In re
Impeachment of
William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States
TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT
WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
David E. Kendall
Nicole K. Seligman
Emmet T. Flood
Max Stier
Glen Donath
Alicia Marti
Williams & Connolly
725 12th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 | Charles F.C. Ruff
Gregory B. Craig
Bruce R. Lindsey
Cheryl D. Mills
Lanny A. Breuer
Office of the White House Counsel
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502 |
January 13, 1999
TABLE OF CONTENTS
| I.
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| A. | The Constitutional Standard
for Impeachment Has Not Been Satisfied | 4 |
| B. | The President Did Not
Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice | 5 |
| C. | Compound Charges and
Vagueness | 5 |
II. |
BACKGROUND |
6 |
| A. | The Whitewater
Investigative Dead-End | 6 |
| B. | The Paula Jones Litigation
| 8 |
| C. | The President's Grand Jury
Testimony About Ms. Lewinsky | 11 |
| D. | Proceedings in the House of
Representatives | 12 |
III. |
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD AND BURDEN OF PROOF FOR DECISION |
15 |
| A. | The Offenses Alleged Do Not
Meet the Constitutional Standard of High Crimes and Misdemeanors |
15 |
| 1. | The Senate Has a
Constitutional Duty to Confront the Question Whether Impeachable Offenses Have
Been Alleged | 15 |
| 2. | The Constitution Requires a
High Standard of Proof of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors" for Removal
| 16 |
| a. | The Constitutional Text and
Structure Set an Intentionally High Standard for Removal |
16 |
| b. | The Framers Believed that
Impeachment and Removal Were Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of
Government | 19 |
| 3. | Past Precedents Confirm
that Allegations of Dishonesty Do Not Alone State Impeachable Offenses |
21 |
| a. | The Fraudulent Tax Return
Allegation Against President Nixon | 21 |
| b. | The Financial Misdealing
Allegation Against Alexander Hamilton | 23 |
| 4. | The Views of Prominent
Historians and Legal Scholars Confirm that Impeachable Offenses Are Not Present
| 24 |
| a. | No Impeachable Offense Has
Been Stated Here | 24 |
| b. | To Make Impeachable
Offenses of These Allegations Would Forever Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to
the Presidency and to Our Government of Separated Powers |
26 |
| 5. | Comparisons to Impeachment
of Judges Are Wrong | 27 |
| B. | The Standard of Proof |
31 |
IV. |
THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE I |
33 |
| A. | Applicable Law |
33 |
| B. | Structure of the
Allegations | 36 |
| C. | Response to the Particular
Allegations in Article I | 38 |
| 1. | The President denies that
he made materially false or misleading statements to the grand jury about "the
nature and details of his relationship" with Monica Lewinsky |
39 |
| 2. | The President denies that
he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about
testimony he gave in the Jones case | 45 |
| 3. | The President denies that
he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about the
statements of his attorney to Judge Wright during the Jones deposition
| 50 |
| 4. | The President denies that
he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury when he
denied attempting "to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede
the discovery of evidence" in the Jones case |
51 |
V. |
THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE II |
54 |
| A. | Applicable Law | 54 |
| B. | Structure of the
Allegations | 55 |
| C. | Response to the Particular
Allegations in Article II | 56 |
| 1. | The President denies that
on or about December 17, 1997, he "corruptly encouraged" Monica
Lewinsky "to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to
be perjurious, false and misleading" | 56 |
| 2. | The President denies that
on or about December 17, 1997, he "corruptly encouraged" Monica
Lewinsky "to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when
called to testify personally" in the Jones litigation |
59 |
| 3. | The President denies that
he "corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal
evidence" -- gifts he had given to Monica Lewinsky -- in the Jones case
| 63 |
| a. | Ms. Lewinsky's December 28
Meeting with the President | 63 |
| b. | Ms. Currie's Supposed
Involvement in Concealing Gifts | 66 |
| c. | The
Obstruction-by-Gift-Concealment Charge Is at Odds With the President's Actions
| 72 |
| 4. | The President denies that
he obstructed justice in connection with Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a
job in New York in an effort to "corruptly prevent" her "truthful
testimony" in the Jones case | 74 |
| a. | The Complete Absence of
Direct Evidence Supporting This Charge | 75 |
| b. | Background of Ms.
Lewinsky's New York Job Search | 76 |
| c. | The Committee Report's
Circumstantial Case | 80 |
| 1) | Monica Lewinsky's December
11 meeting with Vernon Jordan | 80 |
| 2) | The January job interviews
and the Revlon employment offer | 84 |
| d. | Conclusion |
88 |
| 5. | The President denies that
he "corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements
to a Federal judge" concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit |
89 |
| 6. | The President denies that
he obstructed justice by relating "false and misleading statements" to
"a potential witness," Betty Currie, "in order to corruptly
influence [her] testimony" | 91 |
| 7. | The President denies that
he obstructed justice when he relayed allegedly "false and misleading
statements" to his aides | 96 |
VI. |
THE STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE ARTICLES PRECLUDE A CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND
VOTE |
98 |
| A. | The Articles Are Both
Unfairly Complex and Lacking in Specificity | 100 |
| 1. | The Structure of Article I
| 100 |
| 2. | The Structure of Article II
| 102 |
| B. | Conviction on These
Articles Would Violate the Constitutional Requirement That Two-Thirds of the
Senate Reach Agreement that Specific Wrongdoing Has Been Proven |
104 |
| 1. | The Articles Bundle
Together Disparate Allegations in Violation of the Constitution's Requirements
of Concurrence and Due Process | 104 |
| a. | The Articles Violate the
Constitution's Two-Thirds Concurrence Requirement | 104 |
| b. | Conviction on the Articles
Would Violate Due Process Protections that Forbid Compound Charges in a Single
Accusation | 109 |
| C. | Conviction on These
Articles Would Violate Due Process Protections Prohibiting Vague and Nonspecific
Accusations | 113 |
| 1. | The Law of Due Process
Forbids Vague and Nonspecific Charges | 113 |
| 2. | The Allegations of Both
Articles Are Unconstitutionally Vague | 115 |
| D. | The
Senate's Judgment Will Be Final and That Judgment Must Speak Clearly and
Intelligibly. | 120 |
VII. |
THE NEED FOR DISCOVERY |
121 |
VIII. |
CONCLUSION |
126 |
TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-six months ago, more than 90 million Americans left their homes and
work places to travel to schools, church halls and other civic centers to elect
a President of the United States. And on January 20, 1997, William Jefferson
Clinton was sworn in to serve a second term of office for four years.
The Senate, in receipt of Articles of Impeachment from the House of
Representatives, is now gathered in trial to consider whether that decision
should be set aside for the remaining two years of the President's term. It is a
power contemplated and authorized by the Framers of the Constitution, but never
before employed in our nation's history. The gravity of what is at stake -- the
democratic choice of the American people -- and the solemnity of the proceedings
dictate that a decision to remove the President from office should follow only
from the most serious of circumstances and should be done in conformity with
Constitutional standards and in the interest of the Nation and its people.
The Articles of Impeachment that have been exhibited to the Senate fall far
short of what the Founding Fathers had in mind when they placed in the hands of
the Congress the power to impeach and remove a President from office. They fall
far short of what the American people demand be shown and proven before their
democratic choice is reversed. And they even fall far short of what a prudent
prosecutor would require before presenting a case to a judge or jury.
Take away the elaborate trappings of the Articles and the high-flying
rhetoric that has accompanied them, and we see clearly that the House of
Representatives asks the Senate to remove the President from office because he:
- used the phrase "certain occasions" to describe the
frequency of his improper intimate contacts with Ms. Monica Lewinsky. There
were, according to the House Managers, eleven such contacts over the course of
approximately 500 days.
Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the United
States be removed from office because he used the phrase "certain occasions"
to describe eleven events over some 500 days? That is what the House of
Representatives asks the Senate to do.
- used the word "occasional" to describe the frequency of
inappropriate telephone conversations between he and Monica Lewinsky. According
to Ms. Lewinsky, the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in between ten and
fifteen such conversations spanning a 23-month period.
Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the United
States be removed from office because he used the word "occasional" to
describe up to 15 telephone calls over a 23-month period? That is what the House
of Representatives asks the Senate to do.
- said the improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began in early 1996,
while she recalls that it began in November 1995. And he said the contact did
not include touching certain parts of her body, while she said it did.
Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the United
States be removed from office because two people have a different recollection
of the details of a wrongful relationship -- which the President has admitted?
That is what the House of Representatives asks the Senate to do.
The Articles of Impeachment are not limited to the examples cited above, but
the other allegations of wrongdoing are similarly unconvincing. There is the
charge that the President unlawfully obstructed justice by allegedly trying to
find a job for Monica Lewinsky in exchange for her silence about their
relationship. This charge is made despite the fact that no one involved in the
effort to find work for Ms. Lewinsky -- including Ms. Lewinsky herself --
testifies that there was any connection between the job search and the
affidavit. Indeed, the basis for that allegation, Ms. Lewinsky's statements to
Ms. Tripp, was expressly repudiated by Ms. Lewinsky under oath.
There is also the charge that the President conspired to obstruct justice by
arranging for Ms. Lewinsky to hide gifts that he had given her, even though the
facts and the testimony contain no evidence that he did so. In fact, the
evidence shows that the President gave her new gifts on the very day that the
articles allege he conspired to conceal his gifts to her.
In the final analysis, the House is asking the Senate to remove the
President because he had a wrongful relationship and sought to keep the
existence of that relationship private.
Nothing said in this Trial Memorandum is intended to excuse the President's
actions. By his own admission, he is guilty of personal failings. As he has
publicly stated, "I don't think there is a fancy way to say that I have
sinned." He has misled his family, his friends, his staff, and the Nation
about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He hoped to avoid
exposure of personal wrongdoing so as to protect his family and himself and to
avoid public embarrassment. He has acknowledged that his actions were wrong.
By the same token, these actions must not be mischaracterized into a wholly
groundless excuse for removing the President from the office to which he was
twice elected by the American people. The allegations in the articles and the
argument in the House Managers' Trial Memorandum do not begin to satisfy the
stringent showing required by our Founding Fathers to remove a duly elected
President from office, either as a matter of fact or law.
A. The Constitutional Standard for
Impeachment Has Not Been Satisfied
There is strong agreement among constitutional and legal scholars and
historians that the substance of the articles does not amount to impeachable
offenses. On November 6, 1998, 430 Constitutional law professors wrote:
Did President Clinton commit "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
warranting impeachment under the Constitution? We . . . believe that the
misconduct alleged in the report of the Independent Counsel . . . does not cross
the threshold. . . . [I]t is clear that Members of Congress could violate their
constitutional responsibilities if they sought to impeach and remove the
President for misconduct, even criminal misconduct, that fell short of the high
constitutional standard required for impeachment.
On October 28, 1998, more than 400 historians issued a joint statement
warning that because impeachment had traditionally been reserved for high crimes
and misdemeanors in the exercise of executive power, impeachment of the
President based on the facts alleged in the OIC Referral would set a dangerous
precedent. "If carried forward, they will leave the Presidency permanently
disfigured and diminished, at the mercy as never before of caprices of any
Congress. The Presidency, historically the center of leadership during our great
national ordeals, will be crippled in meeting the inevitable challenges of the
future."
We address why the charges in the two articles do not rise to the level of
`high Crimes and Misdemeanors" in Section III, Constitutional Standard and
Burden of Proof.
B. The President Did Not Commit Perjury or
Obstruct Justice
Article I alleges perjury before a federal grand jury. Article II alleges
obstruction of justice. Both perjury and obstruction of justice are statutory
crimes. In rebutting the allegations contained in the articles of impeachment,
this brief refers to the facts as well as to laws, legal principles, court
decisions, procedural safeguards, and the Constitution itself. Those
who seek to remove the President speak of the "rule of law." Among the
most fundamental rules of law are the principles that those who accuse have the
burden of proof, and those who are accused have the right to defend themselves
by relying on the law, established procedures, and the Constitution. These
principles are not "legalisms" but rather the very essence of the "rule
of law" that distinguishes our Nation from others.
We respond, in detail, to those allegations whose substance we can decipher
in Section IV, The President Should Be Acquitted on Article I, and in Section V,
The President Should Be Acquitted on Article II.
C. Compound Charges and Vagueness
If there were any doubt that the House of Representatives has utterly failed
in its constitutional responsibility to the Senate and to the President, that
doubt vanishes upon reading the Trial Memorandum submitted by the House
Managers. Having proffered two articles of impeachment, each of which
unconstitutionally combines multiple offenses and fails to give even minimally
adequate notice of the charges it encompasses, the House -- three days before
the Managers are to open their case -- is still expanding, not refining, the
scope of those articles. In further violation of the most basic constitutional
principles, their brief advances, merely as "examples,"
nineteen conclusory allegations -- eight of perjury under Article I and eleven
of obstruction of justice under Article II, some of which have never appeared
before, even in the Report submitted by the Judiciary Committee ("Committee
Report"), much less in the Office of Independent Counsel ("OIC")
Referral or in the articles themselves.1
If the target the Managers present to the Senate and to the President is still
moving now, what can the President expect in the coming days? Is there any point
at which the President will be given the right accorded a defendant in the most
minor criminal case -- to know with certainty the charges against which he must
defend?
The Senate, we know, fully appreciates these concerns and has, in past
proceedings, dealt appropriately with articles far less flawed than these. The
constitutional concerns raised by the House's action are addressed in Section
VI, The Structural Deficiencies of the Articles Preclude a Constitutionally
Sound Vote.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Whitewater Investigative Dead-End
The Lewinsky investigation emerged in January 1998 from the long-running
Whitewater investigation. On August 5, 1994, the Special Division of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Court Circuit appointed
Kenneth W. Starr as Independent Counsel to conduct an investigation centering on
two Arkansas entities, Whitewater Development Company, Inc., and Madison
Guaranty Savings and Loan Association.
In the spring of 1997, OIC investigators, without any expansion of
jurisdiction, interviewed Arkansas state troopers who had once been assigned to
the Governor's security detail, and "[t]he troopers said Starr's
investigators asked about 12 to 15 women by name, including Paula Corbin
Jones. . . ." Woodward & Schmidt, "Starr Probes
Clinton Personal Life," The Washington Post (June 25, 1997) at A1
(emphasis added). "The nature of the questioning marks a sharp departure
from previous avenues of inquiry in the three-year old investigation . . . .
Until now, . . . what has become a wide-ranging investigation of many aspects of
Clinton's governorship has largely steered clear of questions about Clinton's
relationships with women . . . ."2
One of the most striking aspects of this new phase of the Whitewater
investigation was the extent to which it focused on the Jones case. One
of the troopers interviewed declared, "`[t]hey asked me about Paula Jones,
all kinds of questions about Paula Jones, whether I saw Clinton and Paula
together and how many times.'"3
In his November 19, 1998, testimony before the House Judiciary Committee,
Mr. Starr conceded that his agents had conducted these interrogations and
acknowledged that at that time, he had not sought expansion of his jurisdiction
from either the Special Division or the Attorney General.4
Mr. Starr contended that these inquiries were somehow relevant to his Whitewater
investigation: "we were, in fact, interviewing, as good prosecutors, good
investigators do, individuals who would have information that may be relevant to
our inquiry about the President's involvement in Whitewater, in Madison Guaranty
Savings and Loan and the like."5 It
seems irrefutable, however, that the OIC was in fact engaged in an unauthorized
attempt to gather embarrassing information about the President -- information
wholly unrelated to Whitewater or Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan, but
potentially relevant to the lawsuit filed by Paula Jones.
B. The Paula Jones Litigation
The Paula Jones lawsuit made certain allegations about events she said had
occurred three years earlier, in 1991, when the President was Governor of
Arkansas. Discovery in the case had been stayed until the Supreme Court's
decision on May 27, 1997, denying the President temporary immunity from suit.6
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Jones' legal team began a public relations offensive
against the President, headed by Ms. Jones' new spokesperson, Ms. Susan
Carpenter-McMillan, and her new counsel affiliated with the conservative
Rutherford Institute.7 "`I will
never deny that when I first heard about this case I said, "Okay, good.
We're gonna get that little slimeball,"' said Ms. Carpenter-McMillan."8
While Ms. Jones' previous attorneys, Messrs. Gilbert Davis and Joseph Cammarata,
had largely avoided the media, as the Jones civil suit increasingly
became a partisan vehicle to try to damage the President, public personal
attacks became the order of the day.9 As
is now well known, this effort led ultimately to the Jones lawyers being
permitted to subpoena various women, to discover the nature of their
relationship, if any, with the President, allegedly for the purpose of
determining whether they had information relevant to the sexual harassment
charge. Among these women was Ms. Lewinsky.
In January 1998, Ms. Linda Tripp notified the OIC of certain information she
believed she had about Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the Jones case. At
that time, the OIC investigation began to intrude formally into the Jones
case: the OIC met with Ms. Tripp through the week of January 12, and with her
cooperation taped Ms. Lewinsky discussing the Jones case and the
President. Ms. Tripp also informed the OIC that she had been surreptitiously
taping conversations with Ms. Lewinsky in violation of Maryland law, and in
exchange for her cooperation, the OIC promised Ms. Tripp immunity from federal
prosecution, and assistance in protecting her from state prosecution.10
On Friday, January 16, after Ms. Tripp wore a body wire and had taped
conversations with Ms. Lewinsky for the OIC, the OIC received jurisdiction from
the Attorney General and formalized an immunity agreement with Ms. Tripp in
writing.
The President's deposition in the Jones case was scheduled to take
place the next day, on Saturday, January 17. As we now know, Ms. Tripp met with
and briefed the lawyers for Ms. Jones the night before the deposition on her
perception of the relationship between Ms. Lewinsky and the President -- doing
so based on confidences Ms. Lewinsky had entrusted to her.11
She was permitted to do so even though she had been acting all week at the
behest of the OIC and was dependent on the OIC to use its best efforts to
protect her from state prosecution. At the deposition the next day, the
President was asked numerous questions about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky
by lawyers who already knew the answers.
The Jones case, of course, was not about Ms. Lewinsky. She was a
peripheral player and, since her relationship with the President was concededly
consensual, irrelevant to Ms. Jones' case. Shortly after the President's
deposition, Chief Judge Wright ruled that evidence pertaining to Ms. Lewinsky
would not be admissible at the Jones trial because "it is not
essential to the core issues in this case."12
The Court also ruled that, given the allegations at issue in the Jones
case, the Lewinsky evidence "might be inadmissible as extrinsic evidence"
under the Federal Rules of Evidence because it involved merely the "specific
instances of conduct" of a witness.13
On April 1, 1998, the Court ruled that Ms. Jones had no case and granted
summary judgment for the President. Although Judge Wright "viewed the
record in the light most favorable to [Ms. Jones] and [gave] her the benefit of
all reasonable factual inferences,"14
the Court ruled that, as a matter of law, she simply had no case against
President Clinton, both because "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact" and because President Clinton was "entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 11-12. After reviewing all the
proffered evidence, the Court ruled that "the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for" Ms. Jones. Id. at
39.
C. The President's Grand Jury Testimony
About Ms. Lewinsky
On August 17, 1998, the President voluntarily testified to the grand jury
and specifically acknowledged that he had had a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky
involving "improper intimate contact," and that he "engaged in
conduct that was wrong." App. at 461.15
He described how the relationship began and how he had ended it early in 1997 --
long before any public attention or scrutiny. He stated to the grand jury "it's
an embarrassing and personally painful thing, the truth about my relationship
with Ms. Lewinsky," App. at 533, and told the grand jurors, "I take
full responsibility for it. It wasn't her fault, it was mine." App. at
589-90.
The President also explained how he had tried to navigate the deposition in
the Jones case months earlier without admitting what he admitted to the
grand jury -- that he had been engaged in an improper intimate relationship with
Ms. Lewinsky. Id. at 530-531. He further testified that the "inappropriate
encounters" with Ms. Lewinsky had ended, at his insistence, in early 1997.
He declined to describe, because of considerations of personal privacy and
institutional dignity, certain specifics about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky,16
but he indicated his willingness to answer,17
and he did answer, the other questions put to him about his relationship with
her. No one who watched the videotape of this grand jury testimony had any doubt
that the President admitted to having had an improper intimate relationship with
Ms. Lewinsky.
D. Proceedings in the House of
Representatives
On September 9, 1998, Mr. Starr transmitted a Referral to the House of
Representatives that alleged eleven acts by the President related to the
Lewinsky matter that, in the opinion of the OIC, "may constitute grounds
for an impeachment."18 The
allegations fell into three broad categories: lying under oath, obstruction of
justice, and abuse of power.
The House Judiciary Committee held a total of four hearings and called but
one witness: Kenneth W. Starr. The Committee allowed the President's lawyers two
days in which to present a defense. The White House presented four panels of
distinguished expert witnesses who testified that the facts, as alleged, did not
constitute an impeachable offense, did not reveal an abuse of power, and would
not support a case for perjury or obstruction of justice that any reasonable
prosecutor would bring. White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff presented argument
to the Committee on behalf of the President, which is incorporated into this
Trial Memorandum by reference.19
On December 11 and 12, the Judiciary Committee voted essentially along party
lines to approve four articles of impeachment. Republicans defeated the
alternative resolution of censure offered by certain Committee Democrats. Almost
immediately after censure failed in the Committee, the House Republican
leadership declared publicly that no censure proposal would be considered by the
full House when it considered the articles of impeachment.20
On December 19, 1998, voting essentially on party lines, the House of
Representatives approved two articles of impeachment: Article I, which alleged
perjury before the grand jury, passed by a vote of 228 to 206 and Article III,
which alleged obstruction of justice, passed by a vote of 221 to 212. The full
House defeated two other Articles: Article II, which alleged that the President
committed perjury in his civil deposition, and Article IV, which alleged abuse
of power. Consideration of a censure resolution was blocked, even though members
of both parties had expressed a desire to vote on such an option.
From beginning to end the House process was both partisan and unfair.
Consider:
- The House released the entire OIC Referral to the public without ever
reading it, reviewing it, editing it, or allowing the President's counsel to
review it;
- The Chairman of the House of Judiciary Committee said he had "no
interest in not working in a bipartisan way";21
- The Chairman also pledged a process the American people would conclude was
fair;22
- The Speaker-Designate of the House endorsed a vote of conscience on a
motion to censure;23
- Members of the House were shown secret "evidence" in order to
influence their vote -- evidence which the President's counsel still has not
been able to review.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD AND BURDEN OF PROOF FOR DECISION
A. The Offenses Alleged Do Not Meet the
Constitutional Standard of High Crimes and Misdemeanors
1. The Senate Has a Constitutional Duty to
Confront the Question Whether Impeachable Offenses Have Been Alleged
It is the solemn duty of the Senate to consider the question whether the
articles state an impeachable offense.24
That Constitutional question has not, in the words of one House Manager,
"already been resolved by the House."25
To the contrary, that question now awaits the Senate's measured consideration
and independent judgment. Indeed, throughout our history, resolving this
question has been an essential part of the Senate's constitutional obligation to
"try all Impeachments." U.S. Const. Art. I, § 3, cl. 7. In the
words of John Logan, a House Manager in the 1868 proceedings:
It is the rule that all questions of law or of fact are to be
decided, in these proceedings, by the final vote upon the guilt or innocence of
the accused. It is also the rule, that in determining this general issue senators
must consider the sufficiency or insufficiency in law or in fact of
every article of accusation."26
We respectfully suggest that the articles exhibited here do not state
wrongdoing that constitutes impeachable offenses under our Constitution.
2. The Constitution Requires a High Standard
of Proof of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors" for Removal
a. The Constitutional Text and Structure Set
an Intentionally High Standard for Removal
The Constitution provides that the President shall be removed from office
only upon "Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. Constitution, Art. II, section 4. The
charges fail to meet the high standard that the Framers established.27
The syntax of the Constitutional standard "Treason, Bribery or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" (emphasis added) strongly suggests,
by the interpretive principle noscitur a sociis,28
that, to be impeachable offenses, high crimes and misdemeanors must be of the
seriousness of "Treason" and "Bribery."
Our Constitutional structure reaffirms that the standard must be a very high
one. Ours is a Constitution of separated powers. In that Constitution, the
President does not serve at the will of Congress, but as the directly elected,29
solitary head of the Executive Branch. The Constitution
reflects a judgment that a strong Executive, executing the law independently of
legislative will, is a necessary protection for a free people.
These elementary facts of constitutional structure underscore the need for a
very high standard for impeachment. The House Managers, in their Brief, suggest
that the failure to remove the President would raise the standard for
impeachment higher than the Framers intended. They say that if the Senate does
not remove the President, "The bar will be so high that only a convicted
felon or a traitor will need to be concerned." But that standard is just a
modified version of the plain language of Article II, Section 4 of the
Constitution, which says a President can only be impeached and removed for "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." The Framers wanted a high
bar. It was not the intention of the Framers that the President should be
subject to the will of the dominant legislative party. As Alexander Hamilton
said in a warning against the politicization of impeachment: "There will
always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by
comparative strength of parties than by the real demonstrations of innocence or
guilt." Federalist 65. Our system of government does not permit Congress to
unseat the President merely because it disagrees with his behavior or his
policies. The Framers' decisive rejection of parliamentary government is one
reason they caused the phrase "Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" to appear in the Constitution itself. They chose to specify
those categories of offenses subject to the impeachment power, rather than leave
that judgment to the unfettered whim of the legislature.
Any just and proper impeachment process must be reasonably viewed by the
public as arising from one of those rare cases when the Legislature is compelled
to stand in for all the people and remove a President whose continuation in
office threatens grave harm to the Republic. Indeed, it is not exaggeration to
say -- as a group of more than 400 leading historians and constitutional
scholars publicly stated -- that removal on these articles would "mangle
the system of checks and balances that is our chief safeguard against abuses of
public power."30 Removal of the
President on these grounds would defy the constitutional presumption that the
removal power rests with the people in elections, and it would do incalculable
damage to the institution of the Presidency. If "successful," removal
here "will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, at
the mercy as never before of the caprices of any Congress."31
The Framers made the President the sole nationally elected public official
(together with the Vice-President), responsible to all the people. Therefore,
when articles of impeachment have been exhibited, the Senate confronts this
inescapable question: is the alleged misconduct so profoundly serious, so
malevolent to our Constitutional system, that it justifies undoing the people's
decision? Is the wrong alleged of a sort that not only demands removal of the
President before the ordinary electoral cycle can do its work, but also
justifies the national trauma that accompanies the impeachment trial process
itself? The wrongdoing alleged here does not remotely meet that standard.
b. The Framers Believed that Impeachment and
Removal Were Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of Government
"[H]igh Crimes and Misdemeanors" refers to nothing short of
Presidential actions that are "great and dangerous offenses" or "attempts
to subvert the Constitution."32
Impeachment was never intended to be a remedy for private wrongs. It was
intended to be a method of removing a President whose continued presence in the
Office would cause grave danger to the Nation and our Constitutional system of
government.33 Thus, "in all but the
most extreme instances, impeachment should be limited to abuse of public office,
not private misconduct unrelated to public office."34
Impeachment was designed to be a means of redressing wrongful public
conduct. As scholar and Justice James Wilson wrote, "our President . .
. is amenable to [the laws] in his private character as a citizen, and in
his public character by impeachment."35
As such, impeachment is limited to certain forms of wrongdoing. Alexander
Hamilton described the subject of the Senate's impeachment jurisdiction as
those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or
in other words from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they
relate chiefly to injuries done to the society itself.36
The Framers "intended that a president be removable from office for the
commission of great offenses against the Constitution."37
Impeachment therefore addresses public wrongdoing, whether denominated a "political
crime[ ] against the state,"38 or "an act
of malfeasance or abuse of office,"39 or a "great
offense[ ] against the federal government."40
Ordinary civil and criminal wrongs can be addressed through ordinary judicial
processes. And ordinary political wrongs can be addressed at the ballot box and
by public opinion. Impeachment is reserved for the most serious public
misconduct, those aggravated abuses of executive power that, given the
President's four-year term, might otherwise go unchecked.
3. Past Precedents Confirm that Allegations
of Dishonesty Do Not Alone State Impeachable Offenses
Because impeachment of a President nullifies the popular will of the people,
as evidenced by an election, it must be used with great circumspection. As
applicable precedents establish, it should not be used to punish private
misconduct.
a. The Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation
Against President Nixon
Five articles of impeachment were proposed against then-President Nixon by
the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in 1974. Three were
approved and two were not. The approved articles alleged official wrongdoing.
Article I charged President Nixon with "using the powers of his high office
[to] engage[ ] . . . in a course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede
and obstruct" the Watergate investigation.41
Article II described the President as engaging in "repeated and continuing
abuse of the powers of the Presidency in disregard of the fundamental principle
of the rule of law in our system of government" thereby "us[ing] his
power as President to violate the Constitution and the law of the land."42
Article III charged the President with refusing to comply with Judiciary
Committee subpoenas in frustration of a power necessary to "preserve the
integrity of the impeachment process itself and the ability of Congress to act
as the ultimate safeguard against improper Presidential conduct."43
One article not approved by the House Judiciary Committee charged that
President Nixon both "knowingly and fraudulently failed to report certain
income and claimed deductions [for 1969-72] on his Federal income tax returns
which were not authorized by law."44
The President had signed his returns for those years under penalty of perjury,45
and there was reason to believe that the underlying facts would have
supported a criminal prosecution against President Nixon himself.46
Specifying the applicable standard for impeachment, the majority staff
concluded that
[b]ecause impeachment of a President is a grave step for the
nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously incompatible with
either the constitutional form and principles of our government or the proper
performance of constitutional duties of the president office.47
And the minority views of many Republican members were in substantial
agreement:
the Framers . . . were concerned with preserving the government
from being overthrown by the treachery or corruption of one man. . . . [I]t is
our judgment, based upon this constitutional history, that the Framers of the
United States Constitution intended that the President should be removable by
the legislative branch only for serious misconduct dangerous to the system of
government established by the Constitution.48
The legal principle that impeachable offenses required misconduct dangerous
to our system of government provided one basis for the Committee's rejection of
the fraudulent-tax-return charge. As Congressman Hogan (R-Md.) put the matter,
the Constitution's phrase "high crime signified a crime against the system
of government, not merely a serious crime."49
As noted, the tax-fraud charge, involving an act which did not demonstrate
public misconduct, was rejected by an overwhelming (and bipartisan) 26-12
margin.50
b. The Financial Misdealing Allegation
Against Alexander Hamilton
In 1792, Congress investigated Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton for
alleged financial misdealings with a convicted swindler. Hamilton had made
payments to the swindler and had urged his wife (Hamilton's paramour) to burn
incriminating correspondence. Members of Congress investigated the matter and it
came to the attention of President Washington and future Presidents Adams,
Jefferson, Madison and Monroe.
This private matter was not deemed worthy of removing Mr. Hamilton as
Secretary of the Treasury.51 Even when it
eventually became public, it was no barrier to Hamilton's appointment to high
position in the United States Army. Although not insignificant, Hamilton's
behavior was essentially private. It was certainly not regarded as impeachable.
4. The Views of Prominent Historians and
Legal Scholars Confirm that Impeachable Offenses Are Not Present
a. No Impeachable Offense Has Been Stated
Here
There is strong agreement among constitutional scholars and historians that
the articles do not charge impeachable offenses. As Professor Michael Gerhardt
summarized in his recent testimony before a subcommittee of the House of
Representatives, there is "widespread recognition [of] a paradigmatic case
for impeachment."52 In such a case, "there
must be a nexus between the misconduct of an impeachable official and the
latter's official duties."53
There is no such nexus here. Indeed the allegations are so far removed from
official wrongdoing that their assertion here threatens to weaken significantly
the Presidency itself. As the more than 400 prominent historians and
constitutional scholars warned in their public statement:
[t]he theory of impeachment underlying these efforts is
unprecedented in our history . . . [and is] are extremely ominous for the future
of our political institutions. If carried forward, [the current processes] will
leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, at the mercy as
never before of the caprices of any Congress.54
Similarly, in a letter to the House of Representatives, an extraordinary
group of 430 legal scholars argued together that these offenses, even if proven
true, did not rise to the level of an impeachable offense.55
The gist of these scholarly objections is that the alleged wrongdoing is
insufficiently connected to the exercise of public office. Because the articles
charge wrongdoing of an essentially private nature, any harm such behavior poses
is too removed from our system of government to justify unseating the President.
Numerous scholars, opining long before the current controversy. have emphasized
the necessary connection of impeachable wrongs to threats against the state
itself. They have found that impeachment should be reserved for:
- "offenses against the government";56
- "political crimes against the state";57
- "serious assaults on the integrity of the processes of government";58
- "wrongdoing convincingly established [and] so egregious that [the
President's] continuation in office is intolerable";59
- "malfeasance or abuse of office,"60bearing
a "functional relationship" to public office;61
- "great offense[s] against the federal government";62
- "acts which, like treason and bribery, undermine the integrity of
government."63
The articles contain nothing approximating that level of wrongdoing. Indeed
the House Managers themselves acknowledge that "the President's [alleged]
perjury and obstruction do not directly involve his official conduct."64
b. To Make Impeachable Offenses of These
Allegations Would Forever Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to the Presidency and
to Our Government of Separated Powers
These articles allege (1) sexual misbehavior, (2) statements about sexual
misbehavior and (3) attempts to conceal the fact of sexual misbehavior. These
kinds of wrongs are simply not subjects fit for impeachment. To remove a
President on this basis would lower the impeachment bar to an unprecedented
level and create a devastating precedent. As Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
addressing this problem, has testified:
Lowering the bar for impeachment creates a novel, . . .
revolutionary theory of impeachment, [and] . . . would send us on an adventure
with ominous implications for the separation of powers that the Constitution
established as the basis of our political order. It would permanently weaken the
Presidency.65
The lowering of the bar that Professor Schlesinger described must stop here.
Professor Jack Rakove made a similar point when he stated that "Impeachment
[is] a remedy to be deployed only in . . . unequivocal cases where . . . the
insult to the constitutional system is grave."66
Indeed, he said, there "would have to be a high degree of consensus on both
sides of the aisle in Congress and in both Houses to proceed."67
Bipartisan consensus was, of course, utterly lacking in the House of
Representatives. No civil officer -- no President, no judge, no cabinet member
-- has ever been impeached by so narrow a margin as supported the articles
exhibited here.68 The closeness and
partisan division of the vote reflect the constitutionally dubious nature of the
charges.
When articles are based on sexual wrongdoing, and when they have passed only
by the narrowest, partisan margin, the future of our constitutional politics is
in the balance. The very stability of our Constitutional government may depend
upon the Senate's response to these articles. Nothing about this case justifies
removal of a twice-elected President, because no "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" are alleged.
5. Comparisons to Impeachment of Judges Are
Wrong
The House Managers suggest that perjury per se is an impeachable
offense because (1) several federal judges have been impeached and removed for
perjury, and (2) those precedents control this case. See House Br. at
95-105. That notion is erroneous. It is blind both to the qualitative
differences among different allegations of perjury and the very basic
differences between federal judges and the President.
First, the impeachment and removal of a Federal judge, while a very solemn
task, implicates very different considerations than the impeachment of a
President. Federal judges are appointed without public approval and enjoy life
tenure without public accountability. Consequently, they hold their offices
under our Constitution only "during good behavior." Under our system,
impeachment is the only way to remove a Federal judge from office --
even a Federal judge sitting in jail.69
By contrast, a President is elected by the Nation to a term, limited to a
specified number of years, and he faces accountability in the form of elections.
Second, whether an allegedly perjurious statement rises to the level of an
impeachable offense depends necessarily on the particulars of that statement,
and the relation of those statements to the fulfillment of official
responsibilities. In the impeachment of Judge Harry Claiborne, the accused had
been convicted of filing false income tax returns.70
As a judge, Claiborne was charged with the responsibility of hearing tax-evasion
cases. Once convicted, he simply could not perform his official functions
because his personal probity had been impaired such that he could not longer be
an arbiter of others' oaths. His wrongdoing bore a direct connection to the
performance of his judicial tasks. The inquiry into President Nixon disclosed
similar wrongdoing, but the House Judiciary Committee refused to approve an
article of impeachment against the President on that basis. The case of Judge
Walter Nixon is similar. He was convicted of making perjurious statements
concerning his intervention in a judicial proceeding, which is to say,
employing the power and prestige of his office to obtain advantage for a party.71
Although the proceeding at issue was not in his court, his use of the judicial
office for the private gain of a party to a judicial proceeding directly
implicated his official functions. Finally, Judge Alcee Hastings was impeached
and removed for making perjurious statements at his trial for conspiring to fix
cases in his own court.72 As with Judges
Claiborne and Nixon, Judge Hastings' perjurious statements were immediately and
incurably detrimental to the performance of his official duties. The allegations
against the President, which (as the Managers acknowledge) "do not directly
involve his official conduct," House Br. at 109, simply do not involve
wrongdoing of gravity sufficient to foreclose effective performance of the
Presidential office.
Impeachment scholar John Labovitz, writing of the judicial impeachment cases
predating Watergate, observed that:
For both legal and practical reasons, th[e] [judicial impeachment]
cases did not necessarily affect the grounds for impeachment of a president. The
practical reason was that it seemed inappropriate to determine the fate of
an elected chief executive on the basis of law developed in proceedings directed
at petty misconduct by obscure judges. The legal reason was that the
Constitution provides that judges serve during good behavior. . . . [T]he [good
behavior] clause made a difference in judicial impeachments, confounding the
application of these cases to presidential impeachment.73
Thus, the judicial precedents relied upon by the House Managers have only "limited
force when applied to the impeachment of a President."74
The most telling rejoinder to the House's argument comes from President
Ford. His definition of impeachable offenses, offered as a congressman in 1970
in connection with an effort to impeach Associate Justice William O. Douglas --
that it is, in essence, "whatever the majority of the House of
Representatives considers it to be"-- has been cited. Almost never noted is
the more important aspect of then-Congressman Ford's statement -- that, in
contrast to the life-tenure of judges, because presidents can be removed by the
electorate, "to remove them in midterm . . . would indeed require crimes of
the magnitude of treason and bribery."75
B. The Standard of Proof
Beyond the question of what constitutes an impeachable offense, each Senator
must confront the question of what standard the evidence must meet to justify a
vote of "guilty." The Senate has, of course, addressed this issue
before -- most recently in the trials of Judge Claiborne and Judge Hastings. We
recognize that the Senate chose in the Claiborne proceedings, and reaffirmed in
the Hastings trial, not to impose on itself any single standard of proof but,
rather, to leave that judgment to the conscience of each senator. Many Senators
here today were present for the debate on this issue and chose a standard by
which to test the evidence. For many Senators, however, the issue is a new one.
And none previously has had to face the issue in the special context of a
Presidential impeachment.
We argued before the House Judiciary Committee that it must treat a vote to
impeach as, in effect, a vote to remove the President from office and that a
decision of such moment ought not to be based on anything less than "clear
and convincing" evidence. That standard is higher than the "preponderance
of the evidence" test applicable to the ordinary civil case but lower than
the beyond a reasonable doubt test applicable to a criminal case. Nonetheless,
we felt that the clear and convincing standard was consistent with the grave
responsibility of triggering a process that might result in the removal of a
president. In fact, it had been the standard agreed upon by both Watergate
Committee majority and minority counsel (as well as counsel for President Nixon)
twenty-four years ago.
Certainly no lesser standard should be applied in the Senate. Indeed, we
submit that the gravity of the decision the Senate must reach should lead each
Senator to go further and ask whether the House has established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Both lawyers and laymen too often treat the standard of proof as meaningless
legal jargon with no application to the real world of difficult decisions. But
it is much more than that. In our system of justice, it is the guidepost that
shows the way through the labyrinth of conflicting evidence. It tells the
factfinder to look within and ask: "Would I make the most important
decisions of my life based on the degree of certainty I have about these facts?"
In the unique legal-political setting of an impeachment trial, it protects
against partisan overreaching, and it assures the public that this grave
decision has been made with care. In sum, it is a disciplining force to carry
into the deliberations.
This point is given added weight by the language of the Constitution.
Article I, section 3, clause 6 of the United States Constitution gives to the
Senate "the Power to try all Impeachments. . . . and no Person
shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present." (Emphasis added.) Use of the words "try" and "convicted"
strongly suggests that an impeachment trial is akin to a criminal proceeding and
that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of criminal proceedings should be
used. This position was enunciated in the Minority Views contained in the Report
of the House Judiciary Committee on the impeachment proceedings against
President Nixon (H.Rep. 93-1305 at 377-381) and has been espoused as the correct
standard by such Senators as Robert Taft, Jr., Sam Ervin, Strom Thurmond and
John Stennis.76
Even if the clear and convincing standard nonetheless is appropriate for
judicial impeachments, it does not follow that it should be applied where the
Presidency itself is at stake. With judges, the Senate must balance its concern
for the independence of the judiciary against the recognition that, because
judges hold life-time tenure, impeachment is the only available means to protect
the public against those who are corrupt. On the other hand, when a President is
on trial, the balance to be struck is quite different. Here the Senate is asked,
in effect, to overturn the results of an election held two years ago in which
the American people selected the head of one of the three coordinate branches of
government. It is asked to take this action in circumstances where there is no
suggestion of corruption or misuse of office -- or any other conduct that places
our system of government at risk in the two remaining years of the President's
term, when once again the people will judge who they wish to lead them. In this
setting, the evidence should be tested by the most stringent standard we know --
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Only then can the American people be confident
that this most serious of constitutional decisions has been given the careful
consideration it deserves.
IV. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE
ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE I
The evidence does not support the allegations of Article I.
A. Applicable Law
Article I alleges perjury, along with false and misleading statements,
before a federal grand jury. Perjury is a statutory crime that is set forth in
the United States Code at 18 U.S.C. § 1623.77
Before an accused may be found guilty of perjury before a grand jury, a
prosecutor must prove all elements of the offense.
In the criminal law context, § 1623 requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the following elements: that an accused (1) while under oath
(2) knowingly (3) made a false statement as to (4) material facts. The "materiality"
element is fundamental: it means that testimony given to a grand jury may be
found perjurious only if it had a tendency to influence, impede, or hamper the
grand jury's investigation. See, e.g., United States v.
Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1419 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Barrett,
111 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1997). If an answer provided to a grand jury has no
impact on the grand jury's investigation, or if it relates to a subject that the
grand jury is not considering, it is incapable as a matter of law of being
perjurious. Thus, alleged false testimony concerning details that a grand jury
is not investigating cannot as a matter of law constitute perjury, since such
testimony by definition is immaterial. See, e.g., United
States v. Lasater, 535 F.2d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 1976) (where defendant
admitted signing letter and testified to its purpose, his denial of actually
writing letter was not material to grand jury investigation and was incapable of
supporting perjury charge); United States v. Pyle, 156 F.2d 852, 856
(D.C. Cir. 1946) (details such as whether defendant "paid the rent on her
Washington apartment, as she testified that she did" were "not
pertinent to the issue being tried;" therefore, "the false statement
attributed to [defendant] was in no way material in the case in which she made
it and did not constitute perjury within the meaning of the statute.") In
other words, mere falsity -- even knowing falsity -- is not perjury if the
statement at issue is not "material" to the matter under
consideration.
An additional "element" of perjury prosecutions, at least as a
matter of prosecutorial practice, is that a perjury conviction cannot rest
solely on the testimony of one witness. In United States v. Weiler, 323
U.S. 606, 608-09 (1945), the Supreme Court observed that the "special rule
which bars conviction for perjury solely upon the evidence of a single witness
is deeply rooted in past centuries." While § 1623 does not literally
incorporate the so-called "two-witness" rule, the case law makes clear
that perjury prosecutions under this statute require a high degree of proof, and
that prosecutors should not, as a matter of reason and practicality, try to
bring perjury prosecutions based solely on the testimony of a single witness. As
the Supreme Court has cautioned, perjury cases should not rest merely upon "an
oath against an oath." Id. at 609.
Indeed, that is exactly the point that experienced former federal
prosecutors made to the House Judiciary Committee. A panel of former federal
prosecutors, some Republican, testified that they would not charge perjury based
upon the facts in this case. For example, Mr. Thomas Sullivan, a former United
States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, told the Committee that "the
evidence set out in the Starr report would not be prosecuted as a criminal case
by a responsible federal prosecutor." See Transcript of "Prosecutorial
Standards for Obstruction of Justice and Perjury" Hearing (Dec. 9, 1998);
see generally Minority Report at 340-47. As Mr. Sullivan emphasized, "because
perjury and obstruction charges often arise from private dealings with few
observers, the courts have required either two witnesses who testified directly
to the facts establishing the crime, or, if only one witness testifies to the
facts constituting the alleged perjury, that there be substantial corroborating
proof to establish guilt." See Transcript of "Prosecutorial
Standards for Obstruction of Justice and Perjury" Hearing (Dec. 9, 1998).
The other prosecutors on the panel agreed. Mr. Richard J. Davis, who served as
an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and as
a Task Force Leader for the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, testified that
"it is virtually unheard of to bring a perjury prosecution based solely on
the conflicting testimony of two people." Id. A review of the
perjury alleged here thus requires both careful scrutiny of the materiality of
any alleged falsehood and vigilance against conviction merely on an "oath
against an oath." Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609.
B. Structure of the Allegations
Article I charges that the President committed perjury when he testified
before the grand jury on August 17, 1998. It alleges he "willfully provided
perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning "one
or more of the following: (1) the nature and details of his relationship with a
subordinate Government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading
testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3)
prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a
Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to
influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in
that civil rights action." As noted above, the article does not provide
guidance on the particular statements alleged to be perjurious, false and
misleading. But by reference to the different views in the House Committee
Report, the presentation of House Majority Counsel David Schippers, the OIC
Referral, and the Trial Memorandum of the House Managers, we have attempted to
identify certain statements from which members of the House might have chosen.
Subpart (1) alleges that the President committed perjury before the grand
jury about the details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky -- including
apparently such insignificant matters as mis-remembering the precise month on
which certain inappropriate physical contact started, understating as "occasional"
his infrequent inappropriate physical and telephone contacts with Ms. Lewinsky
over a period of many months, characterizing their relationship as starting as a
friendship, and touching Ms. Lewinsky in certain ways and for certain purposes
during their intimate encounters.
Subpart (2) of Article I alleges that the President made perjurious, false
and misleading statements to the grand jury when he testified about certain
responses he had given in the Jones civil deposition. The House Managers
erroneously suggest that in the grand jury President Clinton was asked about and
reaffirmed his entire deposition testimony, including his deposition testimony
about whether he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. See House Br. at 2,
60. That is demonstrably false. Those statements that the President did in fact
make in the grand jury, by way of explaining his deposition testimony, were
truthful. Moreover, to the extent this subpart repeats allegations of Article II
of the original proposed articles of impeachment, the full House of
Representatives has explicitly considered and specifically rejected those
charges, and their consideration would violate the impeachment procedures
mandated by the Constitution.
Subparts (3) and (4) allege that the President lied in the grand jury when
he testified about certain activities in late 1997 and early 1998. They are
based on statements about conduct that the House Managers claim constitutes
obstruction of justice under Article II and in many respects track Article II.
Compare Article I (3) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged "prior
false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal
judge") with Article II (5) (obstructing justice by "allow[ing]
his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge) and
compare Article I (4) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged "corrupt
efforts to influence testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of
evidence") with Article II (3), (6), (7) (obstructing justice when
he (3) "engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence,"
i.e., gifts; (6) "corruptly influence[d] the testimony" of
Betty Currie; (7) "made false and misleading statements to potential
witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the
testimony of those witnesses"). These perjury allegations are without merit
both because the obstruction charges upon which they are based are wrong and
because the statements that President Clinton made in the grand jury about these
charges are true. Because of the close parallel, and for sake of brevity in this
submission, we have dealt comprehensively with these overlapping allegations in
the next section addressing Article II (obstruction of justice), and address
them only briefly in this section.
C. Response to the Particular Allegations in
Article I
The President testified truthfully before the grand jury. There must be no
mistake about what the President said. He admitted to the grand jury that he had
engaged in an inappropriate intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky over a
period of many months. He admitted to the grand jury that he had been alone with
Ms. Lewinsky. He admitted to the grand jury that he had misled his family,
his friends and staff, and the entire Nation about the nature of that
relationship. No one who heard the President's August 17 speech or watched the
President's videotaped grand jury testimony had any doubt that he had admitted
to an ongoing physical relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
The article makes general allegations about this testimony but does not
specify alleged false statements, so direct rebuttal is impossible. In light of
this uncertainty, we set forth below responses to the allegations that have been
made by the House Managers, the House Committee, and the OIC, even though they
were not adopted in the article, in an effort to try to respond comprehensively
to the charges.
1. The President denies that he made
materially false or misleading statements to the grand jury about "the
nature and details of his relationship" with Monica Lewinsky
a) Early in his grand jury testimony, the President specifically
acknowledged that he had had a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that involved "improper
intimate contact." App. at 461. He described how the relationship began and
how it ended early in 1997 -- long before any public attention or scrutiny.
In response to the first question about Ms. Lewinsky, the President read the
following statement:
When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 1996 and
once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters did
not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations as I
understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition. But they
did involve inappropriate intimate contact.
These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in early 1997. I
also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included
inappropriate sexual banter.
I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this conduct, and I
take full responsibility for my actions.
While I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I can,
because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, and others, and
in an effort to preserve the dignity of the office I hold, this is all I will
say about the specifics of these particular matters.
I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other questions including
questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; questions about my
understanding of the term "sexual relations," as I understood it to be
defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions concerning alleged
subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and intimidation of witnesses.
App. at 460-62. The President occasionally referred back to this statement
-- but only when asked very specific questions about his physical relationship
with Ms. Lewinsky -- and he otherwise responded fully to four hours of
interrogation about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, his answers in the civil
deposition, and his conduct surrounding the Jones deposition.
The articles are silent on precisely what statements the President made
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that were allegedly perjurious. But
between the House Brief and the Committee Report, both drafted by the Managers,
it appears there are three aspects of this prepared statement that are alleged
to be false and misleading because Ms. Lewinsky's recollection differs -- albeit
with respect to certain very specific, utterly immaterial matters: first,
when the President admitted that inappropriate conduct occurred "on certain
occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997," he allegedly committed
perjury because in the Managers' view, the first instance of
inappropriate conduct apparently occurred a few months prior to "early
1996," see House Br. at 53; second, when the President
admitted to inappropriate conduct "on certain occasions in early
1996 and once in 1997," he allegedly committed perjury because, according
to the House Committee, there were eleven total sexual encounters and
the term "on certain occasions" implied something other than eleven,
see Committee Report at 34; and third, when the President
admitted that he "had occasional telephone conversations with Ms.
Lewinsky that included sexual banter," he allegedly committed perjury
because, according to the House Committee (although not Ms. Lewinsky), seventeen
conversations may have included sexually explicit conversation, ibid.
Apart from the fact that the record itself refutes some of the allegations (for
example, seven of the seventeen calls were only "possible," according
even to the OIC, App. at 116-26, and Ms. Lewinsky recalled fewer than seventeen,
App. at 744), simply to state them is to reveal their utter immateriality.78
The President categorically denies that his prepared statement was
perjurious, false and misleading in any respect. He offered his written
statement to focus the questioning in a manner that would allow the OIC to
obtain the information it needed without unduly dwelling on the salacious
details of his relationship. It preceded almost four hours of follow-up
questions about the relationship. It is utterly remarkable that the Managers now
find fault even with the President's very painful public admission of
inappropriate conduct.
In any event, the charges are totally without merit. The Committee Report
takes issue with the terms "on certain occasions" and "occasional,"
but neither phrase implies a definite or maximum number. "On certain
occasions" -- the phrase introducing discussion of the physical contacts --
has virtually no meaning other than "it sometimes happened." It is
unfathomable what objective interpretation the Majority gives to this phrase to
suggest that it could be false. An attack on the phrase "occasional"
-- the phrase introducing discussion of the inappropriate telephone contacts --
is little different. Dictionaries define "occasional" to mean "occurring
at irregular or infrequent intervals" or "now and then."79
It is a measure of the Committee Report's extraordinary overreaching to suggest
that the eleven occasions of intimate contact alleged by the House Majority over
well more than a year did not occur, by any objective reading, "on certain
occasions." And since even the OIC Referral acknowledges that the
inappropriate telephone contact occurred not "at least 17 times" (as
the Committee Report and the Managers suggest, Committee Report at 8; House Br.
at 11) but between 10 and 15 times over a 23-month period,80
"occasional" would surely seem not just a reasonable description but
the correct one.
Finally, these squabbles are utterly immaterial. Even if the President and
Ms. Lewinsky disagreed as to the precise number of such encounters, it is of no
consequence whatsoever to anything, given his admission of their relationship.
This is precisely the kind of disagreement that the law does not intend to
capture as perjury.
The date of the first intimate encounter is also totally immaterial. Having
acknowledged the relationship, the President had no conceivable motive to
misstate the date on which it began. The Managers assert that the President
committed perjury when he testified about when the relationship began, but they
offer no rationale for why he would have done so.81
The President had already made a painful admission. Any misstatement about when
the intimate relationship began (if there was a misstatement) cannot justify a
charge of perjury, let alone the removal of the President from office. As
Chairman Hyde himself stated in reference to this latter allegation, "It
doesn't strike me as a terribly serious count." Remarks of Chairman Hyde at
Perjury Hearing of December 1, 1998.
b) The Managers also assert that the President lied when, after admitting
that he had an inappropriate sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he
maintained that he did not touch Ms. Lewinsky in a manner that met the
definition used in the Jones deposition. See House Br. at 54.
The President admits that he engaged in inappropriate physical contact with Ms.
Lewinsky, but has testified that he did not engage in activity that met the
convoluted and truncated definition he was presented in the Jones
deposition.82
It is important to note that this Jones definition was not of the
President's making. It was one provided to him by the Jones' lawyers for
their questioning of him. Under that definition, oral sex performed by Ms.
Lewinsky on the President would not constitute sexual relations, while touching
certain areas of Ms. Lewinsky's body with the intent to arouse her would meet
the definition. The President testified in the grand jury that believed that
oral sex performed on him fell outside the Jones definition. App. at
544.83 As strange as this may sound, a
totally reasonable reading of the definition supports that conclusion, as many
commentators have agreed.84
This claim comes down to an oath against an oath about immaterial details
concerning an acknowledged wrongful relationship.
2. The President denies that he made
perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about testimony he
gave in the Jones case
First, it is important to understand that the allegation of Article I that
the President "willfully provided false and misleading testimony to the
grand jury concerning ... prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he
gave in" the Jones deposition is premised on a misunderstanding of
the President's grand jury testimony. The President was not asked to, and he did
not, reaffirm his entire Jones deposition testimony during his grand
jury appearance. For example, contrary to popular myth and the undocumented
assertion of the House Managers, House Br. at 2, the President was never even
asked in the grand jury about his answer to the deposition question whether he
and Ms. Lewinsky had been "together alone in the Oval Office," Dep. at
52-53,85 and he therefore neither
reaffirmed it nor even addressed it. In fact, in the grand jury he was asked
only about a small handful of his answers in the deposition. As is demonstrated
below, his explanations of these answers were not reaffirmations or in any
respect evasive or misleading -- they were completely truthful, and they do not
support a perjury allegation.
The extent to which this allegation of the House Majority misses the mark is
dramatically apparent when it is compared with the OIC's Referral. The OIC did
not charge that the President's statements about his prior deposition testimony
were perjurious (apart from the charge discussed above concerning the nature and
details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky). See OIC Ref. at 145.86
It would be remarkable to contemplate charges beyond those brought by the OIC,
particularly in the context of a perjury claim where the OIC chose what to ask
the President and itself conducted the grand jury session.
The House Managers point to a single statement made by President Clinton in
the grand jury to justify their contention that every statement from his civil
deposition is now fair game. House Br. at 60. Specifically, the House Managers
rely on President Clinton's explanation in the grand jury of his state of mind
during the Jones deposition: "My goal in this deposition was to be
truthful, but not particularly helpful ... I was determined to walk through the
mine field of this deposition without violating the law, and I believe I did."
App. at 532. In addition to being a true statement of his belief as to his legal
position, this single remark plainly was not intended as and was not a broad
reaffirmation of the accuracy of all the statements the President made during
the Jones deposition. Indeed, given that he told the grand jury that he
had an intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky during which he was alone with
her, no one who heard the grand jury testimony could have understood it to be
the unequivocal reaffirmation that is alleged.
The Managers charge that the President did not really mean it when he told
the grand jury how he was trying to be literally truthful in the Jones
deposition without providing information about his relationship with Ms.
Lewinsky. The President had endeavored to navigate the deposition without having
to make embarrassing admissions about his inappropriate, albeit consensual,
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. And to do this, the President walked as close to
the line between (a) truthful but evasive or non-responsive testimony and (b)
false testimony as he could without crossing it. He sought, as he explained to
the grand jury, to give answers that were literally accurate, even if, as a
result, they were evasive and thus misleading. We repeat: what is at issue here
is not the underlying statements made by the President in the deposition, but
the President's explanations in the grand jury of his effort to walk a
fine line. Anyone who reads or watches that deposition knows the
President was in fact trying to do precisely what he has admitted -- to give the
lawyers grudging, unresponsive or even misleading answers without actually
lying. However successful or unsuccessful he might have been, there is no
evidence that controverts the fact that this was indeed the President's
intention.
An examination of the statements that the President actually did make in the
grand jury about his deposition testimony further demonstrates the lack of merit
in this article. In the grand jury, the President only was asked about three
areas of his deposition testimony that were covered in the failed impeachment
article alleging perjury in the civil deposition.87
The first topic was the nature of any intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky and has
already been addressed above.
The second topic was the President's testimony about his knowledge of gifts
he exchanged with Ms. Lewinsky. In his grand jury testimony, the President had
the following exchange with the OIC:
Q: When you testified in the Paula Jones case, this was only two and a half
weeks after you had given her these six gifts, you were asked, at page 75 in
your deposition, lines 2 through 5, "Well, have you ever given any gifts to
Monica Lewinsky?" And you answer, "I don't recall."
And you were correct. You pointed out that you actually asked them, for
prompting, "Do you know what they were?"
A: I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they were, not that I
don't recall whether I had given them. And then if you see, they did give me
these specifics, and I gave them quite a good explanation here. I remembered
very clearly what the facts were about The Black Dog. ...
App. at 502-03. The President's explanation that he could not recall the
exact gifts that he had given Ms. Lewinsky and that he affirmatively sought
prompting from the Jones lawyers is entirely consistent with his
deposition testimony. This record plainly does not support a charge of perjury.
The third and last topic was the President's deposition testimony that Ms.
Lewinsky's affidavit statement denying have a sexual relationship with the
President was correct:
Q: And you indicated that it [Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit statement that she
had no sexual relationship with him] was absolutely correct.
A: I did. ... I believe at the time that she filled out this affidavit, if
she believed that the definition of sexual relationship was two people having
intercourse, then this is accurate. And I believe that this is the definition
that most ordinary Americans would give it. ...
App. at 473. The President's grand jury testimony was truthful. As Ms.
Lewinsky and Ms. Tripp discussed long before any of this matter was public, this
was in fact Ms. Lewinsky's definition of "sex" and apparently the
President's as well. See Supp. at 2664 (10/3/97 Tape); see also
App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). There is no evidence whatever that the
President did not believe this definition of sexual relations, and his belief
finds support in dictionary definitions, the courts and commentators.88
Moreover, the record establishes that Ms. Lewinsky shared this view.89
Since the President's grand jury testimony about his understanding is
corroborated both by dictionaries and by his prior statements to Ms. Lewinsky,
it simply cannot be labeled "wrong" or, more seriously, "perjurious."
The President did not testify falsely and perjuriously in the grand jury
about his civil deposition testimony.
3. The President denies that he made
perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about the
statements of his attorney to Judge Wright during the Jones deposition.
It is remarkable that Article I contains allegations such as this one that
even the OIC, which conducted the President's grand jury appearance, chose not
to include in the Referral (presumably because there was no "substantial
and credible information" to support the claim). Subpart (3) appears to
allege that the President lied in his grand jury testimony when he characterized
his state of mind in his civil deposition as his lawyer described the Lewinsky
affidavit as meaning "there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or
form." Dep. at 53-54. Specifically, the House Managers appear to base their
perjury claim on President Clinton's grand jury statement that "I'm not
even sure I paid attention to what he [Mr. Bennett] was saying." House Br.
at 62.
The House Brief takes issue with President Clinton's statement that he was "not
paying a great deal of attention to this exchange" because, it alleges, the
"videotape [of the deposition] shows the President looking directly at Mr.
Bennett, paying close attention to his argument to Judge Wright." Ibid.
While it is true that the videotape shows the President staring in what is
presumably Mr. Bennett's direction, there is no evidence whatsoever that he was
indeed "paying close attention" to the lengthy exchange. Notably
absent from the videotape is any action on the part of the President that could
be read as affirming Mr. Bennett's statement, such as a nod of the head, or any
other activity that could be used to distinguish between a fixed stare and true
attention to the complicated sparring of counsel. The President was a witness in
a difficult and complex deposition and, as he testified, he was "focussing
on [his] answers to the questions." App. at 477. It is a safe bet that the
common law has never seen a perjury charge based on so little.90
4. The President denies that he made
perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury when he denied
attempting "to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the
discovery of evidence" in the Jones case
The general language of the final proviso of Article I, according to the
House Managers, is meant to signify a wide range of allegations, see
House Br. at 60-69, although none were thought sufficiently credible to be
included in the OIC Referral. These allegations were not even included in the
summary of the Starr evidence presented to the Committee on October 5, 1998, by
House Majority Counsel Schippers. They are nothing more than an effort to
inflate the perjury allegations by converting every statement that the President
made about the subject matter of Article II into a new count for perjury. As the
discussion of Article II establishes, the President did not attempt to obstruct
justice. Thus, his explanations of his statements in the grand jury were
truthful.
The House Brief asserts that the President committed perjury with respect to
three areas of his grand jury testimony about the obstruction allegations. These
claims are addressed thoroughly in the next section along with the corresponding
Article II obstruction claims, and they are addressed in a short form here. The
first claim is that the President committed perjury "when he testified
before the grand jury that he recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. Jones'
lawyers requested the gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and the President,
she should provide them." House Br. at 63. The House Managers contest the
truthfulness of this statement by asserting that the President was responsible
for Ms. Lewinsky's transfer of gifts to Ms. Currie in late December. In other
words, if the obstruction claim is true, they allege, this statement is not
true. As is laid out in greater detail in the next section, the House Manager's
view of this matter ignores a wealth of evidence establishing that the idea to
conceal some of the gifts she had received originated with, and was executed by,
Ms. Lewinsky. See, e.g., Supp. at 557 (Currie GJ 1/27/98); Supp. at 531
(Currie FBI 302 1/24/98); Supp. at 582 (Currie GJ 5/6/98); App. at 1122
(Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); see also App. at 1481 ("LEWINSKY . . .
suggested to the President that Betty Currie hold the gifts.") (Lewinsky
FBI 302 8/1/98).
Second, the House Managers contend that the President provided perjurious
testimony when he explained to the grand jury that he was trying to "refresh"
his recollection when he spoke with Betty Currie on January 18, 1998 about his
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. House Br. at 65. The House Managers completely
ignore the numerous statements that Ms. Currie makes in her testimony that
support the President's assertion that he was merely trying to gather
information. For example, Ms. Currie stated in her first interview with the OIC
that "Clinton then mentioned some of the questions he was asked at his
deposition. Currie advised the way Clinton phrased the queries, they were both
statements and questions at the same time." Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 302
1/24/98). Ms. Currie's final grand jury testimony on this issue also supports
the President' explanation of his questioning:
Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you testified the President
made to you that were presented as statements, did you feel pressured when he
told you those statements?
A: None whatsoever.
Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind about what he was
doing?
A: At that time I felt that he was - I want to use the word shocked or
surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking.
Q: That was your impression that he wanted you to say - because he would end
each of the statements with "Right?," with a question.
A: I do not remember that he wanted me to say "Right." He
would say "Right" and I could have said, "Wrong."
Q: But he would end each of those questions with a "Right?" and
you could either say whether it was true or not true?
A: Correct.
Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
A: None.
Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98) (emphasis added).
Ms. Currie's testimony supports the President's assertion that he was
looking for information as a result of his deposition. There is no basis to
doubt the President's explanation that his expectation of a media onslaught
prompted the conversation. See App. at 583. Indeed, neither the
testimony of Ms. Currie nor that of the President -- the only two participants
in this conversation -- conceivably supports the inference that he had any other
intent. The House Managers' contention that the President's explanation to the
grand jury was perjurious totally disregards the testimony of the only two
witnesses with first-hand knowledge and has no basis in fact or in the evidence.
Finally, the House Managers contend that President Clinton "lied about
his attempts to influence the testimony of some of his top aides." House
Br. at 68. The basis for this charge appears to be the President's testimony
that, although he said misleading things to his aides about his relationship
with Ms. Lewinsky, he tried to say things that were true. Id. at
69. Once again, the record does not even approach a case for perjury. The
President acknowledged that he misled; he tried, however, not to lie. It is a
mystery how the Managers could try to disprove this simple statement of intent.
V. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE
ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE II
The evidence does not support the allegations of Article II.
A. Applicable Law
Article II alleges obstruction of justice, a statutory crime that is set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the "Omnibus Obstruction Provision."
In the criminal law context, § 1503 requires proof of the following
elements: (1) that there existed a pending judicial proceeding; (2) that the
accused knew of the proceeding; and (3) that the defendant acted "corruptly"
with the specific intent to obstruct or interfere with the proceeding or due
administration of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Bucey,
876 F.2d 1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989). False statements alone cannot sustain a
conviction under § 1503. See United States v. Thomas, 916
F.2d 647, 652 (11th Cir. 1990).91
B. Structure of the Allegations
Article II exhibited by the House of Representatives alleges that the
President "has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of
justice, and has to that end engaged personally, and through his subordinates
and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover
up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony" in the Jones
case. The Article alleges that the President did so by engaging in "one or
more of the following acts": the President (1) corruptly encouraged Ms.
Lewinsky "to execute a sworn affidavit ... that he knew to be perjurious,
false and misleading"; (2) "corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give
perjurious, false, and misleading testimony if and when called to testify
personally" in the Jones case; (3) "corruptly engaged in,
encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed"
in the Jones case, namely gifts given by him to Ms. Lewinsky; (4) "intensified
and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance" for Ms. Lewinsky
between December 7, 1997 and January 14, 1998, "in order to corruptly
prevent [her] truthful testimony" in the Jones case; (5) "corruptly
allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements" to Judge
Susan Webber Wright at the Jones deposition; (6) "related a false
and misleading account of events" involving Ms. Lewinsky to Betty Currie, a
"potential witness" in the Jones case, "in order to
corruptly influence" her testimony; and (7) made false and misleading
statements to certain members of his staff who were "potential" grand
jury witnesses, in order to corruptly influence their testimony.
As noted above, this article essentially duplicates some of the perjury
allegations of Article I (4): Article II alleges particular acts of obstruction
while Article I (4) alleges that the President lied in the grand jury when he
discussed those allegations.92 Both sets
of allegations are unsupported. Our discussion here of the details of these
charges will, as well, serve in part as our response to the allegations in
Article I (4).
C. Response to the Particular Allegations
in Article II
1. The President denies that on or about
December 17, 1997, he "corruptly encouraged" Monica Lewinsky "to
execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious,
false and misleading"
Article II (1) alleges that the President "corruptly encouraged"
Monica Lewinsky "to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he
knew to be perjurious, false and misleading." The House Managers allege
that during a December 17 phone conversation, Ms. Lewinsky asked the President
what she could do if she were subpoenaed in the Jones case and that the
President responded, "Well, maybe you can sign an affidavit." House
Br. at 22. This admitted statement by the President of totally lawful conduct is
the Managers' entire factual basis for the allegation in Article II (1).
The Managers do not allege that the President ever suggested to Ms. Lewinsky
she should file a false affidavit or otherwise told her what to say in
the affidavit. Indeed they could not, because Ms. Lewinsky has repeatedly and
forcefully denied any such suggestions:
- "Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on their
behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie." App. at 718 (2/1/98
Proffer).
- "[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my
silence." App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
- "Neither the President nor Jordan ever told Lewinsky that she had to
lie." App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
- "Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky to say
anything or to lie. . . ." App. at 1400 (Lewinsky FBI 302
7/27/98).
- "I think I told [Linda Tripp] that -- you know at various times the
President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That wasn't true." App.
at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).
In an attempt to compensate for the total lack of evidence supporting their
theory,93 the Managers offer their view
that "both parties knew the affidavit would have to be false and misleading
in order to accomplish the desired result." House Br. at 22; see also
Committee Report at 65 (the President "knew [the affidavit] would have to
be false for Ms. Lewinsky to avoid testifying"). But there is no evidence
to support such bald conjecture, and in fact the opposite is true. Both Ms.
Lewinsky and the President testified that, given the particular claims in the
Jones case, they thought a truthful, limited affidavit might establish
that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing relevant to offer. The President explained to
the grand jury why he believed that Ms. Lewinsky could execute a truthful but
limited affidavit that would have established that she was not relevant to the
Jones case:94
- "But I'm just telling you that it's certainly true what she says
here, that we didn't have -- there was no employment, no benefit in exchange,
there was nothing having to do with sexual harassment. And if she defined sexual
relationship in the way I think most Americans do, meaning intercourse, then she
told the truth." App. at 474.
- "You know, I believed then, I believe now, that Monica Lewinsky could
have sworn out an honest affidavit, that under reasonable circumstances, and
without the benefit of what Linda Tripp did to her, would have given her a
chance not to be a witness in this case." App. at 521.
- "I believed then, I believe today, that she could execute an affidavit
which, under reasonable circumstances with fair-minded, nonpolitically-oriented
people, would result in her being relieved of the burden to be put through the
kind of testimony that, thanks to Linda Tripp's work with you and with the Jones
lawyers, she would have been put through. I don't think that's dishonest. I
don't think that's illegal." App. at 529.
- "But I also will tell you that I felt quite comfortable that she could
have executed a truthful affidavit, which would not have disclosed the
embarrassing details of the relationship that we had had, which had been over
for many, many months by the time this incident occurred." App. at 568-69.
- "I've already told you that I felt strongly that she could issue, that
she could execute an affidavit that would be factually truthful, that might get
her out of having to testify. . . . And did I hope she'd be able
to get out of testifying on an affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to execute
a false affidavit? No, I did not." App. at 571.
The Jones case involved allegations of a nonconsensual sexual
solicitation. Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with the President was consensual, and
she knew nothing about the factual allegations of the Jones case.
Ms. Lewinsky similarly recognized that an affidavit need not be false in
order to accomplish the purpose of avoiding a deposition:
- LEWINSKY told TRIPP that the purpose of the affidavit was to avoid
being deposed. LEWINSKY advised that one does this by giving a portion of
the whole story, so the attorneys do not think you have anything of
relevance to their case. App. at 1420 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (emphasis
added).
- LEWINSKY advised the goal of an affidavit is to be as benign as
possible, so as to avoid being deposed. App. at 1421 (Lewinsky FBI 302
7/29/98) (emphasis added).
- I thought that signing an affidavit could range from anywhere -- the point
of it would be to deter or to prevent me from being deposed and so that that
could range from anywhere between maybe just somehow mentioning, you know,
innocuous things or going as far as maybe having to deny any kind of a
relationship. App. at 842 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (emphasis added).
The Committee Report argued that Ms. Lewinsky must have known that the
President wanted her to lie because he never told her to fully detail their
relationship in her affidavit and because an affidavit fully detailing the "true
nature" of their relationship would have been damaging to him in the Jones
case. Committee Report at 65. The Managers wisely appear to have abandoned this
argument.95 Ms. Lewinsky plainly was
under no obligation to volunteer to the Jones lawyers every last detail about
her relationship with the President -- and the failure of the President to
instruct her to do so is neither wrong nor an obstruction of justice. A limited,
truthful affidavit might have established that Ms. Lewinsky was not relevant to
the Jones case. The suggestion that perhaps Ms. Lewinsky could submit an
affidavit in lieu of a deposition, as the President knew other potential
deponents in the Jones case had attempted to do, in order to avoid the
expense, burden, and humiliation of testifying in the Jones case was
entirely proper. The notion that the President of the United States could face
removal from office not because he told Monica Lewinsky to lie, or encouraged
her to do so, but because he did not affirmatively instruct her to disclose
every detail of their relationship to the Jones lawyers is simply not
supportable.
Moreover, there is significant evidence in the record that, at the time she
executed the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky honestly believed that her denial of a
sexual relationship was accurate given what she believed to be the definition of
a "sexual relationship":
- "I never even came close to sleeping with [the President] . . .
We didn't have sex . . . Having sex is having intercourse. That's how most
people would --" Supp. at 2664 (Lewinsky-Tripp tape 10/3/97).96
- "Ms. L[ewinsky] was comfortable signing the affidavit with regard to
the sexual relationship because she could justify to herself that she and the
Pres[ident] did not have sexual intercourse." App. at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer).
- "Lewinsky said that her use of the term `having sex' means having
intercourse. . . ." App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98).
The allegation contained in Article II (1) is totally unsupported by
evidence. It is the product of a baseless hypothesis, and it should be rejected.
2. The President denies that on or about
December 17, 1997, he "corruptly encouraged" Monica Lewinsky "to
give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when called to testify
personally" in the Jones litigation
Article II (2) alleges that the President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give
false testimony if and when she was called to testify personally in the Jones
litigation. Again, Ms. Lewinsky repeatedly denied that anyone told her or
encouraged her to lie:
- "Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on their
behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie." App. at 718 (2/1/98
Proffer).
- "[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my
silence." App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
- "Neither the President nor Jordan ever told Lewinsky that she had to
lie." App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
- "Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky to say
anything or to lie. . . ." App. at 1400 (Lewinsky FBI 302
7/27/98).
- "I think I told [Linda Tripp] that -- you know at various times the
President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That wasn't true."
App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (emphasis added).
The Managers allege that the President called Ms. Lewinsky on December 17 to
inform her that she had been listed as a potential witness in the Jones case,
and that during this conversation, he "sort of said, `You know, you can
always say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.'"
House Br. at 22; App. at 843 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). Other than the fact that Ms.
Lewinsky recalls this statement being made in the same conversation in which she
learned that her name was on the Jones witness list, the Managers cite
no evidence whatsoever that supports their claim that the President encouraged
her to make such statements "if and when called to testify personally in
the Jones case." They claim simply that Ms. Lewinsky had discussed
such explanations for her visits with the President in the past. Unremarkably,
the President and Ms. Lewinsky had been concerned about concealing their
improper relationship from others while it was ongoing.
Ms. Lewinsky's own testimony and proffered statements undercut their case:
- When asked what should be said if anyone questioned Ms. Lewinsky
about her being with the President, he said she should say she was bringing him
letters (when she worked in Legislative Affairs) or visiting Betty Currie (after
she left the WH). There is truth to both of these statements.... [This] occurred
prior to the subpoena in the Paula Jones case. App. at 709 and 718
(2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis added).
- After Ms. Lewinsky was informed, by the Pres[ident], that she was
identified as a possible witness in the Jones case, the Pres[ident] and Ms.
L[ewinsky] discussed what she should do. The President told her he was not sure
she would be subpoenaed, but in the event that she was, she should contact Ms. Currie.
When asked what to do if she was subpoenaed, the Pres[ident] suggested she could
sign an affidavit to try to satisfy their inquiry and not be deposed. In
general, Ms. L[ewinsky] should say she visited the WH to see Ms. Currie
and, on occasion when working at the WH, she brought him letters when no one
else was around. Neither of those statements untrue. App. at 712 (2/1/98
Proffer) (emphasis added).
- To the best of Ms. L[ewinsky]'s memory, she does not believe they
discussed the content of any deposition that Ms. L[ewinsky] might be
involved in at a later date. App. at 712 (2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis added).
- LEWINSKY advised, though they did not discuss the issue in specific
relation to the JONES matter, she and CLINTON had discussed what to say when
asked about LEWINSKY's visits to the White House. App. at 1466 (Lewinsky FBI 302
7/31/98) (emphasis added).
Ms. Lewinsky's statements indicate that she asked the President what to say
if "anyone" asked about her visits, that the President said "in
general" she could give such an explanation, and that they "did not
discuss the issue in specific relation to the Jones matter."
This is consistent with the President's testimony that he and Ms. Lewinsky "might
have talked about what to do in a non-legal context at some point in the past,"
although he had no specific memory of that conversation. App. at 569. The
President also stated in his grand jury testimony that he did not recall saying
anything like that in connection with Ms. Lewinsky's testimony in the Jones
case:
Q. And in that conversation, or in any conversation in which you informed
her she was on the witness list, did you tell her, you know, you can always say
that you were coming to see Betty or bringing me letters? Did you tell her
anything like that?
A. I don't remember. She was coming to see Betty. I can tell you this. I
absolutely never asked her to lie.
App. at 568. Ms. Lewinsky does not testify that this discussion was had in
reference to testimony she may or may not have been called to give personally,
and the Managers' implication is directly contradicted by Ms. Lewinsky's
statement that she and the President did not discuss her deposition
testimony in that conversation. See App. at 712 (2/1/98 Proffer) ("To
the best of Ms. L[ewinsky's] memory, she does not believe they discussed [in the
December 17 conversation] the content of any deposition that Ms. L[ewinsky]
might be involved in at a later date.").
In support of this allegation, the Managers also cite Ms. Lewinsky's
testimony that she told the President she would deny the relationship and that
the President made some encouraging comment. House Br. at 23. Ms. Lewinsky never
stated that she told the President any such thing on December 17, or at any
other time after she had been identified as a witness. Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky
testified that that discussion did not take place after she learned she was a
witness in the Jones case:
Q: It is possible that you also had these discussions [about denying the
relationship] after you learned that you were a witness in the Paula Jones case?
A: I don't believe so. No.
Q: Can you exclude that possibility?
A: I pretty much can. I really don't remember it. I mean, it would
be very surprising for me to be confronted with something that would show me
different, but I -- it was 2:30 in the -- I mean, the conversation I'm thinking
of mainly would have been December 17th, which was --
Q: The telephone call.
A: Right. And it was -- you know, 2:00, 2:30 in the morning. I remember the
gist of it and I -- I really don't think so.
App. at 1119-20 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky has stated several times that neither of these
so-called "cover stories" was untrue. In her handwritten proffer, Ms.
Lewinsky stated that she asked that the President what to say if anyone asked
her about her visits to the Oval Office and he said that she could say "she
was bringing him letters (when she worked in Legislative Affairs) or visiting
Betty Currie (after she left the White House)." App. at 709 (Lewinsky
2/1/98 Proffer). Ms. Lewinsky expressly stated: "There is truth to both
of these statements." Id. (emphasis added); see also App.
at 712 (2/1/98 Proffer) ("[n]either of those statements [was] untrue.")
(emphasis added). Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky testified to the grand jury that she did
in fact bring papers to the President and that on some occasions, she visited
the Oval Office only to see Ms. Currie:
Q: Did you actually bring [the President] papers at all?
A: Yes.
Q: All right. Tell us a little about that.
A: It varied. Sometimes it was just actual copies of letters. . . .
App. at 774-75 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).
I saw Betty on every time that I was there ... most of the time my purpose
was to see the President, but there were some times when I did just go see Betty
but the President wasn't in the office.
App. at 775 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). The Managers assert that these stories
were misleading. House Br. at 23; see also Committee Report at 66
(delivering documents to the President was a "ruse that had no legitimate
business purpose."). In other words, while the so-called "cover
stories" were literally true, such explanations might have been misleading.
But literal truth is a critical issue in perjury and obstruction cases, as is
Ms. Lewinsky's belief that the statements were, in fact, literally true.
The allegation contained in Article II (2) is unsupported by the evidence
and should be rejected.
3. The President denies that he "corruptly
engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence" -- gifts
he had given to Monica Lewinsky -- in the Jones case
This allegation charges that the President participated in a scheme to
conceal certain gifts he had given to Monica Lewinsky. It apparently centers on
two events allegedly occurring in December 1997: (a) a conversation between the
President and Ms. Lewinsky in which the two allegedly discussed the gifts the
President had given Ms. Lewinsky, and (b) Ms. Currie's receipt of a box of gifts
from Ms. Lewinsky and storage of them under her bed. The evidence does not
support the charge.
a. Ms. Lewinsky's December 28 Meeting with
the President
Monica Lewinsky met with the President on December 28, 1997, sometime
shortly after 8:00 a.m. to pick up Christmas presents. App. at 868 (Lewinsky GJ
8/6/98). According to Ms. Lewinsky, she raised the subject of gifts she had
received from the President in relation to the Jones subpoena, and this
was the first and only time that this subject arose. App. at 1130 (Lewinsky GJ
8/20/98); App. at 1338 (Lewinsky Depo. 8/26/98).
The House Trial Brief and the Committee Report quote one version of Ms.
Lewinsky's description of that December 28 conversation:
"[A]t some point I said to him, `Well, you know, should I -- maybe I
should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to someone,
maybe Betty.' And he sort of said -- I think he responded, `I don't know' or
`Let me think about that.' And left that topic." App. at 872 (Lewinsky GJ
8/6/98).
In fairness, the Senate should be aware that Ms. Lewinsky has addressed this
crucial exchange with prosecutors on at least ten different occasions, which we
lay out in the margin for review.97 The
accounts varied -- in some Ms. Lewinsky essentially recalled that the President
gave no response, but the House Managers, like the Committee Report and the OIC
Referral, cite only the account most favorable to their case, failing even to
take note of the other inconsistent recollections. But the important fact about
Ms. Lewinsky's various descriptions of this conversation is that, at the very
most, the President stated "I don't know" or "Let me think about
it" when Ms. Lewinsky raised the issue of the gifts. Even by the account
most unfavorable to the President, the record is clear and unambiguous that the
President never initiated any discussion about the gifts nor did he
tell or even suggest to Ms. Lewinsky that she should conceal the gifts.
Indeed, on several occasions, Ms. Lewinsky's accounts of the President's
reaction depict the President as not even acknowledging her suggestion.
Among those versions, ignored by the Committee Report and the Managers, are the
following:
- "And he -- I don't remember his response. I think it was
something like, `I don't know," or `Hmm,' or -- there really was no
response." App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
- "[The President] either did not respond or responded `I don't
know.' LEWINSKY is not sure exactly what was said, but she is certain that
whatever CLINTON said, she did not have a clear image in her mind of what to
do next." App. at 1566 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/24/98) (emphasis added).
- "The President wouldn't have brought up Betty's name, because he
really didn't -- he really didn't discuss it . . ." App. at 1122
(Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
- "A JUROR: You had said that the President had called you initially to
come get your Christmas gift, you had gone there, you had a talk, et cetera, and
there was no -- you expressed concern, the President didn't really say
anything." App. at 1126 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).98
Thus, the evidence establishes that there was essentially no discussion of
gifts. That December 28 meeting provides no evidence of any "scheme . . .
designed to . . . conceal the existence" of any gifts.
b. Ms. Currie's Supposed Involvement in
Concealing Gifts
Because the record is devoid of any evidence of obstruction by the President
at his December 28 meeting with Monica Lewinsky, Article II (3) necessarily
depends on the added assumption that, after the December 28 meeting, the
President must have instructed his secretary, Ms. Betty Currie, to retrieve the
gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, thereby consummating the obstruction of justice