Margaret Rudin's lawyer may have volunteered to fall on a sword to give the accused murderer a chance at a new trial, but Judge Joseph Bonaventure denied that bid, charging that the "sword must be one of tempered steel and not silicone rubber."

Monday afternoon's decision came after Rudin last week made a motion for a mistrial, claiming that her lawyer, Michael Amador, was inadequately prepared to defend her. Though Amador admitted some shortcomings to the judge in support of Rudin's efforts, Bonaventure used Amador's own words against him when deciding that, although her legal defense isn't perfect, it isn't substandard either.

"This court would be setting a dangerous precedent if after an attorney announced 'ready for trial,' he was allowed to throw in the towel because he felt his performance was deficient in some areas," Bonaventure said. "There is no room in a court system already clogged up to grant attorneys the ability to stop a trial due to his or her perception of possible future performance."

Bonaventure (Court TV)

Bonaventure did, however, approve allocation of more public money to the defense for further investigation and more experts. He also granted preparation time for the defense before it starts calling witnesses.

Testimony in the case continued Monday afternoon in front of the jury charged with deciding whether the former socialite murdered her millionaire husband. Real estate mogul Ron Rudin disappeared from his modest home on Dec. 18, 1994, but his shot, decapitated and burned body was discovered nearly a month later. Nearly three years later the murder weapon was found at the bottom of Lake Mead, and Margaret Rudin was indicted shortly after. But by that time, she had fled Nevada, escaping capture for more than two years.

Amador promised the jury he would show that Ron Rudin's greedy business partners, not his grieving widow, were responsible for Rudin's murder. But amid more than two weeks of testimony by witnesses called by prosecutors Chris Owens and Gary Guymon — including Margaret Rudin's own sister — the soft-spoken defendant asked Bonaventure for a mistrial.

In his decision, the judge seemed leery of the timing of Rudin's request, which came just after her sister, Dona Cantrell-Robinson, testified that Rudin spied on her unfaithful husband and talked of divorcing him. When Rudin expressed her concerns to Bonaventure that her lawyers were unprepared, she specifically mentioned that they were not ready to cross-examine her sister.

"Ms. Rudin decided to follow her instincts and ask for a mistrial, especially after being so frustrated and upset after her sister testified," Bonaventure said.

Dressed in a white suit, the 57-year-old defendant sat with a slight grin as she stared at Bonaventure, who read his decision from a prepared statement.

"Ms. Rudin has not been denied her rights under the Constitution, her attorney has used his best efforts, has focused on the areas he felt were important and discarded those that in his judgment were not.

Last week, Amador conceded that his opening statement fell short, that he failed to ask for another continuance and that he was unprepared to cross-examine prosecution witnesses — but he did say he believed that the defense has won every witness that has testified so far in the three-week trial.

In his decision, Bonaventure said that, since an opening statement is not considered evidence, it cannot serve as the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel motion for a mistrial.

"Mr. Amador states that he spent an enormous amount of time and preparation using his absolute best efforts and did everything humanly possible," said Bonaventure.

Bonaventure detailed the measures the court took to accommodate the defense, citing numerous continuances, money allocated for investigators and experts and even the appointment of prominent criminal defense lawyer Tom Pitaro to assist in the case.

Pitaro (Court TV)

Rudin even threw Bonaventure's own words back at him during a conference in the judge's chambers Thursday, saying that his outspoken frustration with Amador and the snail-pace of the trial confirmed her worries that her defense was falling short.

"She is also not happy that the court is sometimes justifiably frustrated with the pace of the trial," Bonaventure acknowledged, but not without reminding the defense that Rudin is no stranger to firing lawyers out of dissatisfaction.

"One might also note that Ms. Rudin has made it a habit of changing and removing her civil and criminal attorneys at will," she said.

In the end, however, Bonaventure said he based his decision on the standards set by the Supreme Court for declaring a mistrial, and said that this situation did not meet those standards.

Bonaventure said that in order to grant the motion, he would have had to find that there was a "manifest necessity" to declare a mistrial. Citing Illinois v. Somerville, Bonaventure said that the nation's highest court requires a "high degree" of necessity to pull the plug on the murder trial. Coupled with a precedent set by a Nevada Supreme Court case, Hylton v. Eighth Judicial District Court, Bonaventure said that such an issue must be reflected on the court record — something that he says is not the case in this trial.

Though the New York-born jurist has had harsh words for Amador throughout the trial, criticizing his tardiness, his lack of preparation and his rambling cross-examinations, he did say there was nothing to indicate that Amador has fallen beneath the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set by another Supreme Court case, Strickland v. Washington.

According to that 1984 decision, the lawyer in question must fall below an "objective standard of reasonableness" and must have made errors that would affect the verdict.

"In fact to the contrary, as Mr. Amador's representations attest, he has in fact been diligent in his duty to his client," he said, citing Amador's 20 years of trial experience — in addition to the help of Pitaro, whom Bonaventure glowingly termed "most competent."

Bonaventure further said that no Nevada case has ever found a lawyer ineffective before a verdict was rendered.