monica Lewinsky in front
of the grand jury, she explicitly said "no, the president didn't tell
me to lie, but he didn't discourage me either. He didn't encourage me
nor discourage me."
But you need to have her say that to you. I mean they've been up
here whacking away at that. They've confusing everything they can,
talking about the job search at the same time they 're talking about
the affidavit, what she said here, what she said there, what she
there, what she said anywhere else.
Witnesses are a logical thing. There are a lot of conflicts that
here. When we get to the point which we presume we'll that
opportunity to do, to argue on our case on why we should have
witnesses -- maybe Monday or perhaps Tuesday, I think under your
rules, even though you have a motion to dismiss -- we will get that
chance.
MCCOLLUM: We'll lay out a lot of these things. There are a lot
of them out there. But the point is, overall, you need to have the
witnesses to judge what any trier of fact judges, about any one of
these. And I'll be happy to yield to Mr. Graham or Mr. Rogan if you'd
like to come up here.
Neither one?
That's fair enough. But that's why you need witnesses.
REHNQUIST: The chair recognizes the majority leader.
LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice, it now approaches the hour that we'd
indicated that we would conclude our work on Saturday. There may
still be some questions that senators would like to have offered.
I've talked to Senator Daschle, one suggestion that's been made is,
maybe we would, on Monday, ask that questions could be submitted for
the record in writing.
I think that's a common practice, but we don't want to cut it off
and, at this point, I wouldn't be prepared to do that, but I would
like to suggest that we go ahead and conclude our business today, and
if there is a need by a senator on either side to have another
question, or two, or three we would certainly consult with each other
and see how we could handle that, perhaps, on Monday and even see if
it would be appropriate to prepare a motion with regard to being able
to submit questions for the record, which would be answered. We
wouldn't want to abuse that and cause that to be a protracted process.
But, and here are the times that have been spent here, in fact,
we've had around 106 questions, and we got about 10 hours in this,
now. I think we should conclude for this Saturday. We will resume at
1:00 p.m. on Monday, and continue in concordance with provisions of
SRES-16. I will update all members as to the specific questions -- or
schedule when it becomes clear.
I now ask unanimous consent that, in the record following today's
proceedings, there appear a period of morning business to accommodate
bills and statements that have been submitted during the day by
senators. I plead for attentiveness during the proceedings, and ask
the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.
HARKIN?: I object, Mr. Chief Justice. (OFF-MIKE)
REHNQUIST: Objection is...
LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice I move that the Senate stand in
adjournment under the previous order.
HARKIN?: Mr. Chief Justice, (OFF-MIKE) recognition.
REHNQUIST: This is a motion to adjourn. The motion -- the
question on the motion to adjourn. All in favor say aye.
AYES: Aye!
REHNQUIST: Those opposed, no.
NOS: No!
REHNQUIST: The ayes appear to have it. The ayes do have it.
Senate is adjourned.
END
Testimony index
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