|
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v.
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED Defendants.
In negotiating the 1996 National Agreement, Defendant Union had the "unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect to any subject or matter not removed by law from the area of collective bargaining . . . " Agreement, Paragraph 225. Moreover, the Union "voluntarily and unqualifiedly waive[d] the right . . . to bargain collectively with respect to any subject or matter referred to or covered in th[e] Agreement, or with respect to any subject or matter not specifically referred to or covered in th[e] Agreement . . . " for the life of the Agreement. Id. The Agreement is presently in full force and effect, and was in full force and effect at all times mentioned herein, including when the unlawful strikes began. In Paragraph 117, the Agreement's no-strike clause, Defendants waived the right to strike except in certain limited circumstances:
During the life of this agreement, the Union will not cause or permit its members to cause, nor will any member of the Union take part in any sit-down, stay-in or slow-down, in any plant of the Corporation, or any curtailment of work or restriction of production or interference with production of the Corporation. The Union will not cause or permit its members to cause nor will any member of the Union take part in any strike or stoppage of any of the Corporation's operations or picket any of the Corporation's plants or premises until all the bargaining procedure as outlined in this agreement has been exhausted, and in no case on which the Umpire shall have ruled, and in no other case on which the Umpire is not empowered to rule until after negotiations have continued for at least five days at the third step.... Flint Metal Center In 1994, the Flint Metal Center was made part of GM's Metal Fabricating Division. During 1994 and 1995, as the result of a study by A.T. Kearney regarding the productivity of the Flint Metal Center, GM and the Defendant Union negotiated over a variety of productivity related issues. The object of these negotiations was to enhance the competitive position of the Flint Metal Center to improve GM's productivity and profitability so as to also provide greater job security and opportunity to Flint Metal Center employees. In January, 1995, GM and the Defendant Union agreed upon a series of steps to improve the Flint Metal Center's competitive position. Pursuant to these discussions and the Union's agreement to take certain actions, GM made certain commitments which are embodies in a letter from J.D. Spielman to Tony Boone, then Chairman of the Local Union 659 Shop Committee ("Spielman Letter"). (A true and correct copy of the Spielman Letter is attached as Exhibit B). The Union agreed to change local work practices that, inter alia enabled a significant number of employees to be paid for eight hours of work while working only four to six hours per day. Despite Defendant Union's agreements to implement changes designed to improve the competitive position of the Flint Metal Center, the Union repeatedly failed and refused to implement many of the specific work rule and other changes to which it agreed. For example, while certain employees were given pay raises based on an understanding that they would perform additional tasks, the Union and the employees have since refused to perform those additional tasks. Similarly, while the Union does not dispute its overall promise to implement changes designed to increase Flint Metal Center's productivity and competitiveness, the Union has repeatedly disputed the scope of its specific obligations. On February 20, Defendant Union affirmed the real reason(s) for the strike when it informed Local Union 659 members that it would hold GM to what it believed were teh commitments made in the Spielman Letter "by whatever means necessary." On May 4, 1998, special negotiations began between GM and Defendant Union with respect to the Flint Metal Center. During this meeting, the Union, through its representatives, stated that there would be no settlement at Flint Metal Center until GM complied with the commitments allegedly made in the Spielman Letter. The parties continued to meet between May 4 and May 28, 1998, but the Union continued to focus the negotiations on the Spielman Letter rather than on resolving any strikeable grievances. On June 2, 1998, after receiving authorization from the International Union, Local Union No. 659 told GM that there was a strike deadline of June 5, 1998 at 10:00 a.m. A strike began at Flint Metal Center at approximately 10:00 a.m. when all, or nearly all, of the first shift of employees represented by Defendant Union walked off the job and refused to return. The strike has continued to date with the entire Flint Metal Center workforce of approximately 3600 Union-represented employees refusing to work. Defendant Union, acting by and through its respective officers and agents, and the individual Defendants, acting on their own behalf and on behalf of the employees of Flint Metal Center and UAW-represented employees nation-wide, breached the Agreement by collectively and individually engaging in this strike. An object of the strike is to coerce GM to agree to Defendant Union's demands over a dispute about product allocation and investment decisions which GM and the Defendant UAW have committed to resolve through the mandatory dispute resolution procedures contained in the parties' Agreement. Defendants' actions in quickly filing and processing unrelated grievances are designed to camouflage this intent and to frustrate and evade the agreed-upon arbitration process by filing such strikeable grievances and then by engaging in strike activity to force GM to capitulate to, rather than arbitrate, Defendants' demands over the Spielman Letter. Delphi East In August 1995, two of the Delphi East plants were placed on a troubled plant list. This was an effort by Delphi to identify and remedy operations that were unprofitable. Operations so identified were required to develop and execute plans to turn around performance or face the prospect of being sold or closed. In 1995, GM management and Defendant Union met to develop and implement action plans to address the situation. As a result, in May 1996 the Delphi East plants were taken off the troubled plant list and placed on a watch list. In 1997, GM again became concerned about the competitiveness of certain Delphi East operations. GM informed Defendant Union of its concerns over the profitability of various product lines and discussed the Union's concerns regarding GM sourcing decisions that affected Delphi East operations. Tensions at the facility increased and Local Union 651 took a strike vote on September 12, 1997. In November 1997, GM and Defendant Union representatives commenced discussions on the future of certain Delphi East operations. In an effort to help bring about a peaceful resolution, GM agreed to a 90-day moratorium on any sale or movement of work that it controlled and the Defendant Union agreed not to strike during this period. While this process was underway, Defendant Union advised the members of Local 651 that it would "not stand by and allow [GM] to outsource" and that it was willing to "take a stand to protect our job." (A true and correct copy of this communication is attached as Exhibit F). Under Appendix I, of the Agreement, GM and the UAW have established detailed procedures for the handling of outsourcing disputes. These procedures culminate in the use of the grievance/arbitration machinery of the Agreement. In April 1998, Defendant Union gave GM its plan. After reviewing the plan, GM informed Defendant Union that the proposals presented were inadequate and did not meaningfully address GM's concerns. The parties agreed, however, to continue to look for ways to resolve the issues even though Defendant Union would still not agree to resolve any of the production standard and subcontracting cases (the so-called strikeable grievances) until the Union's job security demands were also resolved. On or about June 11, 1998 at approximately 7:00 p.m., after receiving authorization from the International Union and giving the five-day strike notice, Local Union No. 651 began a strike at Delphi East. With the exception of several hundred employees, who are performing work on parts for non-GM operations, all represented employees at the site are on strike. The strike has continued to this day. An object of the strike is to coerce GM to agree to Defendant Unions' demands over disputes about the sale of operations, transfer of work and sourcing that GM and the UAW have committed to resolve through the mandatory dispute resolution procedures contained in the Agreement. Defendant Union's actions are designed to camouflage this intent and to frustrate and evade the agreed-upon arbitration process by filing strikeable grievances and then by engaging in strike activity to force GM to capitulate to, rather than arbitrate, Defendant Union's demands. Defendant Union's bad faith and intent to frustrate and evade the agreed-upon arbitration process is illustrated by the fact that before Defendant Union provided the five-day strike notice, the parties had reached a "tentative" agreement on the vast majority of disputes. After June 5, 1998, the date on which Flint Metal Center went on strike, Defendant Union raised the settlement price of these grievances. For example, in two cases where, prior to June 5, 1998, Defendant Union sought only a momentary settlement, after June 5 Defendant Union sought to force GM to hire 250 additional tradespeople and 100 additional truck mechanics in addition to the monetary settlement, despite the fact that GM had no need for such additional manpower. Impact of Strikes Defendants' strike activity at Flint Metal Center and Delphi East have shut down virtually all of GM's operations in North America. This unlawful activity has also affected GM's dealers and suppliers and, to date, has caused GM over one billion dollars in losses. Defendants' concerted strike activity has resulted and will continue to result in irreparable damage to GM and others in meeting production commitments, overhead costs, in caring for materials and property, in the loss of goodwill, in the loss of reputation, in probable permanent loss of customers to competitors, in the shutdown of other GM plants and in occasioning severe economic harm. GM has been incurring and will continue to incur significant economic and non-economic losses as a result of teh strikes. The magnitude of the potential loss to GM resulting from the inability of the parties to resolve this dispute short of arbitration, and from any further delays or intransigent conduct by Defendant Union to avoid proceeding to arbitration, justifies prompt action to compel expedited arbitration. GM does business in a highly competitive market. Valuable goodwill and customer relationships have been developed by GM over a period of years as a result of its prompt and satisfactory service to its customers. Defendant Union has informed GM that it may authorize similar strike activity at other GM facilities in the near future even if the current strike is resolved. GM is without an adequate remedy in a civil action at law because the delays incident to obtaining relief by way of a civil action at law for damages would permit Defendant Union to avoid its contractual commitment to submit disputes over the interpretation and application of the Agreement to the Agreement's arbitration procedure, and permit the Union's unlawful actions to continue. Such unlawful activities of Defendants will continue to result in serious and irreparable damage to GM's business before such legal relief could be obtained, and to sue Defendants only in an action at law would not prevent a continuance of the illegal acts and conduct complained of herein. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF The object of the strikes at Flint Metal Center and Delphi East is to coerce GM to agree to Defendant Union's demands over matters that are subject to the Agreement's grievance and arbitration procedures. The issues in dispute are arbitrable and, pursuant to the Agreement, must be submitted to the Umpire for resolution. As each additional day of the strike passes, GM continues to suffer substantial economic damage and other irreparble harm. Moreover, each day that the strike continues add to GM's significant non-economic losses, including (but not limited to) loss of goodwill, loss of reputation, and probable loss of customers to competitors. The only way to slow this irreparable harm is by returning the parties to the pre-strike status until the Umpire has an opportunity to rule on the arbitrable issues that are at the heart of Defendants' unlawful strike activity. BREACH OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT Since the beginning of the strike, GM has sustained significant losses, in excess of one billion dollars so far. These losses increase each day that Defendants' unlawful activity continues. Because these losses are a direct result of Defendant Union's breach of the Agreement, Defendant Union is responsible for compensating GM for these losses. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, GM requests that: This Court enter an order compelling arbitration of the issue regarding whether Defendants are in violation of teh no-strike clause; This Court order a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants from continuing to strike over grievances which the parties have agreed to arbitrate pursuant to the terms of the Agreement; This Court retain jurisdiction of this matter in the event that the Umpire cannot fully award GM all of the damages to which it is legally entitled; This Court order any such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate, equitable, and just.
|
|
LEGAL DOCUMENTS | HOMEPAGE | VERDICTS | FAMOUS CASES | TRIAL TRACKING | PROGRAM GUIDE | CTV STORE | GAMES/CONTEST | LEGAL TERMS | SEARCH | INDEX | HOW TO GET CTV | COMMENTS
|