This lawsuit was filed by heirs of those killed in the ValuJet crash on May 11, 1996. The suit seeks the revocation of ValuJet's operating certificate on the grounds that the airline has and continues to violate Federal Aviation Association safety measures.

 UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

DANNY H. BELL; JENNIFER L. BELL; RICHARD H. 
BELL, Individually and as Heirs of the Estate of TERRI 
BELL; B. JACK WATKINS; D. ANN WATKINS;

and

J. CHAD JONES, Individually and on Behalf of HOPE 
MEDEIROS, a Minor; TAMI SCHRAMM; JERRY W. 
JONES, Individually, and as Heirs of the Estate of JUDY 
MEDEIROS;

and

ANNETTE NEWELL, Individually, and on Behalf of 
HOPE MEDEIROS, a Minor, and as Heirs of the Estate of 
ROBERT MEDEIROS;

Complainants,

v.

VALUJET AIRLINES, INC., 1800 Phoenix Blvd., Suite 
126 Atlanta, Georgia 30349 770/907-2586

Respondent. Docket No. ___________

 COMPLAINT SEEKING EMERGENCY ORDER 
REVOCATING VALUJET'S AIR CARRIER 
OPERATING CERTIFICATE

COME NOW Complainants, Danny H. Bell, Jennifer L. 
Bell, Richard H. Bell, Individually, and as Heirs of the 
Estate of Terri Bell, B. Jack Watkins, D. Ann Watkins; J. 
Chad Jones, Individually and on Behalf of Hope Medeiros, 
a Minor, Tami Schramm, Jerry W. Jones, Individually, and 
as Heirs of the Estate of Judy Medeiros; and Annette 
Newell, Individually and on Behalf of Hope Medeiros, a 
Minor, and as Heirs of the Estate of Robert Medeiros, 
complaining of ValuJet Airlines, Inc. ("ValuJet"), 1800 
Phoenix Blvd., Suite 126, Atlanta, Georgia, 30349, and 
alleging as follows:

1.

Complainants are survivors of Terri Bell, Judy Medeiros 
and Robert Medeiros, passengers killed in the crash of 
ValuJet Flight 592 on May 11, 1996. See generally NTSB 
Preliminary Report, DCA96MA054.

2.

This Complaint is brought to the Administrator, Federal 
Aviation Administration ("FAA"), in accordance with 
Special Federal Aviation Regulation 72, Section 13.5, 
based on information discovered during the investigation of 
the crash of ValuJet 592, as well as in FAA memoranda, 
correspondence, reports, and publically reported statements 
of government officials. Months before the crash of ValuJet 
592, the FAA expressed concern that ValuJet was not 
meeting its duty to provide service with the highest 
possible degree of safety as required by section 44702 of 
Public Law 103-272. ValuJet continues to operate and 
maintain its aircraft in an unsafe manner. See FAA Aircraft 
Maintenance Division (AFS-300) report dated February 14, 
1996; FAA letter of February 29, 1996, to ValuJet 
President Lewis Jordan; preliminary draft report, FAA's 
ValuJet "Special Emphasis Program," dated May 6, 1996 
(cited in Washington Post, June 11, 1996).

3.

The Complainants allege that ValuJet is the holder of an 
Air Carrier Operating Certificate number VJ6A465W 
issued by the FAA and is subject to the Federal Aviation 
Regulations ("FAR") promulgated by the FAA.

4.

ValuJet violated and continues to violate FAR 121.105 by 
failing to show that competent personnel and adequate 
facilities and equipment (including spare parts, supplies, 
and materials) are available at such points along the 
certificate holder's route as are necessary for the proper 
servicing, maintenance, and preventive maintenance of 
airplanes and auxiliary equipment. See FAA Aircraft 
Maintenance Division (AFS-300) report, dated February 
14, 1966; preliminary draft report, FAA's ValuJet "Special 
Emphasis Program," dated May 6, 1996 (cited in 
Washington Post, June 11, 1996).

5.

ValuJet violated and continues to violate FAR 
121.363(a)(1) and (2) by failing to insure "the airworthiness 
of its aircraft," and "the performance of maintenance . . . of 
its aircraft" in accordance with its manual and the FAR's. 
See FAA Aircraft Maintenance Division (AFS-300) report, 
dated February 14, 1996; FAA letter to ValuJet President 
Lewis Jordan, dated February 29, 1996.

6.

ValuJet violated and continues to violate FAR 121.365 by 
failing to have a maintenance "organization adequate to 
perform the [maintenance] work."  See FAA Aircraft 
Maintenance Division (AFS- 300) report, dated February 
14, 1996; FAA letter to ValuJet President Lewis Jordan, 
dated February 29, 1996; preliminary draft report, FAA's 
ValuJet "Special Emphasis Program," dated May 6, 1996 
(cited in Washington Post, June 11, 1996).

7.

ValuJet violated and continues to violate FAR 121.367(a), 
(b) and (c) by failing to have a sufficient maintenance 
inspection program to insure maintenance is performed in 
accordance with the certificate holder's manual, competent 
personnel and adequate facilities and equipment are 
provided for the proper performance of maintenance and 
each aircraft released to service is airworthy and has been 
properly maintained for operation. See FAA Aircraft 
Maintenance Division (AFS-300) report, dated February 
14, 1996; preliminary draft report, FAA's ValuJet "Special 
Emphasis Program," dated May 6, 1996 (cited in 
Washington Post, June 11, 1996).

8.

ValuJet violated and continues to violate FAR 121.371(a) 
by failing to insure aircraft maintenance inspections are 
carried out by appropriately certified, properly trained, 
qualified and authorized personnel. See FAA letter to 
ValuJet President Lewis Jordan, dated February 29, 1996; 
preliminary draft report, FAA's ValuJet "Special Emphasis 
Program," dated May 6, 1996 (cited in Washington Post, 
June 11, 1996).

9.

ValuJet violated FAR 121.373(a) by failing to "establish 
and maintain a system for the continuing analysis and 
surveillance of the performance and effectiveness of its 
[maintenance] inspection program."  See FAA Aircraft 
Maintenance Division (AFS-300) report, dated February 
14, 1996.

10.

ValuJet violated 49 CFR Section 175.30, by accepting 
hazardous material in the form of oxygen generators for 
transportation aboard an aircraft that was not properly 
authorized, marked or identified. These oxygen generators 
had been scrapped from other ValuJet aircraft undergoing 
maintenance at SabreTech, Inc. in Miami, Florida. See 
Statement of Richard D'Arcy, ValuJet maintenance 
employee, dated May 19, 1996 (available on Internet); 
NTSB Preliminary Report Aviation DCA96MA054.

11.

The Secretary of Transportation is charged with the 
responsibility of "assigning and maintaining safety as the 
highest priority in air commerce."  49 U.S.C. Section 
40101(a)(1).

12.

ValuJet maintenance and operations are unsafe and this 
pattern of unsafe operation and maintenance is ongoing. 
The Secretary of Transportation and FAA Administrator 
have failed to enforce federal statutes against ValuJet 
Airlines, Inc. and now appear to have placed the promotion 
and development of ValuJet Airlines, Inc. above the safety 
of the traveling public in direct contravention of the clear 
mandate of 49 U.S.C. Section 40101 (a)(1).

13.

The Secretary of Transportation and FAA Administrator 
are also charged by federal statute with the responsibility of 
"preventing deterioration in established safety procedures, 
recognizing the clear intent, encouragement, and dedication 
of Congress to further the highest degree of safety in air 
transportation and air commence, and to maintain the safety 
that has evolved in air transportation and air commerce and 
has come to be expected by the traveling and shipping 
public."  49 U.S.C. Section 40101(a)(3).

14.

The disproportionate allocation of government inspectors 
assigned to ValuJet in an effort to keep it flying has 
unreasonably and arbitrarily diverted essential safety 
inspection and enforcement resources away from other 
areas of air transportation and has allowed a deterioration 
of established safety procedures throughout the air 
transportation system in direct contravention of the clear 
mandate of 49 U.S.C. Section 40101 (a)(3).

15.

Oxygen generators scrapped from other ValuJet aircraft at 
SabreTech, Inc. were improperly located into the forward 
cargo compartment where the fire erupted on ValuJet 592. 
NTSB Preliminary Report Aviation DCA96MA054. The 
FAA Aircraft Maintenance Division report of February 14, 
1996 recommended consideration of an immediate re-
certification of ValuJet based on known safety-related 
issues. That report focused, in part, on ValuJet's inadequate 
General Maintenance Manual which had conflicting 
provisions, violated FAR's, and significantly did not 
address "parts scrapping procedures."

16.

Prior to the crash of ValuJet Flight 592, the FAA was 
aware of numerous continuing safety violations by ValuJet 
Airlines, Inc. In a February 29, 1996 letter to ValuJet 
Airlines, the FAA expressed concerns "that ValuJet is not 
meeting its duty to provide service with the highest 
possible degree of safety."  The FAA has heretofore 
concealed this important information from the traveling 
public. The preliminary draft report, FAA's ValuJet 
"Special Emphasis Program," dated May 6, 1996 (cited in 
Washington Post, June 11, 1996) demonstrates that 
ValuJet's safety violations are continuing.

17.

The arbitrary reduction in the number of flights by ValuJet 
following the crash of Flight 592 and the initiation of 
additional special FAA inspections, are admissions by 
ValuJet and the FAA that ValuJet is not "fit, willing, and 
able to provide the transportation authorized by the 
certificate," as required by 49 U.S.C. Section 41110(e)(1).

18.

While negotiations are ongoing to obtain adequate 
maintenance support, ValuJet continues to operate aircraft 
maintained by the admittedly unsatisfactory contract 
maintenance facilities. ValuJet has publicly admitted that 
its maintenance practices are inadequate and is attempting 
to reach agreements with qualified maintenance facilities to 
maintain its aircraft. The preliminary draft report, FAA's 
ValuJet "Special Emphasis Program," dated May 6, 1996 
labeled ValuJet's procedures for quality control of its 
maintenance facilities "inadequate."  This is further 
admission by the FAA and ValuJet that ValuJet is not "fit, 
willing, and able to provide the transportation authorized by 
the certificate."  49 U.S.C. Section 41110(e)(1).

19.

The FAA has demonstrated a pattern of inaction and non-
enforcement regarding ValuJet's noncompliance with 
federal statutes and regulations enacted to protect the safety 
of the public. ValuJet has operated at the advisory or alert 
threshold during the majority of its brief existence as 
evidenced by the results of the FAA NASIP Inspection 
Program, with known safety related issues including the 
absence of adequate policies and procedures for 
maintenance personnel to follow. See FAA Aircraft 
Maintenance Division (AFS- 300) report, dated February 
14, 1996.

20.

The FAA's authorization of continued ValuJet operations 
under Air Carrier Operating Certificate VJ6A465W poses a 
significant threat of irreparable harm by allowing unsafe air 
transportation and requiring the unreasonable diversion of 
essential FAA safety inspection and enforcement resources 
away from other critical areas of air transportation.

21.

ValuJet, in spite of blatant violations of federal law that 
continue to this day, and admissions that it cannot safely 
perform the transportation authorized by its Air Carrier 
Operating Certificate, continues to fly and carry passengers, 
creating an immediate threat to aviation safety, endangering 
the lives and property of others. The crash of flight 592 and 
the resultant loss of 110 lives could have been prevented 
had the FAA followed the clear mandate of the law 
demanding that ValuJet be grounded until it can operate 
safely. Innocent passengers and unsuspecting crew 
members should not be placed at continued risk on ValuJet 
aircraft.

WHEREFORE, Complainants demand the Administrator 
immediately issue an Emergency Order of Revocation of 
ValuJet's Air Carrier Operating Certificate number 
VJ6A465W pursuant to Special Federal Aviation 
Regulation 72, Section 13.20 and require ValuJet to show 
cause why its authority to operate an airline in air 
commerce should not be permanently revoked until such 
time as ValuJet has demonstrated that it is fit, willing, and 
able to safely maintain its aircraft and provide 
transportation authorized by its certificate as required by 
law.

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________________________ JOHN 
HOWIE, Tx. Bar No. 10121500 JON KETTLES, Tx. Bar 
No. 00791021 HOWIE & SWEENEY, L.L.P. Suite 1400, 
Park Place on Turtle Creek 2911 Turtle Creek Boulevard 
Dallas, Texas 75219 (214) 523-8800 Telecopier (214) 523-
8888

and

JOSEPH E. SCHMITZ LAWRENCE H. BRINKER 
PATTON BOGGS, L.L.P. 2550 M Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20037 (202) 457-6068 Telecopier (202) 
457-6315

ATTORNEYS FOR COMPLAINANTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the 12th day of June, 1996, a copy of the foregoing 
Complaint was mailed or otherwise delivered to the 
following:

The Federal Aviation Administration Office of the Chief 
Counsel Attention: Enforcement Docket (AGC-10) 800 
Independence Ave. S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591

Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration 800 
Independence Ave. S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591

ValuJet Airlines, Inc. 1800 Phoenix Blvd., Suite 126 
Atlanta, Georgia 30349 (770) 907-2586 (Telecopier)

Regional Administrator FAA Southern Region 1701 
Columbia Ave. College Park, Georgia 30337 (404) 305-
5010 (Telecopier)

SabreTech, Inc. 4900 N.W. 36th Street Building 25 Miami, 
Florida 33142 (305) 871-5564 (Telecopier)



__________________________________ JOHN HOWIE