The U.S. District Court of Georgia has ordered the FBI to make available to the press the four redacted affidavits offered by investigators to obtain search warrants for Richard Jewell's residence, storage unit and automobile. This is the October 23, 1996 order.

 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION


IN RE

FOUR SEARCH WARRANTS

NOS.
1:96-M-687
1:96-M-688
1:96-M-694
2:96-M-037


ORDER

This matter is before the court on the Emergency Petition of The
Atlanta Journal, The Atlanta Constitution, and WSB-TV to Intervene to
Move for Access to Court Records and Proceedings. Also pending before
the court is Richard Jewell's motion requesting that this court
reconsider Magistrate Judge Brill's Order of September 13, 1996.


I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the early morning hours of Saturday, July 27, 1996, a bomb exploded
in the midst of Centennial Olympic Park ("the Park") located in the
downtown area of Atlanta, Georgia. At the time of the explosion, the
Park was filled with spectators attending a concert. The resulting
blast and shrapnel killed one woman, caused one may to have a heart
attack, and injured over one hundred other Park visitors.

Immediately after the explosion, a security guard named Richard Jewell
("Jewell") became a media hero for his role in discovering the bomb
before its detonation and assisting in the evacuation of the
surrounding area. Within a few days, however, law enforcement
officials began to focus their scrutiny on his possible involvement in
the bombing.

On July 30 and July 31, 1996, three affidavits in support of
applications for search warrants were filed under seal. Based upon the
evidence contained in those affidavits, Magistrate Judge Brill issued
three search warrants. In the execution of the warrants, Federal
Bureau of Investigation agents searched and seized various items from
Jewell's residence, pickup truck, and storage unit. A few days later,
on August 3, 1996, an additional affidavit was filed under seal. Based
upon the evidence contained therein, Magistrate Judge Brill issued a
fourth search warrant authorizing the procurement of hair samples from
the person of Richard Jewell.

In early September 1996, Jewell filed a motion seeking access to the
sealed search warrant affidavits and to any sworn testimony upon which
the warrants were based. On September 13, 1996, Magistrate Judge Brill
issued an order granting in part Jewell's motion. The order directed
the Government to release to Jewell certain portions of the
affidavits. Pursuant to the order, before the affidavits were given to
Jewell, the Government redacted any information that provided details
of the bomb's construction and the Government's investigative
techniques. In a related consent order, Jewell agreed to limit
disclosure of any information released to him.

In the days following the bombing, a media frenzy swirled around all
aspects of the investigation. As a result, various rumors and facts
associated with the Jewell investigation have been broadcast all over
the country. Even stories containing statements purporting to come
from "sealed court documents" have become commonplace.

Yet, to date, no charges have been filed relating to the Centennial
Olympic Park bombing. Furthermore, there is no indication that the
Government is about to bring criminal charges against anyone,
including Jewell. Although the FBI seized various items belonging to
Jewell pursuant to the search warrants, the court learned from
Jewell's counsel during an October 8, 1996 hearing that all of that
property has since been returned. According to the Government, the
bombing investigation itself is still ongoing. However, the return of
Jewell's property combined with the Government's statements that it is
pursuing other suspects, forces this court to conclude that Jewell is
no longer the target of the investigation.

On September 17, 1996, The Atlanta Journal, The Atlanta Constitution,
and WSB-TV (the "Petitioners") filed a motion to intervene in order to
move for access to court records and proceedings. In particular,
Petitioners seek access to the portions of the affidavits and other
court records relating to the four search warrants that were released
to Jewell pursuant to Magistrate Judge Brill's Order of September 13,
1996.1/ Petitioners argue that they are entitled to access to the
information released to Jewell under a constitutional right and a
common law right of access to judicial records. Furthermore,
Petitioners contend that under existing Eleventh Circuit law, the
Government must demonstrate a "compelling interest" in order to keep
the information sealed.

The Government denies that there is a constitutional right of access
to sealed search warrant affidavits and argues that the common law
right does not require a "compelling interest" to keep the documents
sealed. The Government further contends that regardless of the
standard that the court applies, release of the redacted information
would damage the ongoing investigation and deter future witnesses from
coming forward with new information. As a result, the Government
opposes any release of the redacted affidavits to the public.2/

On September 26, 1996, Jewell filed a motion asking this court to
reconsider the Magistrate Judge's September 13, 1996 Order that
released certain redacted information to Jewell. In particular, Jewell
avers that the Magistrate Judge allowed too much information to be
redacted. Accordingly, Jewell requests this court to review the
affidavits and to release any additional information that does not
relate to investigatory techniques or the bomb's construction.


II DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Intervene

As an initial matter, two possible sources exist that might support
the media's right of access to sealed judicial materials: (1) a
constitutional right under the First Amendment, and (2) a common law
right as found in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589
(1978). If a First Amendment right of access exists, the court can
deny access only if there exists a "compelling governmental interest"
and the denial of access is "narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606
(1982). However, if only a common law right of access exists, then the
decision to deny access rests in the sound discretion of the trial
court. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599.

There is no Eleventh Circuit authority addressing whether a right of
access to search warrant affidavits exists. However, both the Supreme
Court and the Eleventh Circuit have dealt with the issue of access to
the courtroom and to judicial documents.

In Nixon, the Supreme Court determined that there was no First
Amendment right to copy and publish court exhibits and materials. 435
U.S. at 608-10. In the same opinion, however, the Court did recognize
that there was a common law right of access to inspect and copy
judicial records and documents. Id. at 597. A few years later, in its
plurality opinion in Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980), the Court found that there was a qualified First Amendment
right to attend criminal trials. In Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed this right to an open criminal trial. 457 U.S. at 598. In
so doing, the Court stated that denial of access to a criminal trial
would violate the First Amendment unless the denial was "necessitated
by a compelling governmental interest, and [was] narrowly tailored to
serve that interest." Id. at 606-07.

In Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981),3/
The Fifth Circuit applied Nixon and determined that there was a common
law right of access to trial exhibits. Before analyzing the common law
right, the court concluded that a constitutional right of access to
trial exhibits did not exist. Id. at 426. In its discussion, the court
stated that nothing in Richmond Newspaper, which narrowly dealt with
the issue of the right to attend a trial, affected the court's
conclusions. Id, at 428. See also U.S. v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1209
(11th Cir. 1977) (no First Amendment right of access to court
documents that were not part of public record, access decision within
judge's discretion), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).

These holdings are all binding authority on the Eleventh Circuit and
this court. As a result, in determining the degree of access to court
documents, the Eleventh Circuit has applied the common law test
articulated in Nixon and Belo Broadcasting. In Newman v. Graddick, 696
F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983), for example, the Eleventh Circuit dealt
with the question of whether the media could have access to future
court hearings and lists of prisoners submitted to the court as part
of a continuing decree enforcement process. In analyzing the media's
requests, the court applied the Supreme Court's Globe Newspaper First
Amendment test to the issue of access to court hearings. Id. at 802.
However, when determining if the press could inspect and copy the
prisoner lists, which were court documents, the court applied the
common law right of access standard. Id. at 802-03. Similarly, in U.S.
v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 1985), the Eleventh
Circuit applied the Nixon common law standard to determine whether a
right existed to copy wiretap information that had been introduced as
evidence at trial. In accordance with these decisions, in U.S. v.
Kooistra, 796 F.2d 1390, 1391 n.1 (11th Cir. 1986), the court noted in
dicta that the lower common law standard would apply to issues of
access to documents filed with the court.4/


1. First Amendment Right

As stated supra, there are no Eleventh Circuit cases that establish
any First Amendment right of access to sealed search warrant
affidavits. The circuits that have dealt with the issue are split as
to whether such a right exists. Compare Times Mirror Co. v. Copley
Press, Inc., 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989) (no right of access) with
In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area, 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir.
1988) (finding a First Amendment right of access). The most recent
decision addressing this issue, which the Fourth Circuit issued in
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989), agreed
with the rationale of the Ninth Circuit and held that the press did
not have a First Amendment right of access to search warrant
affidavits.5/

There is a two-part test for determining whether a First Amendment
right of access exists. First, the court must determine "whether the
place and process have historically been open to the press and general
public." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for
Riverside County, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). Second, the court must inquire
"whether public access plays a significant role in the functioning of
the particular process in question." Id. Both the Ninth Circuit and
the Fourth Circuit concluded that a First Amendment claim for access
to sealed search warrant affidavits failed the first prong of this
test. These courts' rationale was that the search warrant application
process was traditionally closed to the public. Goetz, 886 F.2d at 64;
Times Mirror Co., 873 F.2d at 1214. The process was historically
conducted ex parse in order to prevent the subject of the search from
learning about the application for the warrant and destroying
evidence. Goetz, 886 F.2d at 64 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154, 169 (1978)). In addition, the Ninth Circuit also determined that
a request for sealed warrant materials also failed the second prong of
the test. The Ninth Circuit concluded that public access to the search
warrant materials, just as public access to grand jury proceedings,
would hinder rather than assist in the functioning of the process.
Times Mirror Co., 873 F.2d at 1215.

This court is persuaded by the reasoning of both of these circuits and
accordingly concludes that there is no First Amendment right of access
to search warrant affidavits.


2. Common Law Right

In the absence of a constitutional right of access, the court does
find that the common law right to inspect. and copy judicial records
and documents applies to the present case. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597;
Newman, 696 F.2d at 803. The common law right of access, however, is
not absolute. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597. "As with any other form of
access, it may interfere with the administration of justice and hence
may have to be curtailed." Newman, 696 F.2d at 803. As a result, a
district court must balance this presumptive right of access against
important competing interests. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d at 1294. Among the
factors to be considered by the court when balancing the interests are
whether the records are sought for improper purposes, "whether access
is likely to promote public understanding of historically significant
events, and whether the press has already been permitted substantial
access to the contents of the records." Newman, 696 F.2d at 803
(citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598-603 & n.11). The proper balancing of
these factors is in the sound discretion of the trial court. Nixon,
435 U.S. at 599; Belo Broadcasting, 654 F.2d at 430; Newman, 696 F.2d
at 803; Rosenthal, 763 F.2d at 1295.

The Government has advanced a number of reasons for keeping the search
warrant affidavits sealed:


(1) Release of the information would jeopardize the ongoing
investigation into the bombing. See U.S. v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 714
(11th Cir.) (Government has compelling interest in protection of a
continuing investigation), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 907 (1993);

(2) A court order directing the release of the affidavit information
to the media in this case could lead to a dangerous precedent that
would jeopardize future investigations;

(3) Release of the names of witnesses in the affidavits will lead to
intense media scrutiny that will harass present witnesses and deter
future witnesses from coming forward.


Although it is true that no case has been found where search warrant
materials did not remain sealed during the pendency of a criminal
investigation, the circumstances of this case are unique. First,
Petitioners are only seeking the limited information that has been
released to Jewell. They are not seeking details regarding the
explosive device or investigatory techniques. Second, the court
believes that the criminal investigation into Jewell's participation
in the bombing has ended. Although the Government seized various items
belonging to Jewell pursuant to the search warrants, the court has
since learned that all of the seized property, including firearms,
have been returned. From the return of this property and the official
statements of the Justice Department that it is pursuing other leads,
the court infers that no charges are currently pending against Jewell
and that he is no longer considered a suspect. As a result, the court
concludes that the Jewell chapter of the Centennial Olympic Park
bombing investigation has been closed. Most of its details have now
become merely a historical footnote to the ongoing investigation.
Third, much of the information in the affidavits which Petitioners
seek has already been made widely available to the public. Jewell and
his counsel have been provided redacted affidavits. In addition, the
media has already reported various details of the Government's
investigation and the sealed affidavits. These stories have apparently
been based on Government leaks. See, e.g., Thomas Heath & William
Booth, Bombing Suspect Allegedly Said He Wanted Big Role at Games,
Washington Post, August 2, 1996, at A14 ("The alleged declaration,
quoted in a sealed affidavit that accompanied the search warrant
..."). Finally, Jewell himself does not oppose the release of the
information in the redacted affidavits. Therefore, the court concludes
that the Government's interest in protecting an ongoing investigation
would not be compromised by the release of the historical information
pertaining only to a known former suspect.6/

In addition, the court does not find compelling the Government's fear
that this decision could lead to a dangerous precedent that would
jeopardize future investigations. As the court stated above, the
circumstances of this case are unique. Furthermore, the court may only
act on the facts before it and cannot attempt to predict how other
courts will react when facing different circumstances in the future.

Finally, the court does not believe that the Government's fear of a
possible "chilling" effect on future witnesses is a sufficiently
compelling reason to keep these affidavits sealed. As the Magistrate
Judge succinctly noted:


Witnesses who come forward in any high profile investigation no doubt
realize that, at some point, their identity and testimony may be made
public at a hearing or trial and that they may receive some unwanted
attention from the news media at that time. Therefore, it is unlikely
that a disclosure of some witness information would have any deterrent
effect on potential witnesses in addition to that which already
exists.


September 13, 1996 Order at 10.

Balanced against these governmental interests, Petitioners have
advanced several public interests in favor of the release of the
information in the affidavits, including: the public's right to
understand the legal process, the preservation of the integrity of the
fact-finding process, and the furtherance of the appearance of
fairness. See Newman, 696 F.2d at 801; Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S.
at 606. The court agrees that these are important interests that
support the release of most of the information contained in the
affidavits. See Matter of Application & Affidavit for a Search
Warrant, 923 F.2d 324, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1991). Further, important
questions have been raised about the response of the constabulary to
the information it possessed before the bomb exploded, and the public
interest is served by knowing all that can be revealed about this
subject. Finally, there is the question of Mr. Jewell's reputation and
his ability to obtain employment in his chosen field, and the public
judgment of him and hits actions is best served by full knowledge of
the information that led to his being a suspect.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS IN PART Petitioners' motion and DIRECTS
that redacted affidavits, in accordance with the court's discussion
infra, be released for public inspection.


B. Motion for Reconsideration

Jewell requests that this court reconsider the court order that
Magistrate Judge Brill issued on September 13, 1996. Jewell based his
original motion seeking release of sealed information on the premise
that he had a right to know whether there was probable cause in order
to determine whether to file a Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) motion for
return of property or a Bivens civil action for damages. Pursuant to
the motion, the Magistrate Judge released redacted affidavits. Since
that time, however, the Government has returned all of the seized
property. As a result, a question has arisen whether Jewell still has
standing to seek reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge's Order.

During the October 10, 1996 hearing, Jewell's counsel cited to the
court the case of Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914), for the
proposition that he could use a motion to return his property as a
vehicle to challenge also the deprivation of his constitutional
rights. The court notes that Weeks was decided before Rule 41(e) was
enacted and before the Supreme Court decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The
court also notes that a better view might be that there would be a
"case or controversy" left in this case addressable under Rule 41 only
if Jewell were charged and the exclusionary rule came into play.

As the court cannot find support for the filing of a Rule 41(e) motion
after all seized property has been returned, the court concludes that
Jewell's motion for reconsideration has become moot.


C. Sealed Material to be Released

In relation to the consideration of Petitioners' intervention,
however, the court believes that Magistrate Judge Brill was overly
cautious in redacting the affidavits. In particular, the court
concludes that information contained in the affidavits was redacted
even though it did not relate to the protection of the governmental
interests articulated in the Magistrate Judge's Order. Specifically,
the court notes that the truly compelling interest in this case is the
identification and prosecution of the actual perpetrator of the
Centennial Olympic Park bombing. As a result, any information in the
affidavits that, if released, would make that task more difficult
should clearly remain sealed from the public view. This information
falls primarily into two categories: (1) information that would
disclose the government's investigative methods, and (2) details
concerning the explosive device.

In order to protect only these articulated interests, and not
historical facts relating merely to Jewell, the court exercises its
supervisory control over documents in its possession and directs that
the affidavits be redacted as follows:

Certain information in paragraphs 28 and 31 of the apartment
affidavit, for example, relates to investigative techniques which, if
released, might result in the destruction of evidence. Accordingly,
the court directs that these portions of the affidavits remain under
seal.

Other portions of the affidavits, such as paragraphs 6 and 13 of the
apartment affidavit, contain details about the composition of the
bomb. These factual details, if known, could also provide
investigative techniques information and lead to the destruction of
evidence. As a result, the court directs that these portions also
remain under seal.

Furthermore, certain core details of the bomb need to be kept under
seal so the Government can evaluate the credibility of any subsequent
confessions or witness testimony. Information of this type, for
example, is contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the apartment
affidavit. Accordingly, the court directs that this type of
information also remain under seal.

Petitioners have requested that they be given access to the lists of
items seized from Richard Jewell pursuant to the four search warrants.
The government contends, and this court agrees, that these lists
should remain sealed. As stated supra, the court believes that the
compelling interest in the present case is the identification and
prosecution of the perpetrator. The lists of items seized, if made
public, would provide details that would reveal the investigative
techniques of the Government. As a result, if released, the lists
could lead to the destruction of evidence and the frustration of the
Government's ongoing investigation. Accordingly, the court directs
that these lists remain under seal.


D. Witness Names

Finally, the Government has requested that the court seal the names of
the witnesses contained in the affidavits. In the exercise of its
discretion, the court finds that the names of witnesses in the
affidavits that to this day have not been released into the public
domain should remain sealed.

When the Government files its applications for search warrants, it has
an absolute right to keep the names of its witnesses confidential at
that time. As a result, when filing its requests for the present four
search warrants, the government could have listed the witnesses as
"confidential informants." If the government had used its
prosecutorial prerogative and not included the names, then even if no
charges were ever filed against Jewell, the real names of the
confidential informants would have remained hidden. Cf. Matter of
Search of 1638 E. 2nd St., Tulsa, Okl., 993 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir.
1993) (properly invoked "informer's privilege" trumps common law right
of access), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 870 (1993), Hoffman v. Reali, 973
F.2d 980, 987 (1st Cir. 1992) (under "informant's privilege,"
government need not disclose identity of person who furnished
information about possible violation of law); Roviaro v. U.S., 353
U.S. 53 (1957).

However, the Government in the present case did not choose to exercise
its prerogative when filing the affidavits. At the October 8, 1996
hearing on this motion, the Government represented to the court that
it is the usual practice in this district for it to reveal all the
real names of witnesses to the magistrate judge who determines whether
probable cause exists. The Government offered the court two reasons
for this full disclosure. First, the Government has an interest in
supplying all available information to the magistrate judge. Second,
there is a custom in this district that sealed search warrant
materials will remain under seal until the conclusion of an
investigation. Consequently, the Government acted, when it disclosed
all the names in the affidavits, in reliance on an established
practice.

Furthermore, the court notes that unlike a case of local interest
covered by a relatively few members of the local media, the world
media has an interest in this case and it further notices that the
unrestrained behavior of the world media at the outset of the
investigation was truly frightening. Recollections of the images of
the sprawling press camp that first established itself outside of
Jewell's apartment in late July might in this case deter witnesses
from coming forward, and, if it could have been anticipated, might
very well have counseled a more circumspect relationship between the
law enforcement establishment and the press.

The court believes that the Government should not be punished now due
to its reliance on a customary practice in view of the reasonableness
of its concerns in this case. The court therefore concludes that
treating these witness names as if they were listed in the affidavits
as "confidential informants" would be the appropriate course of
action.

In accordance with this conclusion, the court conducted an electronic
database search in order to determine which witness names were already
in the public domain. After a thorough search, the court found only
the name of Tom Davis had been reported in the media. As to all other
names contained in the affidavits that are not in the public domain,
the court directs that the names and any identifying information in
the affidavits be redacted. Furthermore, as many of these names have
already been released to Jewell and his attorneys, the court orders
them to continue to abide by their earlier consent decree in regard to
these sealed names.


III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Jewell's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. The
Petitioners' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Attached to
this Order, under seal, are copies of the affidavits with specified
portions highlighted. The Government is DIRECTED to prepare redacted
affidavits in accordance with the ones attached under seal and to
release them for public inspection. The Court further DIRECTS that the
imposition of this Order be stayed for five (5) business days or
unless the Government files a Notice of Appeal, in which event the
affidavits shall remained sealed until the circuit court has acted.

SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of October, 1996.

/s/ J. OWEN FORRESTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


ENDNOTES

1/ This court notes that Petitioners are not seeking access to any
information that would reveal investigative or bomb-construction
information.

2/ Jewell indicated in a response to Petitioners, emergency motion
that he does not oppose the public release of the redacted search
warrant affidavits.

3/ In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
bane), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent the decisions of the
Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.

4/ Petitioners contend that the court should apply the "compelling
interest" test to this case even if the court does not find that a
constitutional right of access exists.

In Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570-72 (11th Cir.
1985), for example, the Eleventh Circuit court applied a "compelling
interest" standard to determine whether the petitioner could have
access to the transcript, papers, and docket in relation to a closed
post-trial settlement. Contrary to prior authority, however, the
Eleventh Circuit failed to draw a distinction between a record of what
happened at the trial and court documents. Instead, the court applied
the same standard to the question of access to the transcript as well
as to the issue of access to the court papers.

In addition, although appearing to use the common law right of access
language, the Eleventh Circuit in Wilson cited to the First Amendment
standard articulated in Newman. Id at 1570-71. In contrast, the
Eleventh Circuit in Newman had applied the First Amendment test, taken
from Globe Newspaper, only to the right to attend hearings. Newman,
696 F.2d at 800-02. In applying this standard to court documents in
Wilson, therefore, the Eleventh Circuit neglected the common law test
that it had applied to the prisoner lists in Newman. See also Brown v.
Advantage Engineering, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing
Wilson and applying First Amendment test to the question of a common
law right to access settlement records).

Moody v. U.S., No-90-8177 (11th Cir. June 28, 1990) (per curiam), is
an unpublished opinion that is not binding precedent. See 11th Cir. R.
36-2. The court further notes that the opinion was addressing, in
part, the issue of access to judicial proceedings when it applied a
"compelling interest" standard. The opinion expressly did not address
the issue of access to search warrant affidavits. Moody, slip op. at 5
n.5.

Of course, Nixon and the earlier Fifth Circuit cases are binding
precedent on this court. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206
(11th Cir. 1981). As a result, the court will follow the common law
analysis articulated in them and applied in such cases as Newman and
Rosenthal.

5/ Those district courts in the Eleventh Circuit which have discussed
the issue have also found no First Amendment right of access to sealed
search warrant affidavits. See In re Macon Telegraph Pub. Co., 900 F.
Supp. 489, 491-92 (M.D. Ga. 1995); In re Search of Office Suites for
World and Islam Studies Enterprise, 925 F. Supp. 738, 741 (M.D. Fla.
1996).

6/ In the typical case where whole search warrant affidavits should
remain sealed during an ongoing investigation, there are details in
the affidavits that, if released, would clearly jeopardize the
successful completion of the Investigation. See Macon Telegraph
Publishing Co., 900 F. Supp. at 492 (investigation ongoing, but
suspects listed in affidavits not known to public); In re Search
Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn, 855 F.2d at 570-71 (mass
investigation of fraud and bribery, unknown suspects contained in
affidavits); Matter of Office Suites for World & Islam Studies, 925 F.
Supp. at 743 (sealed affidavits contained names of suspects being
investigated in addition to those known to public); In re Flower
Aviation of Kansas, 789 F. Supp 366, 368 (D. Kan. 1992) (names of
suspects in affidavits were not known to public, and some evidence had
been destroyed between execution of warrants).