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Defense motion to supress
Court TV Casefiles: Menendez
In this June 12, 1995 motion, defense lawyers ask the court for an order prohibiting the prosecution from introducing evidence that Lyle and Erik Menendez went on a spending spree following the murders of their parents.
LESLIE H. ABRAMSON #44758
A LAW CORPORATION
4929 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 940
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90010
LAW OFFICES OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
CHARLES GESSLER, Deputy Public Defender #32144
TERRI TOWERY, Deputy Public Defender #94453
210 W. Temple Street, 19th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Telephone: (213) 974-2804, 974-2929
Attorneys for Defendant Joseph Lyle Menendez
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff,
ERIK GALEN MENENDEZ and JOSEPH LYLE
MENENDEZ,
Defendants.
CASE NO. BA068880
MOTION IN LIMINE RE
RECENTLY PROFFERED
SPENDING EVIDENCE
DATE: JUNE 26, 1995
DEPT.: NORTHWEST "N"
TIME: 9:00 A.M.
TO: GILL GARCETTI, DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR
LOS ANGELES COUNTY AND HIS
REPRESENTATIVES, DAVID CONN AND CAROL
NAJERA AND TO THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 26, 1995, at 9:00
a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in
Department Northwest "N" of the above-entitled court,
defendants Erik Galen Menendez and Joseph Lyle
Menendez will move this Court for an order prohibiting the
prosecution from introducing additional so-called
"spending" evidence on the grounds that the proffered
evidence is irrelevant, or, if marginally relevant, its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will necessitate undue
consumption of time or create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, or of confusing the issues and of misleading the
jury.
Further, the proffered evidence is inadmissible because the
prosecution has failed to demonstrate the existence of the
foundational facts necessary to qualify most of this newly
offered evidence as, in fact, evidence of spending by the
defendants. As specified below for most of this evidence
there is no information in the discovery provided of the
dates, amounts and sources of the expenditures that the
people seek to admit in vague support of their theory that
the defendants killed their parents in order to spend their
parents' money.
The motion will be based upon pleadings, records and files
herein, upon the previous testimony of witnesses addressed
to these evidentiary issues, upon the written statements of
witnesses provided to the defense by the prosecution in the
course of pretrial discovery and upon the written statements
of witness provided to the defense by the prosecution in the
course of pretrial discovery and upon such other and further
evidence and arguments as may be presented by defendants
at the hearing of the motion.
Dated this 9th day of June, 1995
LESLIE H. ABRAMSON, A Law Corporation
By: /s/
Leslie H. Abramson, Attorney for Erik Galen Menendez
MICHAEL P. JUDGE, PUBLIC DEFENDER
Charles Gessler, Deputy Public Defender
Terri Towery, Deputy Public Defender
By /s/ Terri Towery, Attorney for Joseph Lyle Menendez
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION
In letters to defense counsel dated April 26, 1995 and May
5, 1995, the prosecution gave notice of its intention to
introduce in it's case in chief information characterized as
additional "spending evidence". (Copies of those letters are
attached hereto as Exhibits A1 and A2, respectively).
In numerous previous hearings in this case the prosecution
has asserted the relevancy of evidence of the defendants'
receipt of funds as a direct result of the death of their
parents such as the proceeds of the Sun Life Insurance policy,
and the advance from the parents' estates given to Lyle, as
evidence of motive. In addition, the prosecution has been
granted permission from this Court to introduce evidence of
the defendants' actual spending or offers to spend specific
large sums of money following the death of their parents as
further evidence in support of their motive theory even
though this sort of evidence is obviously of a more
speculative kind depending, as it does, upon the notion that
had they not killed their parents but merely received the
insurance proceeds or inherited money from the estates they
would not have spent it.
Now the prosecution, seeking to shore up its motive theory,
wishes to introduce evidence of various activities of the
defendants, the cost of which are apparently unknown, under
this ever growing and increasingly amorphous category of
"spending evidence".
Additionally, the prosecution should not be permitted to use
the same evidence twice to create a false impression of the
existence of a large quantity of circumstantial motive
evidence. As the record of the first trial demonstrates, there
is, in fact, no direct evidence of motive at all. The
circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution to
establish its financial gain motive was of two kinds. First,
that each defendant received money as a consequence of
their parents' deaths in the form of proceeds from their
father's life insurance policy and, with respect to Lyle
Menendez only, as an advance distribution from the estates
of his parents with which to purchase a restaurant. The
second type of circumstational evidence of motive was that
the defendants spent or offered to spend large sums of
money between September 1989 and February 1990. The
court permitted introduction of evidence on a large number
of expenditures on items ranging from Lyle's purchase of a
restaurant to Erik's purchase of a pool table.
Since evidence at trial indicated that the estates of Jose and
Mary Louise Menendez were still pending distribution at the
time of the defendants' arrest, the only source of funds for all
but the restaurant purchase was the insurance proceeds.
Thus, the prosecution was permitted extensive use of double
counted evidence of both the receipt of funds and the
expenditure of the same funds by the defendants. In
addition, the prosecution was permitted in the first trial to
prove against Erik (since ruled admissible against Lyle as
well) an aborted offer to purchase a condominium at the
Marina City Club. Further, the Court has recently ruled that
it will permit the prosecution to prove against Erik in the
upcoming trial a February 1990 aborted offer to purchase a
house in Marina Del Rey. Presumably these semi-spending
activities were permitted because they arguably speak to the
defendants' states of mind vis a vis their potential
inheritance of the proceeds of their parents; estates.
Interpreted thus they do not constitute further double
dipping of the insurance proceeds evidence especially since
if these purchases had been made, they would have exceeded
the sums obtained from Sun Life. However, with the
exception of the previously ruled inadmissible item #1, the
balance of the items on the prosecution's recently submitted
list consists of cumulative evidence of further and
increasingly petty expenditures of presumably, the insurance
money. Unlike the previously admitted evidence of this
type, however, the people have demonstrated little factual
support by way of dates, amounts and actual payments by
the defendants for these items.
Even with specific facts of large expenditures this type of
evidence is only marginally probative at best. One would
expect young men raised by financially liberal parents but
unaccustomed to managing their own affairs to spend rather
loosely after coming into possession of a large sum of
money whether they obtained that money by fair means or
foul. There has already been more than enough latitude
given to the prosecution to bootstrap both the receipt of
funds and their expenditure to convey the false and
misleading impression to the jury of the existence of a large
quantity of financial gain evidence when in fact there are
only two separate acts of gain, the insurance proceeds and
the estate advance. The impropriety of allowing unfettered
double use of the same "money" evidence is apparent when
analyzing the limited way in which this type of evidence is
logically relevant.
It is commonly understood that the value of money is not
intrinsic. Only in its function as an instrument of exchange
does money become the much sought after object of human
endeavors both legal and illegal.
The rationale underlying the concept of financial gains as a
motivator for criminal acts is that the miscreant seeks to
have the money in order to spend it. But whether the money
is in fact spent or not the proof of a financial gain motive is
complete with the act of abstaining the funds. What is done
with them later is irrelevant. Even if someone merely
hoards the money, the sense of power and security gained by
such act is the knowledge that it will be available to be spent
in the future.
The Court has already ruled that numerous examples of
specific quantified, timely expenditures by the defendants
may be admitted at their joint trial, accompanied by a
cascade of limiting instructions. As demonstrated below the
prosecution is now speculative, cumulative, confusing and
time consuming matters of little or no probative value
except the forbidden one of character assassination.
ITEM BY ITEM ANALYSIS
1. Item #1 on the prosecution list reads "Bungalow Suite at
the Hotel Bel Aire- Los Angeles, California (Both)". At the
first trial the prosecution sought admission of evidence that
the defendants rented a suite (the bungalow part a recent
descriptive addition undisclosed in the material the defense
has in hand) at the Hotel Bel Aire and proceeded to incur
extensive room, telephone and room service charges. An
Evidence Code Section 402 hearing was held concerning
this evidentiary offer on August 13, 1993 at which
defendants' cousin Henry Llanio testified that he, having
decided that the defendants should stay at a hotel
accompanied by Lyle Menendez only, engaged the suite at
the Bel Aire. He further testified that the suite was meant to
be a meeting and eating place for the entire family and
served as such. More over it was his belief that LIVE
Entertainment would be paying for the suite just as they
were paying for his and the rest of the family's hotel
accommodations at the Hotel Bel Age. A Copy of this
testimony is attached at Exhibit B1. Based upon this
testimony the Court ruled the evidence inadmissible stating,
inter alia, at RT Vol. 68, p. 10864
...(It does seem that the evidence is ambiguous, at best, and
the probative value of it is substantially outweighed by the
potential confusion of issues.
It really doesn't have any relevance in that it doesn't prove
anything.
It doesn't establish the state of mind of the defendants in
spending large sums of money.
A copy of the Court's ruling is attached as Exhibit B2.
The prosecution offers no new evidence that would
undermine the previous ruling of this Court. With the
exception of Robin Rosenbloom, the witnesses it lists and
the documents it offers (the hotel bill) are the same as those
they were prepared to offer at the first trial. As for Ms.
Rosenbloom, she apparently has nothing relevant to say on
this issue except that Erik and Lyle (whom she does not
mention seeing) had a room at the Hotel Bel Air the day of
the Memorial service for their parents. One suspects that the
only purpose the prosecution has for calling her is not to
establish "spending" evidence but to establish "partying"
evidence. Copies of the police report statements of the
witnesses and the documents designated by the prosecution
on this issue are attached as Exhibit B3.
2. Item #2 reads "Skiing trip to Aspen-Aspen, Colorado
(Both)". The designated witnesses are Mark Heffernan and
Brian Andersen. An examination of the prior testimony and
all the police interviews with Mark Heffernan reveals no
information whatsoever concerning a skiing trip by the
defendants to Aspen, Colorado. The only reference to this
event by Brian Andersen appears in RT Vol. 133 at page
23038 as follows:
Q. Did you go on a vacation with Erik after his parents were
killed?
A. The skiing vacation?
Q. That qualifies as vacation?
A. Uh-Huh
Q. Did you?
A. Yes
Q. Where did you go
A. To Aspen, Colorado
Q. And who else was there?
A. Mark Heffernan and Lyle.
A Copy of this page of the transcript is attached as Exhibit
C.
Who paid for this vacation? How much did it cost? Was it
planned before the Menendez parents were killed? Did it
represent a change in the defendant's lifestyles or was it like
all the other ski trips that witnesses testified they took over
the course of their lives? These and other questions are
unanswered by the discovery and testimonial records. What
is the probative value of this evidence? None.
3. Item #3 reads "Clothes and accessories-Chicago, Illinois
(Lyle only)". The witness is Mark Andersen. A copy of the
police interview of this witness is attached as Exhibit D.
The crux of the pertinent portion of that statement is that
while Lyle was in Chicago in January 1990 he, Mark
Andersen and Alan Andersen spent 10 hours at a shopping
mall. Lyle charged $3,500 a charge card. Lyle bought suits.
No mention of the "accessories" appears. Likewise, there is
no itemization of the $3,500 nor the number or price of the
suits nor any indication of for whom they were purchased.
The jury is to assume that this extravagance without proof
that it is. They are to further assume that extravagance
equals motive. Like the rest of this type of evidence there is
no indication that Lyle was lacking in suits or anything else
before his parents died, nor that an overwhelming desire for
suits caused him to kill his parents. The real purpose of this
evidence (and the other nasty things Mark Andersen is
quoted as saying about Lyle's behavior during the shopping
excursion) seems to be the "spoiled rich kid" character
attack.
4. Item #4 reads "Private limousines (emphasis added)-
Beverly Hills CA (Lyle only)". The witness is David
Cambell. The relevant portions of his police interviews of
September 1, 1989 and July 27, 1994 are attached as Exhibit
E. In those statements Mr. Campbell indicates that on
August 31, 1989, after having dinner with Lyle (at an
undisclosed restaurant) he saw Lyle get into a limousine.
Was this a $50 lime, a $100 limo? Who picked up the tab
for it? Was this in Beverly Hills? How is this conceivably
proof of motive? It isn't/
5. Item #5 reads "Private limousines-Princeton, New Jersey
(Lyle only)" - the witness is Richard Wenskoski. IN the
attached page of the police report of September 19, 1989,
attached as Exhibit F1, the witness states that Lyle used the
phones in the limousines that were rented for him. This is
during the period of time when Lyle was in Princeton for the
funeral of his parents. Everyone there for the Menendez
rites was transported in a limousine. The company paid for
them.
Similarly in his testimony of July 27, 1993 appearing in RT
vol.55 at page 8042, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit
F2 the witness only makes passing reference to the fact that
Lyle traveled in a limousine in New Jersey.
6. Item #6 is similar to item #5 but here the reference is to
Lyle using private limousines in New York. The Wenskoski
statement of August 29, 1994 addressing this issue consists
again of only a passing reference to the fact that when in
New York Lyle went to the U.S. Open and "made a point to
use the phone in the limousine". A copy of that statement is
attached as Exhibit G. Neither the information from
Wenskoski in support of item #5 nor item#6 proves that
Lyle spent anything. The mere fact of using limousines
within a few days of his parents deaths, before he received
the inso, I even denied that their back taxes were ever canceled. I remember now that the question was put to me in a different connection. A sum of money was set aside for the so-called Hitler Fund, and this amount the Fuehrer put at my disposal for general cultural tasks.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: By the cigarette factory?
GOERING: Not by the cigarette factory; a number of business then subscribed to the Adolf Hitler Fund, and Mr. Reemtsma gave me this sum from the fund in the course of the years, after agreement with the Fuehrer. A part of it was allotted to the State theaters, other part for building up art collections, and other cultural expenditure.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were interrogated on the 12/2/1945 by the External Assets Branch of the United States Investigation of Cartels and External Assets, were you not?
GOERING: May I first say explicitly that I had been asked whether I would be ready to make any statements about it, and was told that these statements would in no way be connected with this Trial. Therefore the presence of my defense counsel would not be necessary This was expressly told me, and was repeated to me by the prison authorities, and before the interrogation it was again confirmed to me that these statements should in no way be brought in in connection with this Trial. However, that is all the same to me. You may produce them as far as I am concerned. But because of the method employed, I desire to have this made known here.
DR. STAHMER: I protest against the use of the statements for the reason that has just been given by the witness. I myself sometime ago-I think it was around Christmas-was asked by, I believe, members of the United States Treasury whether they could interrogate the Defendant Goering on questions of property, adding expressly that I did not have to be present at the interrogation because this had nothing to do with the Trial, and would not be used for it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am not able either to affirm or deny and therefore I will not pursue this subject further at this time. I do not believe that any stipulation was made that these facts should not be gone into. I was not informed of it, and if there has been of course, it would be absurd.
[Turning to the witness.] Now, you were asked about receiving some art objects from Monte Cassino.
GOERING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask you if it is not the fact that an altar statue taken from the Cassino Abbey was brought and delivered to you, and that you expressed great appreciation for it.
GOERING: I am glad to be able to clarify this also. After the monastery of Monte Cassino had been completely destroyed by shelling and had been defended by a paratroop division, a delegation arrived one day bringing along a statue of some saint, entirely worthless from an artistic point of view, as a souvenir of this destroyed monastery. I thanked the men and showed the statue to the curator of my art collection, and he also considered the statue as of absolutely no value. It then remained in the box and was put away somewhere. The other...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think this is coming through sufficiently loud for the shorthand writers to hear.
GOERING: The rest of the art treasures from Monte Cassino according to my knowledge, were shipped in the following manner: A large part, especially those objects which belonged to the old monastery itself, was sent to the Vatican. I must assume this from the fact that the abbot of the monastery sent me and my division a letter written in Latin in which he expressed his extreme gratitude for this action.
Secondly, as far as I remember, the art treasures from the museum in Naples, which were at Monte Cassino, were for the greater part sent by us to Venice and there turned over to the Italian Government. Some pictures and statues were brought to Berlin, and there they were turned over to me. On the very same day I gave the list to the Fuehrer, and some time later also the objects themselves which were in my air raid shelter, so that he could negotiate about the matter with Mussolini. I did not keep a single one of these objects for my own collection. If my troops had not intervened, these priceless art treasures, which were stored in Monte Cassino and belonged to the monastery there, would have been entirely destroyed by enemy bombardment, that is to say, by the gritish-American attackers. Thus they have been saved.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you say of no value-no substantial value?
GOERING: That is even now my conviction, and I depended, above all, on the judgment of my experts. I never took this statue out of its packing case. It did not interest me. On the other hand, I wanted to say a few words of thanks to the men who brought it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The labor shortage in the Reich was becoming acute by 11/1941, was it not?
GOERING: That is correct. [=]
[Copyright 1995 Aristarchus Knowledge Industries]
[Nuremberg War Crimes Trial Online: To Order Call: 1-(800)-435-8221]
[Post Office 45610, Seattle, WA 98105, USA]
Title: "Eighty-Sixth Day, Wednesday, 3/20/1946, Part 25", in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal. Volume IX. Proceedings: 3/8/1946-3/23/1946. [Official text in the English language.] Nuremberg: IMT, 1947. pp. 553-554.
Author: International Military Tribunal
Accession Number: AC_94X_02083
Publication Date: PD_19470101.
Document Type: Government Document.
Source Document Language(s): English
See Also Related Document Supersets: 9IMT; IMT; NWCT
Country of Publication: Germany
Full Text:
MR.JUSTICE JACKSON: And you yourself gave the directives for the employment of Russian prisoners of war, did you not?
GOERING: Employment for what?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: For war industry- tanks, artillery pieces, airplane parts.
GOERING: That is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was at the conference of the 11/7/1941, that you gave that order, was it not?
GOERING: At what conference that was I could not tell you; I issued these directives only in a general way.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the directive was that Russian prisoners of war should be selected in collecting camps beyond the Reich border, and should be transported as rapidly as possible and employed in the following order of priority: mining, railroad maintenance, war industry-tanks, artillery pieces, airplane parts, agriculture, building industry, et cetera. You gave that order, did you not?
GOERING: If I have signed it, the order is from me. I do not remember details.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the number of that, Mr. Jackson?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have you shown Document Number 1193-PS.
GOERING: I have not seen it yet.
[Document 1193-PS was submitted to the witness.]
This document, which you have just mentioned . . .
MR JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not get the answer. GOERING: Excuse me. I have just received a document about the use of Russian troops. Is that the document of which you speak?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. I call your attention to the fact that it is referred to as an annex in the letter signed by Goering.
GOERING: I want to paint out that this document is not signed
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