The President on Trial: Sifting Through the Evidence            Full Coverage Search Clinton in Crisis The Trial Trial Guide Evidence Guide Transcripts Video Discuss the Trial The Starr Report and Rebuttals Video Index Documents Starr Investigation Jones v. Clinton Whitewater Jones v. Clinton Whitewater Article I, Charges 1 & 2: What is Sex? William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning...the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate government employee...[and] prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him. These charges center on Clinton's grand jury testimony about what he said in the Jones case. One major issue arising from his grand jury appearance is the now-infamous prepared statement he invoked 19 times during his testimony in the White House Map Room. The statement in full: "When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition [in the Jones case.] But they did involve inappropriate intimate contact. These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in early 1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included inappropriate sexual banter." GOP members of the House Judiciary committee believe this statement is "half-true, incomplete and misleading." Moreover, they assert, the fact that the statement was prepared prior to Clinton's grand jury appearance reveals "an intent to mislead" the grand jury. Democrats counter that Clinton's use of the statement was simply a way for him to give a consistent explanation of what he understood "sexual relations" to mean. The statement is an abbreviated and non-substantive view of Clinton and Lewinsky's long and tangled relationship. However, it does omit the three 1995 sexual encounters between Lewinsky and the president documented in the Starr report. Factual quibbles notwithstanding, the foundation of Clinton's statement is the well-worn argument that his liaisons with Lewinsky did not constitute "sexual relations." (For those who care, here's the definition of sexual relations used during the Jones deposition: "a person engages in 'sexual relations' when the person knowingly engages in or causes...contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.") It will be up to the Senate to decide whether Clinton's frequent invocation of the statement before the grand jury was perjurious or misleading. More important perhaps, is that so far, there is no known witness who can testify about Clinton's intent in the preparation of — or in its citing before the grand jury — his opaque characterization of his relationship with Lewinsky. Also likely to face scrutiny is Clinton's claim that because his sexual contact with Lewinsky was one-way (her performing acts on him) and not intended for mutual gratification, it wouldn't have qualified as "sexual relations," at least under the Jones deposition definition. While House prosecutors view this as a use of "twisted interpretations that a reasonable person would not draw" and an evasion of his "obligation to tell the truth," Democrats claim that Clinton was fully aware of the potential implications of that definition and had told the literal truth. To back up their claim, they pointed to his admission, under the same definition, that he had sexual relations with Gennifer Flowers. Such candor, they say, is proof that Clinton's claims he never had sexual relations with Lewinsky were rational and forthright. But never mind the legal jumbo, is all of this perjury? The White House points to a 1973 Supreme Court ruling, Bronston v. United States, which defines perjury narrowly. In Bronston, Clinton's lawyers maintain, the court ruled that technically accurate testimony can't be perjurious, "no matter how much the witness may have intended by his answer to mislead." In fact, the high court determined that it's the responsibility of the questioner — in Clinton's case, prosecutors working for Starr — to ask questions that don't leave wiggle room. However, Bronston does not remain the sole standard for perjury, and as some commentators have recently pointed out, appellate courts have found holes in the 1973 decision. In the end, these precedents may mean little. The articles of impeachment are not a criminal indictment, and an impeachment trial is not a trial bound by legal precedent. Introduction Article I Charges 1 & 2: What is Sex? | Charge 3: Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil? | Charge 4: A Man of Influence? | In Sum...A Man of Honor? Article II Charges 1 & 2: Greasing the Wheels? | Charge 3: The Trail of the Gift Horse | Charge 4: Escape to New York | Charge 5: Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil? (Part II) | Charge 6: The Four Questions | Charge 7: An Influential Man (Pt. II) | In Sum...All or Nothing? Version for Printing