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Clinton impeachment trial transcripts — January 23, 1999

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The following transcript was provided to Court TV by Federal Document Clearing House:

SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON CONTINUES

JANUARY 23, 1999

SPEAKERS: WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE, U.S. SUPREME COURT

LLOYD OGILVIE, SENATE CHAPLAIN

U.S. SENATOR TRENT LOTT, MAJORITY LEADER

U.S. SENATOR THOMAS DASCHLE (D-SD)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HENRY HYDE (R-IL)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER (R-WI)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BILL MCCOLLUM (R-FL)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE GEORGE GEKAS (R-PA)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES CANADY (R-FL)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEPHEN BUYER (R-IN)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ED BRYENT (R-TN)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEVE CHABOT (R-OH)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BOB BARR (R-GA)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ASA HUTCHINSON (R-AR)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHRIS CANNON (R-UT)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES ROGAN (R-CA)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC)

DAVID KENDALL, ATTORNEY FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON

CHARLES F.C. RUFF, OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL

GREGORY B. CRAIG, OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL

CHERYL D. MILLS, OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL

...has left office.

RUFF: So there can be no argument that "oh, this will just fall into the cracks or this will disappear in to the ether somewhere.'

The president is -- will be at risk. We trust that reasonable judgments will be made and a determination will be reached that it is not appropriate to pursue him. But that too will be pursued under the rule of law to which he is subject.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Campbell, Hagel and Specter to the House managers.

White House counsel has several times asserted that the grand jury perjury charge is just a "he says, she says" case and that we cannot consider corroborating witnesses you cite. What is it about the president's grand jury testimony that convinces you he should be removed from office?

MCCOLLUM: Mr. Chief Justice, that question goes to the heart of what we're here about, today. We've had a great deal of discussion about a lot of peripheral questions and issues, but the fact of the matter is, the simplest portion of this deals with grand jury perjury.

And I assume the question principally is directed to the first of the four points under the grand jury perjury article because, for example, the second point, with respect to the president having the goal or the intent of being truthful, which he said he did in the grand jury in the Jones deposition, there isn't a he says/she says question. That's just very simple. The president lied multiple times in that civil deposition, and if he said in the grand jury to the grand jurors, "my goal was to be truthful" is pretty self-evident that that was a lie, and he perjured himself.

MCCOLLUM: So, that's not a he says/she says.

But the question that the counsel over here have tried to bring up several times is saying the part with respect particularly to Monica Lewinsky saying that the president certain parts of her of her body, which would have been covered by the Jones' definition of sexual relations, and the president who said explicitly in his grand jury testimony "I didn't touch those parts, and yes I agree that would have been and is part of the definition of sexual relations in the Jones' case." That is where you believe her or him.

And that say that's a he says/she says and it's not.

But even if it were, you could listen to it and accept it. I think there is some confusion about the law.

The law of perjury does not require two witnesses nor does it require the corroborating testimony of anybody else.

It does not. That's why in 1970, it was changed.

MCCOLLUM: And most prosecutions today for perjury, including people who are in federal prison today for perjury in civil cases, for lying about matters related to sex, and there are several -- a couple of whom testified before us in the judiciary committee during our process and hearings -- are based upon that 1970 law that does not require any corroboration.

In this case you have Monica Lewinsky who is a very credible witness by other reasons. That you don't even have to get to those corroborating witnesses on these points. Number one, she was under immunity. Under the threat of prosecution when she testified that way. Number two, she has consistent statements throughout, many times over. She didn't say she'd had sexual intercourse with him. She could have made that up, but she didn't. Everything she says is believable about that portion of it.

And third, and not last in all of this, is that she did make very contemporaneous statements to at least six other people who were her friends and counselors describing in detail exactly the same thing she testified to under oath before the grand jury in this respect.

MCCOLLUM: Now, they say, the counselors here, you can't consider that under the federal rules of evidence because that's presumably hearsay. Well, there are at least three exceptions to that hearsay rule which could be brought out in a courtroom. They've gone about trying to carefully say, "We never said that Monica Lewinsky lied."

I remember -- I think it was Mr. Kendall, or maybe it was Mr. Craig up here a little earlier -- saying, "When asked that question, did she lie in this instance or in any other." And they said, "Well, it's just different version of the truth." Well, if she's saying it as explicitly as she is about this nine times, or four times and whatever. And the president's saying, "I never did that," I don't see how they can fudge around challenging her truthfulness and credibility. That's what they've been doing.

And in any courtroom I've ever been in, once that's occurred you could certainly bring in her prior consistent statements, and you don't even have to go with the rules of evidence on this. You're not bound by those rules of evidence. And common sense says she had no motive to be lying to her friends in those numerous telephone conversations, or her meetings with her counselors when she described in detail these things the president says he didn't do, because all of those statements occurred -- all of those discussions occurred -- before she ever was knowingly on a witness list, or likely to have to testify in any other way.

MCCOLLUM: She's very credible. Those prior consistent statements are very believable and I submit to you they would be admissible in a court, in the kind of contest that would be involved in the situation like this. And it goes to the very heart of what we're here about: grand jury perjury, the simplest, clearest one.

The president lied, Monica Lewinsky told the truth about it and it's profound -- then it is important, and it's critical to this case. And that's the principle. One of the perjuries that we've been directing our attention to because it is so clear.

Thank you.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Dorgan to counsel for the president.

How can the House claim that its function is accusatory only, when the articles it voted for -- voted call for the president's removal?

RUFF: This of course, takes us back to the very heart of the argument that raged fro a small time here yesterday and in previous days. The notion that the House of Representatives viewed itself during the month of December, as merely -- I won't even say that it rose in their mind to the level of accusatory body that we would think of when we think of the grand jury, but to a body who's job it was, as one of the managers said at one point, simply to find probable cause to believe that the president had committed these acts.

RUFF: Perhaps there has been some extraordinary transposition from the mood and the tenor of the comments made during those days when the Judiciary Committee was doing its work to the days when these managers have appeared in the well of the Senate, something that has transformed the mere probable cause screening finding that they allegedly viewed as the role of the House and of the Judiciary Committee into the certainty that you hear today.

It is a good question as to how then given the role they saw for themselves, they could go so far not only to seek the removal of the president, but indeed in all their prosecutorial vigor, something that has never been sought before, a bar against holding any future office at the level of certainty that must have achieved given the standard that they held themselves to.

RUFF: What happened between December 19th and today that allows these managers to come before you not saying, "well, we were certain then and we're more certain now." Or, "we only found probably cause back in 1998 but in 1999 we are sufficiently certain that we ought to shut down the public will as expressed in the elections of 1996."

I haven't yet found an answer to that question.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Bond, Brownback, Campbell, Hagel, Luger, Hutchison of Texas, Roth and Stevens. It's directed to the House managers. "After everything you've heard over the last several weeks from the president's counsel, do you still believe that the facts support the charges of obstruction of justice alleged in the articles of impeachment, specifically, what allegations of improper conduct has the president's counsel failed to undermine?"

The question's also from Senators Specter and McConnell.

HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

HUTCHINSON: First of all, why is obstruction of justice important to begin with? I think back on a opportunity I had at a hearing once to question a member of the Colombian drug cartel and I asked him, "What is the greatest weapon that law enforcement has that you fear?"

And his answer was, very quickly, "Extradition." And I said, "Well, explain, what do you mean by -- why is extradition feared?" And he said, "Because in Colombia you can fix the system, but in America, you can't."

And that's why I think the obstruction of justice charge is so important to the administration of justice. Money, position, power, does not corrupt, should not corrupt the administration of justice. And the question is, is "Where has the president attacked, the counselors attacked credibly, the allegations of obstruction?"

The first one is that the president personally encouraged a witness, Monica Lewinsky, to lie. This was on December 17th at 2:00 am in the morning when the president calls Monica to tell her that she is a witness on the list, 2 a.m. in the morning.

HUTCHINSON: And at that time, of course she's nervous, she's a witness. And asks about well, what am I going to say? And the president offers, according to Monica Lewinsky, you can always say you came to see Betty or you came to deliver papers. Now, the president's counselor attacked this by saying well, remember what Monica said, I was never told to lie. Well, I would refer you to a 10th Circuit case in which United States versus Tranicos (ph), 10th Circuit 1990. And the law is that the request to lie need not be a direct statement. As the court held quote, "The statute prohibits elliptical suggestions as much as it does direct commands," end quote.

HUTCHINSON: Now that's common sense. That is logic. That's what a jury applies, common sense. And here of course, in this case, Monica Lewinsky testified that she was told in essence to lie. Now she wasn't -- the president didn't say "Monica, I need you go in and lie for me." He told her the cover story in a legal context that she could use, that would cover for him, that in essence would be a lie.

We all know that is what it is.

And of course says, well -- he denies that. And of course he said "I never told her to use cover stories in a legal context" -- direct in conflict but clearly the president's counselors have not attacked that obstruction of justice.

The second one is the jobs and the false affidavit. And they say there is absolutely no connection in these two, none whatsoever.

HUTCHINSON: And, of course, I pointed out the testimony of Vernon Jordan, who testified, it doesn't take an Einstein to know that whenever he found out she was a witness, she was under subpoena, that the subpoena changed the circumstances. That's the testimony of Vernon Jordan. So, they say there's no connection, Vernon Jordan, the president's friend, says the circumstances change whenever you're talking about getting a job with somebody who is also under subpoena in a case that is very important to the president of the United States.

And, of course, the president -- Vernon Jordan also indicated the president's personal involvement when he testified before the grand jury in June. He said, "He was interested in this matter. He," referring to the president, "was the source of it coming to my attention in the first place."

He further testified: "The president asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job."

The president was personally involved in the obtaining of a job. He was personally concerned about the false affidavit.

HUTCHINSON: And Vernon Jordan acknowledges that when those are combined, the circumstances are different.

The third area of obstruction is the tampering with the witness, Betty Currie. On January 18th and January 20th, where the questions were posed after the deposition. The president's counselor challenged this and says, "Well, she wasn't a witness. We hadn't -- even the Jones lawyers never had any clue that she was going to be a witness in this case. The president couldn't know that she was going to be a witness."

Well, they hoped that we would never find the subpoena. Because he, Mr. Ruff made that statement early on, which he very professionally expressed regret that he made that misrepresentation. But we found the subpoena, we found the subpoena that was actually issued a few days after the deposition for Betty Currie, she was a witness, she was not just a prospective witness. She was there, she was -- had to be ready to go.

And the president knew this, the Jones lawyer knew it. So that stands. The pillar of obstruction stands.

The false statements to the grand jury. That has been covered. There's been never any holes that have been poked into that. But it was to continue the cover-up of the false statements that were made in a civil rights case.

HUTCHINSON: Another area of obstruction was the December 28th when the gifts were retrieved. And this has been challenged. And I will admit, as I always have, that there is a dispute in the testimony. But I believe the case is made through the circumstances, the motivation, the testimony of Monica Lewinsky as to what Betty Currie said when she called, and the corroborating evidence.

I don't believe they have poked a hole in that. I believe it stands. We would like to hear the witnesses to make you more comfortable in resolving that conflict and to determine the credibility of those witnesses. But the gifts that were subpoenaed were evidence in a trial. They were needed in a civil rights case. The president knew they were under subpoena. He had the most to gain. And they were retrieved, and I believe the testimony indicates that it was based upon the actions of Betty Currie that would have been directed by the president.

HUTCHINSON: There are other areas of obstruction including the president allowing his attorney Robert Bennett to make false representation to the federal district judge in the deposition.

The president's defense is that there's no proof whatsoever that he was paying any attention.

Now we offered the videotape that shows that he is I believe looking at the attorney. But we offer a witness in that regard to show that he was attentive. That's simply something that can be substantiated and we believe that you can evaluate that, that he was paying attention.

But that is an element of obstruction, because he was allowing his attorney to make a false representation to the court that was totally untrue, that would aid in the cover-up and that was presented.

REHNQUIST: Mr. Hutchinson, I think you have answered the question.

HUTCHINSON: I thank the Chief Justice.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senator Levin to counsel for the White House.

In their brief to the Senate, the House managers said that there was quote "no urgency," close quote, to help Ms. Lewinsky until December 11th, 1997 and that on that date quote "sudden interest was inspired," close quote by a court order which the House Managers had represented was issued on the morning of December 11th before the Vernon Jordan - Monica Lewinsky meeting that afternoon.

REHNQUIST: It took doing yesterday to get the House Managers to finally acknowledge that the court order was not issued in the morning, but in the afternoon of December 11th. Why were the House Managers so reluctant to make that acknowledgment?

KENDALL: Mr. Chief Justice. Well, I think they were reluctant to make the acknowledgement because they were in cement (ph) due their trial brief, which at page 20, as the question indicates, said as to this particular time period, after the December 6th meeting.

KENDALL: There was obviously still no urgency to help Miss Lewinsky. They thought that they had a chronology that was consistent with the inference of causation. But when you look at the true time of the events, that dissolves.

Now, Mr. Manager Hutchinson used a word, a phrase I'd like to call your attention to. Repeatedly as he was summarizing the evidence, he used the phrase in essence. Now that's another phrase that's kind of a weasel word. When you hear that, it means that the evidence isn't really quite there but if you look at the big picture maybe you can see what's there in essence. It doesn't work here. It doesn't work because of the evidence. Just a week ago Mr. Manager Hutchinson, on this obstruction of justice question was asked very clearly. On the case that you have against the president on obstruction of justice, not the perjury, would you be confident of a conviction in a criminal court?

KENDALL: And he said, "No, I would not."

Now, he -- I'm not going to walk through each and every elements that he identified -- I think we've repeatedly dealt with them, and I'm not going to step on your patience to do that again each time.

I would like to make two points, and that was: In terms of encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to lie, were these cover stories an attempt to encourage her to lie. As I tried to indicate there is testimony in the record that, at a certain time in the relation these cover stories were discussed.

There is not any evidence, however, for Ms. Lewinsky, the president or anyone else, that these were discussed in connection with the testimony, in connection with the affidavit. You remember Ms. Lewinsky, when asked if she could exclude that possibility said, "I pretty much can."

KENDALL: Now the testimony that Mr. Hutchinson mentioned with Mr. Jordan on December 19th, you'll remember he quoted Mr. Jordan. He said, "The discovery of the subpoena at that point changed the circumstances." Well it did, but just in the opposite way that Mr. -- Manager Hutchinson would have you infer.

Because when Mr. Jordan discovered on December 19th, that Ms. Lewinsky, had a subpoena, was going to testify in the Jones case as a witness, unless she could get it quashed, he went to her and went to the president to seek assurance that the job assistance he was engaging in could not, at any time, be said to be improper because of the presence of an improper relationship. Both parties assured him that there was no such relationship.

This observation by Mr. Jordan, cuts just the opposite way. Thank you.

LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice.

REHNQUIST: The chair recognizes the Majority Leader.

LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice, I do have another question I will send to the desk momentarily, but I would like for the Senators to know that we've had some 104 or five questions now that have been asked. I believe that's correct. One hundred and four.

Senator Daschle and I conferred. We want to thank the Senators for their participation and their questions. We do want to make it clear we're not seeking questions.

(LAUGHTER)

So, don't feel like you need to help us by sending any down.

(LAUGHTER)

But under your rights as senators, under the Senate Resolution 16, and the rules we're proceeding under, every and each Senator is entitled to submit a question if he or she feels that it's important.

But I hope it would be one that you think really is essential, that has not been touched on some where already in the answers to the questions.

And also would hope and the record may be made clear that we in a bipartisan way, have tried very hard to make sure that this proceeding here, and the questions here, and all that we've done has been fair, both to the president's counsel and the House managers.

LOTT: And we will continue to work in that vein. With that observation, and if we do need to continue going forward with questions we would have to give some consideration to taking a break and going longer. Although I'd indicated I'd hoped we could quit at four. Maybe after this question, and if necessary, one or two more, we could end for the day and then get together and see if we need more time on Monday for additional questions. I send the next question to the desk.

REHNQUIST: This is a question from Senators Cochran, Roth, Campbell, and Frist to the House managers. The president's counsel has suggested that the Senate considered a good behavior standard in impeachment cases involving federal judges. The removal of judges seems to have been based by the Senate on the impeachment power whose standard for removal is the same for both federal judges and executive branch officials.

REHNQUIST: Is the counsel for the president asking us to use a different test for removal of this president than we did in the case of Judge Walter Nixon? Please explain."

CANADY: Mr. Chief Justice, members of the Senate, I appreciate the opportunity to ask this question, it is an important question. And it is true that counsel for the president are asking that you use a different standard in this case, than the standard you have already established, not in just one case, but, in fact, in a series of cases involving federal judges that were before the Senate in the 1980s.

There was a succession of three cases in the Senate, all dealing with the question of whether a federal judge who had lied under oath should be removed from office because the federal judge had lied under oath.

CANADY: In all three cases, the Senate decided that the federal judge should be convicted and removed. Now the president's counsel have the burden of establishing that those recent, and very clear precedents of the Senate, should not apply to this case where the president is charged with lying under oath.

And they attempt to do that in a number of ways. What I would suggest, is you evaluate their attempt to distinguish away those precedents. That you look first and last to the Constitution. The Constitution should be your guide. And I would suggest to you that there is nothing in the Constitution which establishes a different standard for the president, for any reason.

There's not something in the Constitution that says he is subject to a different standard because he is elected. That argument has been advanced.

CANADY: If you look in the Constitution, you simply won't find that.

And to argue for a different standard because the president is elected, I would submit to you is to impose something on the Constitution that is entirely alien to the document itself.

The Constitution contains a single standard for the application of the impeachment and removal power. And I've read it before, but I read it again.

Article II, Section 4 provides "the president, vice president and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."

Now reference was made in the question and reference has been made by the president's counsel to the good behavior clause. That's found in Article III, Section I. That clause does not alter the standard I have just read to you however.

Rather than creating a altered standard for removal of federal judges, the good behavior clause merely establishes that the term of office for judicial officers is a lie.

CANADY: Now, I wouldn't ask you to take my word for this, let me refer, again, to the 1974 report by the staff of the Nixon impeachment inquiry.

There they said, they asked the question: "Does article three, section one of the Constitution, which states that judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, limit the relevance of the impeachments of judges with respect to presidential impeachment standard, as has been argued by some."

That is, essentially, the question before the Senate now.

Their answer was: "It does not. It does not. The only impeachment provision," they go on to say, "discussed in the Constitutional Convention, and indeed, in the Constitution, is article two, section four, which, by its express terms, applies to all civil officers, including judges."

Now, I would go on to note that it's very interesting, that at the Constitutional Convention, on August the 27th, 1787, an attempt was made to amend the good behavior clause by adding a provision for the removal of judges by the executive on the application by the Senate and House of Representative.

Now, this proposal, which was offered by John Dickinson, was based on the English parliamentary practice of removal of judges by address.

CANADY: A practice also utilized by several American states. And under this process judges could be removed for misconduct falling short of the level of seriousness that would justify impeachment. Now the proposal offered by Dickinson was overwhelmingly rejected. It was overwhelmingly rejected by the convention.

Thus, the sole provision for removal and the sole standard for removal is that, which I have referred to in Article II Section Four. Now mention has been made and I want to respond to this, because mention has been made of efforts in Congress to establish a separate procedure for the removal of federal judges. A procedure separate and apart from the impeachment and removal process.

A specific mention has also been made of testimony given in 1970 by the Chief Justice, who was then an assistant attorney general, regarding a proposal to establish a separate removal procedure. The testimony given by the Chief Justice at that time, related to the constitutionality of the provisions of the bill relating to the removal of judges by methods "other than," methods "other than" impeachment.

Now my own view, quite candidly, is that such a separate removal procedure raises serious constitutional questions, serious questions about maintaining the independence of the judiciary. But putting that question aside, and regardless of the standards that might be applied in such a separate removal procedure.

CANADY: It is clear that the single constitutional standard for impeachment and removal would remain the same. That is what is in the constitution. That can't be changed by any statute or anything that is set up apart from the constitutional procedures.

Now, one thing I make as I move toward concluding my response, it should be recognized that some specific acts might be a breach of duty if done by a judge, but not a breach of duty if done by the president of the United States. And that's an important distinction that we all should bear in mind.

For example, it would be serious misconduct for a judge to engage in repeated ex parte meetings with parties who have an interest in a matter pending before that judge. But it is typical for the president to engage in such ex parte meetings with persons who have an interest in matters on which he will decide. For a judge, such conduct constitutes a breach of duty.

CANADY: For the president, it does not constitute a breach of duty.

REHNQUIST: Mr. Canady, I think you've answered the question.

CANADY: Thank you.

REHNQUIST: This question from Senator Harkin is to counsel for the president.

There are three contradictions in the record. One, who touched who on what parts of the body. Two, when the relationship began. Three, who called whom to get the gifts, Ms. Curry, or Ms. Lewinsky. How would these witnesses clear up the contradictions?

CRAIG: Mr. Chief Justice, Senator Harkin, it's difficult for me to explain how after you've gotten 19 interviews, two grand jury appearances, one deposition, to cover, to cover that precise territory, that any further kind of inquiry along those lines would be of any help.

CRAIG: The House managers have argued that they need to call witnesses for the purposes of resolving inconsistencies, conflicts and discrepancies in testimony. And they have, in fact, identified Monica Lewinsky, in particular, as having given testimony in conflict with the testimony of the president, with Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan.

But it would be well to remember that the lawyers for the office of independent counsel, certainly not seeking elicit testimony that's favorable to the president, that those lawyers have already done a great deal of this precise kind of inquiry at some great length. Those lawyers, no friends of the president, have already explored inconsistencies, they've already tested memories, they've already laboriously and at great length subjected these witnesses to searching scrutiny. And their work is available for all to see in the record of this case before the Senate today.

CRAIG: Let me be very specific and very concrete.

Monica Lewinsky was interviewed by the lawyers for the office of independent counsel, or testified before the grand jury on 20 different occasions, after Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan had given their testimony before the grand jury. And contrary to the assertions of the House Managers, Monica Lewinsky was interviewed six times and testified twice -- one time before the grand jury and once at a sworn deposition -- after the president had given his testimony before the grand jury on August 17th.

On August 19th, she was interviewed by the FBI and by lawyers for the special counsel.

She testified before the grand jury -- Ms. Lewinsky testified before the grand jury on August 20th. She was interviewed by lawyers and FBI agents for the independent counsel on August 24th. She was interviewed on August 26th. She appeared for a deposition held in the conference room of the office of the independent counsel on August 26th. She was interviewed pursuant to her immunity agreement with independent counsel and FBI agents on September 5th. She was also interviewed -- excuse me that was September 3rd.

She appeared and listened to tapes with the FBI present on many occasions on many period during the period September 3rd through September 6th.

She appeared and was interviewed by special counsel, Independent Counsel on September 7th, on September 5th and on September 6th.

CRAIG: So it raises a question as to whether or not the desire to interview Monica Lewinsky stems from a desire to resolve conflicts that she has with other people. Because certainly these occasions gave the lawyers for the Independent Counsel, an opportunity to do so. And I would simply submit that within the bounds of ethical behavior I'm sure, because I respect the professionalism of the House managers, but I would suspect that one of the reasons they want to inquire of Ms. Lewinsky is not to resolve discrepancies and disputes. It is to perhaps, challenge her testimony when it's helpful to the president, and perhaps bolster her testimony when it's not helpful to the president.

CRAIG: The House managers are not neutral investigators or neutral interrogators. And it raises questions about what the managers' true purpose in calling Vernon Jordan and Betty Currie forward as witnesses; what they want to inquire about if they conduct an interview with them. And I suggest that this is also a bit of a fishing expedition, looking for evidence that will be damaging to the president.

We're not afraid of witnesses. But we do want fairness. And we don't think it's fair in this process -- if you're going to have a real trial, then we want a real defense. And to have a real defense, requires real discovery, and real opportunity to have access to documents, and witnesses, and evidence that has been in the custody and the control of the House of Representatives, that has not been made available to us.

CRAIG: That is in the custody and control of the office of independent counsel that has not been made available to us. And I would suggest, as we have seen from the statements made by the managers to this body yesterday and today about Vernon Jordan suggesting -- actually suggesting that he did not tell the truth when he testified numerous times before the grand jury, which is an outrageous suggestion.

And suggesting, which happened today -- implying that he destroyed evidence, which not even the independent counsel has suggested, they seek to do nothing more than to attack, attack, attack. The best friend of the president of the United States and his personal secretary. That's the reason they want to talk to these people. And I think it's an improper reason. It's wanting to win too much. And I don't think the United States Senate should be part of it.

REHNQUIST: This question is from Senators Hagel, Abraham, and Hatch to the House managers.

REHNQUIST: White House Counsel has indicated their opposition to calling witnesses, asserting that calling witnesses would not shed light on the facts and would unnecessarily prolong the proceedings. But it is the responsibility of this Senate to find the truth. And if any senators reasonably believe that hearing witnesses would assist in finding the truth, why shouldn't they be called?

MCCOLLUM: Mr. Chief Justice, me thinks thou dost protest too much. And I think that's what White House Counsel's been doing. I don't know why. But they frankly don't want witnesses. They don't want what you normally have in a trial.

We can paint this with any kind of colors that you want to have. But a trial without witnesses, when it involves a criminal accusation, a criminal matter, is not a true trial. It really isn't. I mean it's, it is not what I think of and I guarantee it's not what any of my friends who sit over here, who've been counsels and prosecutors and defense lawyers think of.

It is remotely conceivable, but certainly not where you have had the inferences and the conclusions that we draw logically from the entire sequence of events that are painted from the very day when the president got word of Monica Lewinsky being on the witness list. And all the way through his testimony in the Jones case, all the way through his grand jury testimony, when they challenge every inference that we think you should logically draw from the record.

MCCOLLUM: And then suggest that "oh, but we shouldn't have any body in here," so you who are going to judge ultimately whether our representations are persuasive or not about those inferences, whether you should be able to judge -- and I think you should-- what the witnesses actually are saying.

Let's give you one illustration and yield any of my other counsels on this -- I don't know how many times -- I think two or three times I've put up here on a board, or I've said to you, and I know a couple of my colleagues have said to you, that during the discussion with regard to the affidavit that Monica Lewinsky in front of the grand jury, she explicitly said "no, the president didn't tell me to lie, but he didn't discourage me either. He didn't encourage me nor discourage me."

But you need to have her say that to you. I mean they've been up here whacking away at that. They've confusing everything they can, talking about the job search at the same time they 're talking about the affidavit, what she said here, what she said there, what she there, what she said anywhere else.

Witnesses are a logical thing. There are a lot of conflicts that here. When we get to the point which we presume we'll that opportunity to do, to argue on our case on why we should have witnesses -- maybe Monday or perhaps Tuesday, I think under your rules, even though you have a motion to dismiss -- we will get that chance.

MCCOLLUM: We'll lay out a lot of these things. There are a lot of them out there. But the point is, overall, you need to have the witnesses to judge what any trier of fact judges, about any one of these. And I'll be happy to yield to Mr. Graham or Mr. Rogan if you'd like to come up here.

Neither one?

That's fair enough. But that's why you need witnesses.

REHNQUIST: The chair recognizes the majority leader.

LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice, it now approaches the hour that we'd indicated that we would conclude our work on Saturday. There may still be some questions that senators would like to have offered. I've talked to Senator Daschle, one suggestion that's been made is, maybe we would, on Monday, ask that questions could be submitted for the record in writing.

I think that's a common practice, but we don't want to cut it off and, at this point, I wouldn't be prepared to do that, but I would like to suggest that we go ahead and conclude our business today, and if there is a need by a senator on either side to have another question, or two, or three we would certainly consult with each other and see how we could handle that, perhaps, on Monday and even see if it would be appropriate to prepare a motion with regard to being able to submit questions for the record, which would be answered. We wouldn't want to abuse that and cause that to be a protracted process.

But, and here are the times that have been spent here, in fact, we've had around 106 questions, and we got about 10 hours in this, now. I think we should conclude for this Saturday. We will resume at 1:00 p.m. on Monday, and continue in concordance with provisions of SRES-16. I will update all members as to the specific questions -- or schedule when it becomes clear.

I now ask unanimous consent that, in the record following today's proceedings, there appear a period of morning business to accommodate bills and statements that have been submitted during the day by senators. I plead for attentiveness during the proceedings, and ask the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

HARKIN?: I object, Mr. Chief Justice. (OFF-MIKE)

REHNQUIST: Objection is...

LOTT: Mr. Chief Justice I move that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

HARKIN?: Mr. Chief Justice, (OFF-MIKE) recognition.

REHNQUIST: This is a motion to adjourn. The motion -- the question on the motion to adjourn. All in favor say aye.

AYES: Aye!

REHNQUIST: Those opposed, no.

NOS: No!

REHNQUIST: The ayes appear to have it. The ayes do have it. Senate is adjourned.

END

Testimony index

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